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Abstract 
During recent years, calculi for reasoning about concurrent systems have 
been developed; examples are CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems), CSP 
(Communicating Sequential Processes) and ACP (Algebra of Communicating 
Processes). Their theory has been studied intensively; rather less has been done 
in applying these calculi to problems of significant size. The reported work in 
this direction suggests that we should be prepared to develop new formal systems 
and notation for the problems we attack, and also that the sheer mechanics are 
difficult enough that we need new techniques to organise and structure proofs. 
In this thesis we study bisimulation proofs, applied to a small set of related 
problems. We define a class of new operators to capture the structure in these 
problems, and use them to produce significantly smaller and clearer proofs than 
were previously possible. In order to avoid complexities due to interleavings, we 
use a new calculus, MCCS, that can be seen as lying between CCS and ASCCS 
(a variant of CCS); like the latter, MCCS allows synchronisation but is not a 
synchronous calculus. 
We begin by. surnmarising the new layout for bisimulation proofs developed 
for a proof of a simple fault tolerant system carried out in CCS. This proof forms 
the Appendix to the thesis. 
Next, we define MCCS and study its properties, deriving most of them from 
the related calculi, SCCS, ASCCS and CCS. This study also clarifies the relations 
between these older calculi, finding them to be closer than had been previously 
expressed in [Milner83]. In the process, we contribute to the study of ASCCS, 
the least studied of the three. 
Our new operators are designed specifically to help analyse the structure of 
systems into normal and exception processing; the major theorem in each case is 
the Synchronised Displacement Theorem. We comment on other possible design 
choices. We use the new operators and MCCS to reformulate and prove a variant 
of the example in the Appendix. 
A natural question that arises when we deal with new operators is whether 
they are derivable from the old. We study this matter, contributing a new 
technique for proving operators non-derivable. We prove many of the operators 
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1.1 Modelling concurrent systems 
The study of concurrent systems has advanced greatly over the past few years, 
but is still in a very confused state compared to the study of sequential systems. 
This is to be expected, given the greater complexity of behaviour concurrent 
systems can show. The present situation is characterised most strikingly by 
a profusion of models and methods for reasoning about them. Thus the best 
thing to do when trying to solve a practical problem that seems to have to do 
with concurrency is to look around at the available theories, and use the one 
that seems best suited. Net  theory, ADA, and the various algebraic calculi now 
available are all so different from one another that the point needs no further 
emphasis. 
The concurrent programs we can formally reason about and prove are all 
much smaller than the sequential programs we can handle. This is one factor 
common to all theories of concurrency. As researchers, we therefore do not expect 
to make a contribution to "practice" in the sense of providing tools directly 
applicable to the building of large concurrent systems. We hope only to provide 
more insight than was previously available. 
In that spirit, there have been a large number of problems analysed over the 
years: various timing and synchronisation problems, consistency problems for 
distributed data bases, and so on. A common factor here is that while light is 
shed on the problem, even more is usually shed on the method of analysis. The 
problems can usually be described quite reasonably in English, even though it is 
obviously dangerous to reason with it. Whether they can be described at all in 
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any given theory is usually not obvious to start with, and what the problem will 
look like once it has been formulated is of course even less obvious. Goethe said: 
"Mathematicians are like Frenchmen: whenever you say something to them, 
they translate it into their own language, and at once it is entirely different." 
(Quoted by Don Knuth in his TEXbook). The same could certainly be said of 
what concurrency theoreticians do to practical problems. 
With these preliminaries, let us come to the theory and the problem this 
thesis deals with. 
1.1.1 Algebraic calculi of processes 
In recent years, several algebraic calculi of processes have been developed, such 
as CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems)[Milner8O], [Milner83], CSP (Com-
municating Sequential Processes) [Hoare85] and ACP (Algebra of Communicat-
ing Processes) [Bergstra and Klop86]. Even these show striking differences from 
one another, such as for example in the large number of different equivalences 
proposed, and in whether the semantics is given by axioms or operationally, etc. 
All have been studied intensively from theoretical viewpoints, but rather less has 
been done to apply them to problems of significant size. Since they are mathe-
matically appealing and now substantial theories, they seem obvious choices for 
attempts at application. 
The work that has begun in that direction, for example [Backhouse83], 
[He, Jifeng and Hoare86], [Larsen and Milner86], [Shields83], and systems such 
as CIItCAL [Milne83] and LOTOS [BSI85], have all yielded feedback about the 
theoretical systems used. The common discovery here is that we should be pre-
pared to develop new formalisms and notation to suit the problem at hand—it 
is unlikely that ready-made ones will serve. With each such new formalism or 
notation, experience with different problems will tell how flexible or general it is. 
As for the theoretical framework, the question is whether or not it allows such 
new formalisms to be easily developed, continuing to provide the foundation on 
which the work proceeds. 
In this thesis, we study one of these calculi, CCS, concentrating entirely on 
one particular proof method, bisimulation [Park8 1]. (Formal definitions follow 
later on). Bisimulation is an operational equivalence between processes, or agents 
as we shall call them. They do not have to be CCS agents, but can belong to any 
sort of labelled transition system, [Plotkin8l]. If two agents are in a bisimulation, 
each can match the moves of the other, and such matching moves take the agents 
into states that are again in bisimulation. The proof technique therefore consists 
merely of producing a relation and checking that it is a bisimulation. Sometimes, 
indeed, one need do no more than produce the relation and leave it to the reader 
to carry out the check. There are also mechanical methods for producing and 
checking bisimulations. 
Here we are concerned not with systems that are simple enough that it is 
enough to produce a relation by inspection, nor with bisimulations that are so 
large and unstructured that only mechanical aids make them tractable. We 
study in this thesis how to use bisimulation as an acceptable method of proof 
that can be communicated from one person to another, like any other math-
ematical proof. Thus we shall usually show even for small bisimulations, why 
they are indeed bisimulations, i.e., we shall carry out the check. The layout we 
develop for displaying the bisimulation and the check is an important part of the 
contribution this thesis makes. The other part of the story is that we shall not 
be content to display large bisimulations. Instead, we try to break them down 
into understandable bits. This shows up the structure in the agents being stud-
ied. The reader will recognise that this is no more than standard mathematical 
practice. 
We now describe the problem we model and analyse. As we have indicated, 
the end result is more a study of bisimulation proof techniques than a study of 
the problem itself, which in retrospect is a little like the stone on which the tools 
were honed. 
1.1.2 Restartable systems 
The area we borrow our simple problem from is Fault Tolerance. This is a vast 
area, [Anderson and Lee8l], and no unifying methodology or formalism is in 
sight. Many of the issues here in fact seem to defy formalisation. However, it 
is a subject of obvious importance, particularly for distributed systems. Timing 
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and synchronisation problems, as well as consistency or consensus problems, all 
have elements of fault tolerance built into them. Here we shall be concerned 
with a different problem, that of rest artable systems. 
We use the term to mean a deterministic system that is equipped with re-
liable storage, so that its state can be restored after failure. We shall assume 
throughout that the failure being modelled is caused by a transient hardware 
fault, so that it makes sense to restart the program. (Though anyone who has 
re-booted an operating system knows that it sometimes makes sense to re-run a 
program that is known to have bugs in it!) 
Various versions of such systems have long been studied, for example 
[Merlin and Randell77], and the idea is intuitively obvious. Operating systems 
have long provided routines that dump the current state upon trouble, in order 
to continue afterwards where they left off. Many text editors provide a log file 
(or "audit trail") mechanism for error recovery. All the user's commands are 
logged in a file, and if the current editing session has to be abandoned for any 
reason, the user can recover most of the lost work simply by running the editor 
through the commands in the log file. An important efficiency consideration is 
to allow checkpoints, where the user writes out the current state of the editing 
buffer, so that all of the log file upto that point can be thrown away. After future 
failures there will not be so much recovery to do. 
An important idea that we shall use in conjunction with the log-file mecha-
nism is that of failstop processes [Schlichting and Schneider8l]. These are merely 
processes that fail in a very benign way, simply stopping altogether rather than 
put out incorrect information. 
These ideas were used in connection with a message switching system and 
reported in [Prasad, Ramani and Abraham82]. The key idea was to quarantine a 
failed process; it was allowed to recover by feeding it back past messages secretly, 
and its own output during recovery was filtered out. Thus other processes in the 
system observed no more than a longer delay than usual before they got their 
responses. Failstop-ness was approximated because it turned out to be possible 
to identify failed processes very soon after failure. Thus minor patches to other 
processes sufficed to limit damage. Another important observation was that a 
large number of messages did not have to be logged because they did not alter 
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the state of the receiver. 
These are all the ideas we shall need of fault tolerance, error recovery, 
state restoration, failstop processes and the like. "Fault tolerant system" and 
"restartable system", in particular will be used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis, but they both mean no more than the very simple, restricted kind of 
systems we shall formally define. The terms are merely labels, and should not 
be taken to suggest wider applicability of our techniques. That is of course to 
be hoped for, but at present we can say no more than that. 
1.1.3 Bisimulation proofs for restartable systems 
The message switching application lends itself well to modelling in CCS. This 
was carried out in [Prasad84], important design decisions on the way being how 
to model failure, and how to detect the failure. These decisions have survived 
unchanged upto the present; we describe them in detail in the next section. With 
the modelling done, the problem was formulated thus: Is the restartable system 
(called "FTS") equivalent to a perfect system that never fails? And if so, what 
is the equivalence? 
The answer, also reported in [Prasad84], is that the two systems are in a 
weak bisimulation, a form of bisimulation that ignores internal moves, such as 
the secret feeding back of messages to the quarantined recovering process. This 
means that an observer can see no difference between the two, thus agreeing 
with our experience with the message switching system. - 
The proof, even after much effort to break it down, remained long and un-
satisfactory in that it failed to display much structure, though there is plenty to 
be intuitively seen in the system. It does not seem at the moment that one can 
do much better than that in classical CCS, and hence the original proof appears 
as an Appendix to this thesis. 
The main body of the thesis develops two new tools to attack this problem, 
and solve it satisfactorily. The first is a new calculus, MCCS, a variant of CCS 
that permits synchronisation. This allows us to model as synchronous actions, 
many events that we would be prepared to describe in English as "happening 
simultaneously" or corresponding to the notion of "atomic action" in other formal 
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systems. We thus avoid a great many intermediate states that arise out of the 
interleaving forced by CCS, and are of no intuitive significance. 
SCCS of course allows synchronisation, but is of no use to us since our prob-
lem is basically asynchronous. Of the established calculi, MCCS is actually clos-
est to ASCCS, an asynchronous subcalculus of SCCS. In order to establish the 
properties of MCCS, we study the relationship between MCCS and ASCCS, and 
between MCCS and CCS. We also study the equational laws and congruences of 
MCCS. 
The second tool is a set of combinators that allow us to separate the normal 
and exceptional behaviour of agents. We define these combinators and study 
their equational properties, the most important of which is that they factorise 
FTS into its natural divisions. MCCS is important here too, because our basic 
factorisation is expressed by a theorem we call the Synchronised Displacement 
Theorem (SDT), which needs synchronous actions for its formulation. Roughly, 
the equivalence set up by the SDT is valid only in contexts that synchronise 
failure and discovery. Thus we need a version of context dependent bisirnulation, 
a theory developed by [Larsen86], though only an extremely simple special case 
that we can set up briefly. 
With these tools, we solve the FTS problem satisfactorily, showing up all the 
structure one expects intuitively. A bonus is that most of the work turns out 
to be about data structures, thus isolating the concurrency component of the 
problem. 
Finally, a natural question when new combinators (operators) are proposed 
is whether they are definable from the existing ones. We are led to study this 
generally, and discover a method to prove operators non-definable. Several op-
erators of CCS are then proved non-definable from the others. 
We are now ready to look at these ideas in a more concrete setting. 
1.2 Motivation 
We begin with a look at a toy fault tolerant system to set the scene and to 
motivate the formal apparatus we will be introducing in the subsequent chapters. 
We assume a familiarity with CCS, [Milner80] or [Milner83]. "CCS" in this thesis 
usually means specifically the calculus introduced in [Milner80], but occasionally, 
it means any of the calculi SCCS, ASCCS, CCS (all from [Milner83]), or MCCS 
' (to be introduced later). Formal descriptions of all these calculi appear later. 
/ / 
1.2.1 A toy FTS in different calculi 
"FTS" abbreviates the phrase "fault tolerant system", but really refers to various 
kinds of simple restartable systems, all related. 
Consider a deterministic agent P, and let Q be the behaviour of an imple-
mentation of P running on unreliable hardware. We assume that the failures 
of the hardware are of a particularly benign kind, resulting merely in stoppage 
rather than incorrect computation. We also assume that Q emits a failure signal, 
f, or, what comes to the same thing, that Q fails in response to a f signal from 
a demon agent, F. Thus Q behaves just like P except that it may, at any stage, 
do an f and stop. Q is said to be a fail-stop version of the perfect agent, P. The 
idea of fail-stop agents was first described by [Schlichting and Schneider8l]. We 
are interested in fail-stop agents because they never send out erroneous infor-
mation, so errors do not propagate in a system consisting only of fault-free or 
fail-stop agents. 
Here is an example in CCS: 
P4= a.b.P 
Q4= f.O + a.b.Q 
F4= f_iF 
The left pointing double arrow means "is defined to be". The perfect agent P 
does a's and b's alternately. Our fail-stop Q mimics P, until it fails. It refuses 
to fail after an a, a subtlety we shall return to later. 
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Now consider error recovery by means of a fault-free backup agent. With 
such a simple P and Q, all the backup agent need do, when it receives news of 
Q's failure, is spawn a new Q to replace the failed one. The failure of a fail-stop 
agent can only be detected by recognising that it did not communicate when it 
should have done, i.e. by time-outs. These cannot be programmed in CCS, so we 
introduce an action g to stand for "time-out". There is nothing to be gained by 
introducing another agent, so we have the demon agent send out the detection 
signal as well. We can think of g as "information about failure". 
We call the whole system T; remember that we have changed F: 
P= a.b.P 
Q4= 1.0 + a.b.Q 
S= g. (SIQ) 
F.= f 1 .g 1 .F 
T= (QISIF)\\{f, g} 
Can we prove the toy system T equivalent to F? Yes, by the expansion theorem: 
T-- a.b.T + 1. (0SIg 1 .F) \\{f, g} 
a.b.T + 1.1. (OISIQIF) \\{f, g} 
a.b.T+ 1.1.T 
and a simple bisimulation now shows that T P. 
Those familiar only with [Milner8O] will have noticed that the notation has 
changed: we use roman letters rather than greek for actions, write 1 instead of 
i-, f instead of 7, 0 instead of NIL, and \\{f, g} instead of \{f, g}. The latter 
now means only f and g are restricted away, not also f and g 1 . Our notation 
is from [Milner83] and we will use it for all the calculi we look at. A more serious 
updating is that we now use bisimulations to define both strong congruence and 
observational equivalence. Formal definitions follow later on in this chapter. 
Now, S might time out before Q fails. While we cannot express time-outs in 
CCS, we can at least recognise that g might occur before f: 
F= f_i.g_i.F + g 1 .f 1 .F 
We can also interpret the second term here as warning of impending failure. 
If we try to carry out our previous proof now, we fail! This is because S will 
spawn the new Q right away, which might start work before the old one fails, 
producing two consecutive a's. We have run into our first protocol problem; F 
and S must synchronize after the failure: 
Q4= f.O + a.b.Q 
5.4= g.h. (S IQ) 
F.4= f 1 .g 1 .h 1 .F + 9_1 .f - I .h 1 .F 
T.4= (QISIF) \\{f, g, h} 
T'.4= (QIh.  (SjQ) If 1 .h 1 .F) \\{f, g, h} 
where T' is the state after time-out but before failure. 
T a.b.T+ 1.(OISIg 1 h 1 .F)\\{f,g,h} + 1.T' 
a.b.T + 1.1. (0ISIQIF) \\{f, g, h} + 1.T' 
a.b.T + 1.1.T + 1.T' 
and 
T' a.b.T' + 1.1.T 
The rest follows by bisimulation; we get P T T'. 
We shall not pursue this example further. But let us see what happened. 
The protocol problem did not show up earlier because when f happens first, g 
follows immediately; if g is allowed to happen first, we have to ensure it has 
no effect until f occurs; S has to be held up. This example is too small to 
be troublesome, but programming errors become increasingly likely with larger 
ones. For example, other orderings of the actions of F can result in deadlocks. 
The reader can see the beginnings of a combinatorial blow up in the number of 
states because of the different interleavings of actions. 
Synchronisation is one way to avoid this unplanned protocol. Consider the 




F.4= f 1 g 1 : F + 1: F 
T.<-- (Q x  x F)\\{f,g} 
The proof is 
T- a:b:T+ 1:(1 x (S x Q) x F)\\{f,g} 
a:b:T+1:T 
A brief explanation for those unfamiliar with SCCS: In Ax B both agents have to 
act together, and the resulting action is the product of their individual actions. 
So A x 0 0. We have a x 1 = a for all actions a, and 1 is the agent that 
does only l's. So A x 1 "-i A. Note the 1 after failure; if we wrote 0 instead, the 
system would deadlock after the first failure. 
f and g are synchronised, so there is no protocol needed. We could now 
program the time-out, but haven't done so; this is not the issue at hand, and 
we shall not be using SCCS anyway. There are improvements (no unplanned 
protocol, no new states due to interleaving of actions), but we have had to 
acknowledge the synchrony by putting in 1: F and 1: S to mark time, and this 
could vastly increase the number of terms in our agents when we try to model 
a primarily asynchronous system. All the systems we look at in this thesis are 
primarily asynchronous. 
This "marking time" problem is what ASCCS sets out to tackle, so let's write 
out our toy system in it: 
P= a.b.P 
Q=f.0+a.b.Q 
S= S (g. (S x Q)) 
F4= 5(f 1 g 1 .F) 
x S x F)\\{f,g} 
Explanation: Sit does an indefinite number of l's (including possibly none) before 
behaving like A. The agent a.A does an a right away and then behaves like SA. 
If we hadn't put 5's on F and 5, the system would have been forced to start 
with a failure. We could also have put delays on the P and Q. The proof is like 
that for SCCS. 
ASCCS is obviously very different from the other calculi. We conclude that 
it is not quite what we want. More reasons are given later, but here we note only 
that there is a lot of subtlety about delays that we have to get used to before we 
can work easily with ASCCS. 
Wouldn't it be lovely if we could write, in a calculus that looked very like 
CCS except that it allowed product actions, the following definitions and proof? 
P4= a.b.P 
10 
Q4= f.0 + a.b.Q 
S.=g.(SQ) 
F4= f 1 g 1 .F 
T (QISIF) \\{f, g} 
T.- a.b.T + 1. (01 (SIQ) IF) \\{f g} 
a.b.T+l.T 
Indeed it would, and the next chapter is devoted to establishing such a cal-
culus, MCCS. AIB in MCCS means that A or B can act alone as in CCS, or 
that they can act together as in SCCS. 
Such an operator can be written as a derived operator in ASCCS, and 
[Milner83] in fact uses it in defining a subcalculus called the particulate cal-
culus, which is isomorphic to CCS. Even with this derived operator, we would 
still rather not use ASCCS because of the delays, and also the problem that , 
the largest congruence contained in , is significantly different from CCS. In 
contrast, MCCS is like CCS and SCCS in that there are no implicit delays, and 
the congruence looks just like that for CCS as well. The new calculus can be 
seen as a generalisation of the particulate calculus or as lying between the par-
ticulate calculus and ASCCS. A disadvantage that it shares with ASCCS is that 
the expansion theorem has even more terms than in CCS, because all products 
are allowed, not just inverses producing l's. In practice, this has to be controlled 
by restriction, as above. 
Originally the name MCCS was supposed to stand for "mixed CCS", but 
there is no general agreement about terms like "mixed calculus" and "interleaved 
calculus" and so on, so the M in MCCS is now never expanded. It is fair to say 
right away that from the user's point of view the most dramatic differences 
between the new calculus and the old ones are those we have' already sketched 
above; MCCS is a minor variant. However, there are a lot of details to be filled in, 
and the relations between the various calculi are fascinatingly subtle. It is better 
to deal with these subtleties once and for all in a theoretical framework, rather 
than have them turn up unexpectedly in practice. This we do in Chapter 2. 
We should also say that the specific example we have given here could also 
be dealt with by some sort of join operator, where if P and Q can each do a, so 
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can PjoinQ. 
Definition 1.2.1 The operational semantics of the join operator. 
E - - E' F - - F' 
EjoinF --'i E'joinF' 
Indeed this is one of the operators in CSP, and is also taken to be part of 
CCS by [Larsen86]. The 7-conjunction operator in [Milner83], which behaves 
like synchronous product E x F except that it requires each 7-action of E to 
synchronise with a 7-action of F, can also be considered for use. 
Definition 1.2.2 The operational semantics of the 7-conjunction operator. 
E --+ E' F — b +  F'
ab 
E&F 	
In both rules, a and b are actions 
—- E'& F' 
E -- E' 
a"
F -- 	 7 F' with no 7  or _i  particles 
E&,F 
A generalisation, r-conjunction, requires synchronisation on any 7 E r. By 
setting r = Act, we can get it to behave exactly like join. We shall have 
occasion to refer to these last two in a different connection later on, but for now 
we point out that in our reworking of FTS in MCCS, we do use the more general 
possibilities of synchronous composition, and find that it helps to cut down the 
size of the problem. Thus we choose not to use the join operator. 
1.2.2 Checkpoint operators 
Consider the following definitions in MCCS. 
P= a.b.P 
Q= f.O + a. (b.Q + f.0) 
S= g. (SIQ) 
F= f'g 1 .F 
T= (QISF)\\{f,g} 
This is exactly the same system as we had earlier, except that we have changed 
the definition of Q. (Previously, we had f.O + a.b.Q.) The new Q, compared to 
the old, accepts failures in any state rather than just alternate states. 
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But now we no longer have T P, because S will always start up Q in its 
first state regardless of where it failed. S has to keep track of Q, perhaps by 
direct communication, so that it will start it up in the proper state. 
If we try to express all this using our, existing notation, we will find the 
number of states alarming, considering how small the example is. A glance at 
[Prasad84] (included as an Appendix to this thesis) where a simple but general 
FTS is worked out in ordinary CCS, will give an idea of how bad matters can 
get. With the benefit of hindsight, we observe that our problem is that we have 
no way of elucidating the structure of the system in the expressions we write 
down. How helpful such elucidation can be is shown by the chaining operator in 
[Milner8O]. 
The structure we wish to capture is that of normal execution versus exception 
handling. Suppose we invent an operator t to do this. For example, 
Q = QN t QE where QN = a.b.QN and QE = f.0 i.e., Q QN t f.0 
QN describes the behaviour of Q in the absence of faults; it behaves like the 
perfect system. The idea is that Q should now be able to fail after a as well as 
after b, an action by QE  constituting failure. t has to be defined to express this 
structure: QN  acts until failure, when QE  takes over the behaviour of the entire 
expression. 
We had 
Q4= f.0 + a.b.Q 
S= g. (SIQ) 
F4= f'g 1 .F 
T= (QSF)\\{f,g} 
Ti-.' a.b.T + 1. (01 (SIQ) IF)  \\{f g} 
a.b.T + 1.T 
With the redefined Q, we expect 
TTN1.T 	 , where TN.=a.b.TN 
So T does a's and b's until it hiccups (internal failure and recovery seen externally 
as 1), and starts over. Because we are not keeping track of Q's state, we can get 
sequences like a, b, a, 1, a, ... from T. So an observer can see consecutive a's. 
We will worry about this later, but first how do we prove that T thus defined 
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is equivalent to (QISIF) \\{f, g} with the new definition of Q? Obviously, we 
would like to do this using algebraic laws for 4f-. 
The key here is to guess that the behaviour of QIS can now be expressed as 
QN t 1g. (QIS). We are looking for a theorem of the form 
If A AN f.A then (At (f_1)*) \\{f} AN LAN 
Indeed we will have such a theorem later. 
It is more difficult to see how to prove correct our guess about QjS. We could 
ask if I distributes over t; it does not. The key is to write S as 0 t g. (S IQ), 
and to look for a theorem of the form 
(AN t AE) I (BN t BE) (ANIBN) t (AEBE) 
to separate normal and exception behaviour throughout. In its full blown version, 
this Synchronised Displacement Theorem (SDT) is the major result of our work 
with checkpoint operators of which t is our first example. 
This is about as far as we can go before formal definitions become necessary 
to make any sense of our story. We will say only a little more so as to be able 
to give an overview of the thesis. 
To reprogram our system to give us a sequence of alternating a's and b's, one 
way is to relabel Q so that it sends its output to a new S that picks them up, 
thus allowing it to keep track of Q's state. S then relays the output on to the 
outside world. We will do this in a later chapter. For now we just point out that 
if the restart state is to depend on the state of the normal processing, we must 
allow the exception agent to notice what the normal agent is doing. If we define 
a new operator to do this, we don't have to program this explicitly: 
Q = QNtCQE 
ci 	I. c 	-I-_ 	i U.JN IC"' ,mE 
QE =  f.Q + a.Q'E 
Q' -4-- f.Q' + b.QE 
where the set C = { a, b}. This new operator has a third derivation rule in 
addition to the two of f. It says that whenever both normal agent and the 
exception agent have an action in the subscript set, the whole agent may do a 
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combined action, while both normal and exception parts evolve. Failure now can 
be made to yield a different restart state after such an action. 
We define two such operators later that look like tc above, and find the con-
ditions under which the corresponding generalised SDT holds. This programme 
turns out to motivate essentially all the work in the thesis. Before we give an 
overview, we look at the example that started it all. 
1.2.3 FTS without MCCS and checkpoint operators 
The FTS formulated in CCS in the Appendix is more general than the toy system 
above. Since it motivated the work in the main body of the thesis, we shall say 
a little more about it here. 
Error recovery for any deterministic fail-safe agent is possible using check-
points and audit trails of its transactions; the "deterministic" refers to the fault-
free behaviour, not to the occurrence of failures! As in our toy system, we assume 
that the necessary backup agents are fault-free. A generalisation is to allow P 
and Q to accept input. S must then be generalised to a stable storage agent 
that eavesdrops on all inputs to Q. When S starts up a new incarnation of Q, it 
passes it anew any input that the older incarnation consumed before failing. For 
a system generating more than a predictable sequence of a's and b's, we need 
another backup agent: a duplication suppressor, D, to filter out output from Q 
while it is recovering from failure. It is intuitively clear that (QIS), (QSjD) and 
(QISIDIF), with internal labels restricted away, should be strongly related to P 
in some sense, with the last being intuitively equivalent to F, though again the 
precise equivalence was not obvious to start with. 
FTS is observationally equivalent to the perfect system; with hindsight, we 
can say that this could have been guessed from our toy system, but the full 
FTS result came first. In any case, this is rather a strong result at first sight, 
because observational equivalence is a very strong equivalence. In fact, we found 
that observational equivalence is particularly suited to describing the relation 
between the two. For example, testing equivalences [de Nicola and Hennessy841 
are not suitable because they distinguish FTS from the perfect system—because 
of the possibility of repeated failure, the former is capable of infinite chatter 
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while the latter is not. Observational equivalence ignores this difference, but is 
otherwise much stronger than testing equivalences. Thus if we have P Q, it 
would be unnecessarily weak to describe the relation between P and Q in terms 
of testing equivalences, though we would want to assert that both hold if that 
were the case; it is not, in our example. We have a situation where we can use 
a strong relation which happens to be lax in just the one case we need. 
We have said that the proof in CCS [Prasad84] was difficult to do, and long 
and tedious to read. We can now see that among other things, this is because 
we did not have the notation to capture features of our agents, and prove them 
once and for all. As a result, we have comparatively large chunks of proof that 
do not reveal all of the underlying structure. We also have very large numbers 
of states because of interleaving, and the need for protocols. 
Since the main body of the thesis consists largely of one set of remedies to 
these two problems, and of some investigations that arise from the new formal 
machinery that we use, the old CCS proof constitutes an integral and very sub-
stantial part of the work reported. There are also parts of it that have not been 
recast in the new notation; these could be the starting point for further work. 
Substantially better proofs in CCS are not very likely, but cannot be ruled out. 
The old proof should not be regarded as entirely superseded even for the recast 
parts, for while the newer formulations and proofs represent a marked improve-
ment in clarity, the old proof is the best that we could do in CCS, and therefore 
is still of some interest in its own right. More importantly, it might suggest new 
formulations different from those we work out in this thesis. 
Despite all this, we have relegated the CCS specification and proof to the 
Appendix. The main reason is that it is a self contained piece of work. The 
reader is encouraged to look at the first few pages, and the last few, but the 
rest of the thesis can be read independently of it. We have merely made the old 
proof available to those readers who wish to draw their own conclusions from it, 
and to those who wish to follow more closely our comparisons with the new one. 
Minor notational differences are another reason for separating the old proof 
from the new. For example, the Appendix uses traditional CCS notation for 
actions and values, which is not suitable for the new calculus we develop. The 
CCS proof has to deal with large numbers of intermediate states for the agents. 
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The new proof does not, and can therefore use more concise names. While the 
two notations suit the respective proofs well enough, the differences could be 
distracting if the Appendix were to become Chapters 2 and 3. The alternative 
of adopting a common notation would cramp both proofs, forcing each to abide 
by conventions necessary for the other. Indeed, our experience has convinced 
us that we should be prepared to use different formal systems, and therefore 
different notations, for different problems. [Larsen and Milner86] report a similar 
experience with another problem solved in a CCS setting. There was thus little 
motivation to go through a long and difficult typesetting exercise to move the 
old proof into the main body of the thesis. 
The ideal solution would have been to abridge the old proof. That we have 
not been able to do this in CCS for even subproblems of any significance, and 
that we have found concise proofs in the new calculus, are among the major facts 
to emerge from this thesis. 
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
Even the FTS in the Appendix is extremely simple, and our constraints are very 
strong. Nonetheless, the motivation to formulate it actually arose from practice, 
as we saw; a few more details can be found in the Section 2.1.1 of the Appendix. 
We shall not concern ourselves further with such issues; "practice" in this thesis 
refers to using formal systems to draw conclusions about examples expressed in 
them. Nor shall we be concerned very much with trying to generalise to other 
kinds of fault tolerant systems. Instead, we shall focus on very simple-minded 
models of failure and recovery, and carry out formal proofs about them. 
We motivated MCCS and the checkpoint operators as if they were indepen-
dent, and indeed MCCS does not depend in any way on these new operators. But 
our major use for the operators is via the Synchronised Displacement theorem, 
which as its name suggests, is crucially dependent on synchronous actions. Also, 
the particulate nature of the (freely generated) action set we use is fundamental 
to the definition of the checkpoint operator. 
We have already emphasised that these operators are only one interesting 
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formulation of the problems at hand. Now we should go further and say that 
while we do not see any obvious alternatives to the SDT as the major mode 
of applying these operators to FTS-like systems, that theorem too is only one 
formulation. Thus one might almost say that the formal structures set up in this 
thesis are really the result of a study to find sufficient conditions for some form 
of SDT to hold. 
Chronologically, the FTS example in the Appendix came first, then we dis-
covered checkpoint operators in an attempt to improve the example, then we 
discovered we needed synchronous actions, then we settled for MCCS after many 
unsuccessful attempts at formulating a mixed calculus that dealt with both syn-
chronous and asynchronous actions and thus had a tamer expansion theorem, 
and finally we discovered that it was non-trivial to set up MCCS formally even 
though it is so closely related to ASCCS and the particulate calculus. Thus many 
versions of the FTS example and the Synchronised Displacement Theorem were 
in existence, some in very improbable notation, before we formulated MCCS. 
It is fortunate and pleasing that MCCS turns out to be of value indepen-
dently of its use for our FTS proofs. In contrast, the design choices for the 
checkpoint operators and the use of SDT as a tool for our proof are still very 
closely linked. We hope this brief chronology explains to the reader how so much 
formal apparatus came about from one large example. For FTS is still the only 
large example we have. 
In the next section of this chapter we give examples of bisimulation proofs. 
This also serves to establish the new layout and notation developed in [Prasad84], 
and to demonstrate some of their advantages. - 
- - 
Chapter 2 defines MCCS formally and establishes some of its main proper-
ties. It also examines the connections between it and the calculi in [Milner83], 
clarifying in the process the connection between ASCCS and CCS, as well as 
contributing to the study of ASCCS. 
Chapter 3 introduces the Displace and Audit operators, establishes their basic 
properties, and solves simple examples with their help. 
Chapter 4 introduces the Checkpoint operator, a generalisation of the Audit 
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operator. It also uses this to carry out the proof of our major example, the FTS. 
Because of all the new formalism we use, this is in some ways not the "same" 
example as in the Appendix: our new version banishes protocol problems by fiat 
as we saw. As a consolation, we discuss checkpointing, a feature that the old 
FTS did not have, and which seemed then intractable. 
A question that arises naturally out of the previous work is whether we can 
define these new operators in terms of existing operators in our various calculi. 
This is the topic of Chapter 5, which presents a new technique to prove the 
non-derivability of operators. We manage to answer several questions, but not 
all, about the derivability or otherwise not only of our new operators, but also 
of many older operators in CCS. Chapters 2 and 5 are both thus independent of 
I of 
any considerations about FTS and our new operators, and could be1interest to 
a wider CCS audience. 
Chapter 6 presents conclusions and directions for future work. 
1.4 Background 
The only real prerequisite is familiarity with CCS, [Milner83] or [Milner8O]. We 
have summarised the necessary definitions and theorems from [Milner83], here 
and in Chapter 2. Thus the thesis is formally self-contained. 
1.4.1 Bisimulation 
Consider a set of agents P and a family of action relations -- defined over them. 
We shall always take the actions a to be elements of an abelian group, Act. This 
is usually not needed for most theorems, but turns out to be very convenient in 
setting up the calculi; in any case we have no use for a more general action set. 
Definition 1.4.1 A binary relation R C P x P is a strong bisimulation if, 
whenever PRQ and a E Act, 
if P -- F' then, for some Q', Q -- Q' and P'RQ', 
if Q -- Q' then, for some P, P -- P and P'R.Q' 	 0 
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For any 1. c P x P we may define .F ('R.) to be the set of pairs (P, Q) satisfying 
clauses (i) and (ii). Clearly, R. is a strong bisimulation if R. ç .T(R). 
Proposition 1.4.2 F is monotonic over the lattice of binary relations under 
inclusion. 	 o 
Proposition 1.4.3 There exists a maximum bisimulation given by 
u{1jR. c F(R)}. is the maximum fixed point ofF. 	 0 
Proposition 1.4.4 	is an equivalence relation. 	 o 
With this equivalence goes an elegant proof technique; to show P 	Q, 
it is necessary and sufficient to find a bisimulation containing the pair (P, Q). 
Examples follow later in this chapter. 
The action 1 is called the "silent" or "invisible" action. Observational equiv-
alence between agents is concerned only with their visible behaviour. 
Definition 1.4.5 Let u = (ai , a2  . , a) E Act*. Then P==,P' if P 
(—_,)*_-_ 
ul\* 	a 	f1\* / 
—) P. 
Note the special case u = e, the empty sequence. We shall often write P=,P' 
for P=P', i.e. for P (24)*  P'; in particular we have P=P. Note that PPP' 
stands for P (L)* 	We usually have u E (Act — {1})* . 
Definition 1.4.6 A binary relation IZ C P x P is a weak (or observational) 
bisimulation if, whenever P1Q and u E (Act — {1})* , 
if P 	F' then, for some Q', Q 	Q' and P'RQ', 
if Q 	Q' then, for some P', P A4. P' and P'7Q' 
Propositions analogous to those for strong bisimulation follow, and we have 
Proposition 1.4.7 	is an equivalence relation. 	 o 
The following proposition allows us to work conveniently. 
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Proposition 1.4.8 A binary relation R. C P x P is a weak bisimulation 1ff, 
whenever PRQ and a E Act, 
if P -- P' then, either a = 1 and P'RQ or for some Q', Q -- Q' and P"RQ', 
if Q -- Q' then, either a = 1 and P"RQ or for some F', P -- F' and P'7Q' 
Al 
Proposition 1.4.9 P Q implies P Q. 	 o 
1.4.2 The action set 
The action set Act is an abelian group, as for SCCS and ASCCS. As for the 
particulate calculus in [Milner83], we shall further assume that Act is freely 
generated by a set E of names. Let us define, for any A ç Act, A = {a' Ia E A}; 
then = { u-11a E } are the conames, and we call A = E U E the particles, 
or particulate actions. In CCS, A are called the labels, and the only actions are 
A U {1}. Such actions are called simple. We shall use roman letters a, b, c,... to 
represent actions in general, A to represent a particle or particulate action, and 
jt to represent a simple action. 
Definition 1.4.10 Particles A, A' are independent if A 54 A' 0 A -1 . Then every 
action a is uniquely expressible (up to order of factors) as a product A' . . . 
(n, > 0) of powers of independent particles. We denote {A 1 ,.. . , A,j by Part(a). 
Particles A, A' are non-opposing if A' A -1 . Actions a, a' are non-opposing if 
Part(a), Part(a') are pairwise non-opposing.  
Clearly, any action is a unique product (up to order) of non-opposing parti-
cles, not necessarily distinct. 
Lemma 1.4.11 Let a = a1 a2 ... a be a product of non-opposing actions, 
and let a = bc. Then there are products b = b1 b2 . . . b and c = c1c2.. . c, of 
non-opposing actions such that ai = bce , 1 < i < fl. 
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1.4.3 Sorts and restriction 
We introduce more notation. If we are representing a set of particles by a single 
symbol, we try to use script letters. Also, whenever possible, we represent the 
sort of an agent P by P. To classify agents according to the actions they may 
perform, we choose the submonoids generated by subsets of A. 
Definition 1.4.12 Any £ C A generates a submonoid of Act, denoted Lx. 
Let Pc be the set of agents P such that for any derivative Q of F, if Q -- Q' 
then aELx. IfPEP c , we say P has sort l,or write P:L. Thus if P: L, then 
Part(a) C £ for any action a of any derivative of P. 0 
Thus a E £ makes sense if a is a particle, but not otherwise. But the following 
abuse of notation leads to no confusion. 
Definition 1.4.13 a E £ means that all the particles of a are in L. If P is an 
agent, a P implies that P has no a action. 	 0 
Note that 1 E £, for any L. 
The next definition is much more important. We often need conditions of 
the form Part(a) fl C 0 (read "a has particles in C") and Part(a) fl C = 0 ("a 
has no particles in C"). We define convenient abbreviations. 
Definition 1.4.14 Let a be an action, and C a set of particles. Then a E C is 
defined to be Part(a) fl C 0 0, and a E C to be Part(a) fl C = 0. We also define 
a,bCto mean aC and bC. 	 0 




 P a1A 
is our definition of the restriction operator. It 
means exactly the same as the usual definition in [Milner83]. 
Note that again we are using only the particulate form of restriction 
rather than the more general one, and that \N means that only actions in 
(ACT - N) X  may be performed, where this last is the pair of monoids gener-
ated by (ACT - Al'), not the groups as well. The traditional CCS restriction, 
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which we show below, hides both names and conames. First we need the follow-
ing definition. 
Definition 1.4.15 If C is a set of particles, we denote by C the set of the 
complements of the particles in it: U = {p' 1p e C}. 	 0 
Note that C and U are not necessarily disjoint. We shall not need the com-
plements of sets of particles very often because of the following: 
Proposition 1.4.16 a< C 	a 1 < ZT and a It C 	a 1 E ZT 
Proof: 	= For the first, let p EPart(a) such that p e C. Then 
P- 1  EPart(a') and p E ZT. For the second, if C is empty, so is U. If not, 
take any p 1 e U. Then p E C, so p Part(a) and therefore p 	Part(a'). 
similar. 	 o 
Thus the CCS-style restriction, written \\V in MCCS, is defined as follows: 
P\\Al P\AI U V. The derived rule for \\V then reads: 
p a ) P1 a, a 	Al 
P\\Al-- P'\\Al  
In CCS, the side condition reads "a It Al, V", but because of the proposition 
above, our definition is equivalent. One of the ways in which the CCS lineage of 
our work shows is that we use \\Al almost exclusively, \Al almost never. 
1.4.4 Morphism and relabelling 
Morphisms from one MCCS action set to another are just group morphisms, 
as in SCCS or ASCCS. In CCS, morphisms preserve simple action; they satisfy 
the condition 0 (A) 9 A U {1}. In [Milner8O], they are bijections, from one set 
of names to another, that preserve complements and 1. All group morphisms 
preserve 1 and inverses, so in our terms, relabelling is a bijective morphism, i.e., 
an isomorphism. Strong as this constraint of bijectivity is, it is not unrealistic, 
and the morphisms we use in practice are all relabellings. 
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1.5 New layout and notation for bisimulation 
proofs 
We shall often use explicit inference trees inside bisimulations. This is useful if 
we are demonstrating a bisimulation between expressions. The syntax of CCS 
defines a set of expressions, and those with no free variables are called agents. 
For example, P + Q cannot be said to have any moves at all except under 
the premise that P or Q has a move. In such a case, we want to match this 
move by one on the other side, made under the same premises. The inference 
trees make it easy to check that we have not inadvertently made additional 
assumptions, a definite danger once we get to new and complicated operators 
with side conditions. Inference trees also help to check that we have exhausted 
all the possibilities for an agent. An example follows. 
Proposition 1.5.1 IfPflflV = nQn'V = 0 then (PIQ)\i'f 
(P\A() I (Q\AI) 
Proof: By the following bisimulation 
R(P,Q) 	((P1 Q)\iV, (P\.AI) I (Q\.V)) 
Case P +-: 
P--,P' 	 P-4P' aA( 
PIQP'IQ aAr 	 P\Ar--P'\A1 
(P I Q)\AI--*(P'  I 	 (P\N') I (Q\A1) --(P'\A1) J (Q\Ai') 
leading to R. (P', Q) 




(P1 Q)\V--*(P I Q')\iV 
Q--+Q' aA( 
Q\A1--Q'\AI 
(P\iV') I (Q\V)—_(P\..Af)  I (Q'\.AI) 
leading to R (P, Q') 
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Case P9 -+ a It N' A b It N' 	ab It N' follows from the constraint on the sorts 
of  and Q: 
p-p' Q-LQ' 
PIQ - - P'IQ' 	abj%! 
(Fl Q)\N'--(P'I  Q')\Af 
P--P' aA( Q--)Q' bN' 
P\N'--P'\N' 	Q\AI'-LQ!\N' 
(P\N)I(Q\N')±(PF\N')I(QI\N') 
leading to R. (P', Q') 
Each class of pairs in the bisimulation is shown as a parameterised form such 
as R (2, Q) above. The bisimulation here consists of pairs all of which have 
the same form. There could be more forms, in general. A class of pairs that 
occurs quite often is I, which is the class of all pairs (P, F). These pairs are not 
explicitly listed in the bisimulation. 
The proof clearly shows up the fact the side conditions on the two sides are 
not the same for the last case, and that for the proof to be valid, we need to check 
that the two imply each other, which they do in this case under the assumptions 
of the proposition. We can also check, by working from the outermost operator 
inwards, that all the derivations on both sides have been accounted for. 
For strong bisimulations, each agent has to match every action of the other, 
so each pair of trees is actually two proofs, that the lhs can match the rhs, and 
vice-versa. With weak bisimulations, we may need to show that lhs -' lhs' and 
that the rhs matches this by rhs = rhs'. Thus we can have pairs of trees (or 
just the bottom lines showing the resulting inference) that are unidirectional. 
Whenever necessary, we indicate this in the heading line preceding the pair, as 
in the example above. For strong bisimulations, we shall usually not have any 
arrows in the heading. The heading line also serves to label the derivations being 
considered, and sometimes to indicate briefly why the side-conditions imply each 
other. Sometimes such proofs are tricky enough to merit a separate table to 
themselves, which is to be read in conjunction with the bisimulation. In such 
cases, the side-condition table will usually also deal with inferences that are ruled 
out by the conditions of the proposition. 
One of the interesting effects of the work in this thesis is that the general 
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theorems we have are nearly all strong bisimulations, as are most of the equiva-
lences we prove in the FTS example! The proof in the Appendix also uses strong 
bisimulations for all the data transformations, but does not manage to reduce 
the weak bisimulations down to essentially one. 
1.6 A Prolog system for checking bisimulation 
proofs 
As part of early efforts to carry out the FTS example, the author developed a 
Prolog system to check bisimulations. [Larsen86] describes ". ith characteristic 
thoroughness a different system that carries out bisimulation proofs. Since many 
of the ideas are the same, we will point out here only the difference that we think 
is the most important. Readers unfamiliar with Prolog can skip this section with 
no loss of continuity. 
It is tempting to equate Prolog's notion of inference with inference in the 




>( 	moves (P + Q, A, F'): - -moves (F, A, F) 
in Prolog. This will not allow us to prove the associativity of +, say. If we write 
on the other hand, 
derive (moves (F, A, P1), moves (P + Q, A, P1)) 
we can say, in effect, 
bisirn(X,Y) : - 
derive (moves (F, A, P1), moves (X, B, X1)), 
derive (moves (P, A, P1), moves (Y, B, Y1)), 
bisim (X1, Y1). 
and thus get Prolog to check bisimulation between expressions. We would still 
have to check that the necessary side conditions hold! The author's system 
handles a fair amount of indexing and parameterisation, but case analysis is 
often still left to the user; this is often the worst part of the problem. 
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We make two more general comments based on experience with the proof 
checker. Mechanical aids can easily be more detrimental than useful to work such 
as that reported in this thesis. The reason is that the development here depended 
crucially on ability to rapidly change notation, develop temporary notation to 
prove lemmas, and so on. At a different level, success even depends on willingness 
to change formalism and calculus! Few mechanical systems are flexible enough 
to permit all this, and could well tie the user down to one particular formalism 
and notation, and some are clumsy and restrictive even within that. 
A further danger is that one might start regarding a problem as "solved" if it 
can be pushed through the machine. The problem might be solved, if the system 
is implemented correctly, but it will almost surely not be really understood. 
When to rest content with such a state of affairs, and when to search for shorter 
proofs in a different framework is a judgement that comes only with experience, 
but it is as well to be aware of this factor. 
Future work based on this thesis could include further experimentation with 




A New Link in a Chain of Calculi 
In Chapter 1, we looked informally at the old calculi CCS, SCCS, and ASCCS, 
and motivated a new one, MCCS. We set up an example where CCS is unsuitable 
because it forces us to always specify sequences (interleavings) of actions, and 
SCCS is unsuitable because we have an essentially asynchronous system with 
only occasional synchronisation needed. ASCCS is the most interesting of the 
older calculi, for it allows us to enforce synchronisation between actions as well as 
to allow arbitrary interleavings as in CCS. But we noted problems with it as well: 
that delays turn up in subtle ways, that it uses x rather than 1 , and that its weak 
congruence is stronger than that of CCS. We concluded that the best calculus for 
our purposes would be one that looked exactly like CCS except that it allowed 
all actions rather than just particulate ones, and had a I operator that allowed 
synchronisation rather than just communication. (In the synchronisation rule 
P--P' Q-LQ' 	
i communication s the special case a = b - 1 ). This informal 
PIQ-iP'IQ' 
specification for a calculus was named MCCS. 
From the users point of view, it remains only to ensure that MCCS runs into 
no formal troubles, establish equational properties for both strong and weak 
bisimulation, and characterise the weak congruence; we hope this turns out to 
look like that for CCS. 
But it would be a pity to treat MCCS entirely independently when it can be 
seen as a minor variant of either ASCCS or CCS. [Milner83] creates a chain of 
calculi: ASCCS is a subcalculus of SCCS, and CCS is a subcalculus of ASCCS. 
If we note that S is a derived operator in all four calculi, and think of it for 
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the moment as being included in the syntax of all four, then ASCCS is one step 
away from SCCS (replace a: by a.), and the particulate calculus, which turns out 
to be isomorphic to CCS, is two steps away from ASCCS (replace x by 1, and 
restrict observers to seeing only single particles instead of all actions). Surely if 
we take only the first of these steps from ASCCS we get something isomorphic 
to MCCS? (Actually I is just a derived operator in ASCCS, so the real change 
is to make a. a primitive operator rather than define it in terms of a:). And the 
second of these steps from MCCS should give us something isomorphic to CCS? 
In this chapter we carry out the programme in the previous two paragraphs. 
We formalise MCCS; in the sequel, "MCCS" refers to the calculus directly de-
fined, to distinguish it from "derived MCCS", derived from ASCCS. We work out 
the properties of derived MCCS, the relation between it and MCCS, the relation 
between particulate MCCS (i.e. the particulate calculus derived from MCCS) 
and CCS, and the characterisation theorem for weak congruence in MCCS, all 
using the methods of [Milner83]. Not surprisingly, derived MCCS and MCCS 
turn out to be very closely related, as are MCCS and CCS. But all is not routine 
and boredom. 
The first interesting fact is that weak congruence for MCCS turns out to look 
exactly like that for CCS. Whether this should have been entirely expected is 
not clear: Milner comments that the observation congruence depends on both 
the operators admitted and what can be observed. Moving directly from ASCCS 
to CCS changes both factors at once. By separating the factors out we hope to 
shed some light on what effect each has independently. 
MCCS also turns out to be unexpectedly interesting for the light it casts on 
the relationship between ASCCS and CCS, more specifically, on the translation 
between the particulate calculus and CCS. [Milner83] shows that for CCS is 
the restriction of for ASCCS. But this is somewhat disappointing, because it 
mixes up delay discrepancies in the translation and 1 actions within the indi-
vidual calculi. For example, why can't we carry over even simple laws like the 
associativity of +, when + behaves exactly alike in both calculi? 
If we look more closely at why the translation does not preserve 	we see 
that it introduces delay discrepancies for two distinct reasons. We will establish 
closer relations between the calculi which keep the two kinds apart as the de- 
lay discrepancies between MCCS and derived MCCS, and between particulate 
MCCS and CCS respectively. We also keep out the l's in the individual calculi 
to a large extent; thus isolating the sources of discrepancy. It is a conjecture that 
there exists a useful subclass of expressions in (A)SCCS for which we can carry 
several congruence laws from SCCS all the way through to CCS via MCCS. 
A final bonus is that we get a couple of new non-derivability results for 
operators. This work is carried out in Chapter 5. 
Readers who are not interested in the details of our new chain of calculi can 
glance through the statements of the theorems in the next few sections and skip 
directly to Section 2.4 for a summary of facts about MCCS for later use. 
We begin by summarising the necessary facts about SCCS and ASCCS. This 
allows us not only to produce a self-contained description of MCCS, while build-
ing up the formal apparatus in its traditional setting, but also to gather together 
facts for immediate reference and for comparison with the new calculus. The 
material in the next two sections is quoted directly and without proof from 
[Milner83], with a little simplification to suit our needs. Those familiar with 
that paper should therefore skip these sections. 
2.1 SCCS 
The syntax of expressions in our restricted version of this calculus is as follows. 
Here E is an expression, X is a variable. Al is a set of particles. Let Es  and 
PS  be respectively the expressions and agents (closed expressions) of SCCS. 
"fix" is actually a family of constructors, one for each variable. If t is a term, 
fixXt is also a term. Readers who prefer recursive definitions of agents as in 
[Milner8O] can think of the term fixX (a: X + b: X) as the agent defined by the 
recursive definition X <= a: X + b: X. 
Free and bound variables arise in the usual way from the recursive terms. 
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Definition 2.1.1 Let Free(E) denote the set of variables free in E. Let E[O/iC] 
denote the result of simultaneously replacing free occurrences of X1 in E by G, 
for each i, with changes of bound variables as necessary to avoid clashes. 	0 
The reader should note that we have made several trivial simplifications from 
the definition given in [Milner83]. There, sums of the form Fje , E1 are allowed, 
where ( EIi E I) is some indexed family of expressions (possibly infinite). Then 0 
and + are just the special cases I = 0 and I = {O, 1}. Since these are all we need 
for finitely expressed agents, we have chosen to stay with a syntax reminiscent 
of CCS. The set of actions, Act, is taken in SCCS to be any abelian group. Here 
we assume that it is freely generated by a set of names, as described in Chapter 
1, SO that our restriction operator is a special case of that used in SCCS. 
Definition 2.1.2 The operational semantics of SCCS. 
Action a:E--3E 
E?E' E 	E' 
Sum 
E+F--E' F+E--E' 
E -- E' F—LF 
Product 
E x F -.L E' x F' 
Restriction 









Delay SE --SE 
E—E' 
SE —s-. E' 
U 
For more general definitions of sum, restriction and recursion, see [Milner83]. 
We included in the semantics two derived operators, morphism and delay, 
which were not in the syntax at the start. Morphism, which corresponds to the 
relabelling operator of CCS, is written postflx. In the term P[], 0 is just a 
group morphism from one set of actions to another. For a proof of derivability 
of morphism, see the last section of [Milner83]. Delay, SF, can be easily shown 
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to be strongly congruent to fix X (1: X + P). We shall use both operators freely 
from now on. 
Strong bisimulation yields the most important facts about SCCS. First, let 
us extend the relation to expressions. 
Definition 2.1.3 Let X include the free variables of E and F. Then E F if 
E[P/X] - F[P/X] for all agents P. 	 o 
Proposition 2.1.4 	is a congruence, that is, E F implies a: E " a: F, 
E+GF+G,ExGFxG,E\AfF\Ar, and fix XE fix XF. 	0 
Because of this extremely important fact, we shall often refer to as strong 
congruence. 
We state below a few equational properties so that readers can compare x 
and the action prefix a: with the I and a. operators we shall be using in MCCS. 
The 6 operator will not be used in MCCS, but is important for proofs later in 
this chapter. Summation, restriction and morphism are all used in MCCS; we 
shall study them later. 
We define 1 fix X (1: X). 
Proposition 2.1.5 
1 (Ps/ 	x, i). is an abelian monoid. 
P x 0 0 
Px(Q+R)(PxQ)+(PxR) 






We can think of the agents of SCCS as synchronised with a universal clock. 
a: b: 0 must perform b on the next clock tick after a, and a: 1: b: 0 must perform 
b with a delay of exactly one tick after a. By contrast, a: S (b: 0) can idle indefi-
nitely between the two actions. The following definition ensures that idleness is 
preserved by strong congruence. 
Definition 2.2.1 P is idle if P SF. 	 11 
Proposition 2.2.2 (1) SF is idle, for any F. 
If P --+ P then P is idle. 
If P Q and P is idle, then Q is idle 
A natural way to build an asynchronous calculus might appear to be to 
restrict ourselves to agents whose derivatives are all idle. But. this leads to the 
following problem. a: F and b: Q are not idle, and their sum a: F + b: Q is very 
different from the sum S (a: F) + S (b: Q) since the latter can discard one of its 
summands autonomously, whereas the former is controlled externally. We wish 
to preserve this external control, and so we use the following 
Definition 2.2.3 F is asynchronous if all its proper derivatives are idle. 	D 
This property is preserved by strong congruence. But it is not preserved by 
the action operator of SCCS; b: S (0) is asynchronous but a: b: S (0) is not. To get 
an asynchronous calculus we replace this action operator by the derived operator 
"a." defined by 
a.F a: 6P 
We now have ASCCS. Morphism and delay are still derived operators in this 
calculus; it is easily shown that SF fixX (1.X + F). It also turns out that 
SF 1.F + F, but it is better not to take this simpler fact as the definition of 
S. Our definition of 5 keeps the same form in all the calculi, and the extra fact, 
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which turns out to be bothersome, is a property only of ASCCS. We need S so 
frequently that we include it in the syntax of the calculus. 
E::=XIOIa.EISEJE+EIExEIE\JVJ fix  xE 
Let EA  and pA  be respectively the expressions and agents (closed expressions) 
of ASCCS. 
Proposition 2.2.4 If  E pA and P -- P', then F' E pA  and P' --- F'. Every 
P in pA  is asynchronous. 	 o 
Now consider P a.b.O and Q a.1.b.0; both can delay indefinitely between 
the actions a and b, but P can perform b immediately after a whereas Q cannot. 
P and Q are not strongly congruent, but cannot be distinguished by an observer 
who cannot measure the length of a sequence of invisible actions. Observational 
equivalence captures precisely this abstraction. The following proposition re-
lates the action operators and the delay operator, and is in contrast to strong 
congruence. 
Proposition 2.2.5 P 1:P 1.P SF 	 D 
Some operators of SCCS preserve observational equivalence: 
Proposition 2.2.6 If P Q then a: P a: Q, SP SQ and P\iV Q\A/. o 
However, F Q does not imply F x R Q x R even within ASCCS; consider 
P a.O, Q 1.a.0, R b.O; P x R can do ab, Q x R cannot. The same values 
of F, Q, R show also that + does not preserve . As in [Milner8O], we look for 
a congruence that on general grounds is defined by 
P C  Q if for all contexts C[ ], C[P] C[Q] 
A context C[] is an expression with a hole, to be filled in by another expres-
sion. The definition of depends on which contexts are allowed. If any SCCS 
context is allowed, 	turns out to be just . However, if we allow only ASCCS 
contexts, the congruence 	, where the A in the superscript indicates the al- 
lowed contexts, turns out to be very close to . We first extend the definition 
of to expressions before defining cA 
34 
Definition 2.2.7 Let X include the free variables of E and F. Then E F if 
F[i/.k] for all agents J. 	 o 
Definition 2.2.8 E 	F if for all asynchronous (ASCCS) contexts C[ }, 
C[E]C[F]. 	 o 
The following theorem characterises 
Theorem 2.2.9 The following are equivalent in ASCCS: 
PCAQ 
For all RinPA ,PxRQxR 
For all aAct, 
if P --+ F' then, for some Q', 	= Q' and P' 
if Q —3  Q' then, for some F', P-- = F' and F' Q'. 
Moreover 	is a congruence, and, 1fçP contains the free variables of E and 
F, then E cA  F if, for all agents f, E[/J] 	F[/]. 	 o 
Note that clause 3 imposes a stronger condition than weak bisimulation, and 
that this extra demand pertains only to the initial actions of F and Q. 
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2.3 MCCS in relation to ASCCS 
We first present derived MCCS, an intermediate subcalculus in the derivation of 
CCS from ASCCS, and then compare it with MCCS (i.e. the calculus defined 
directly). This section follows the treatment of the relation between the partic-
ulate calculus and CCS in section 9 of [Milner83]. We point out the differences 
as we go along. 
2.3.1 Derived MCCS 
To derive MCCS from ASCCS we make only one change. Instead of the product 
operator x, we use the composition operator, 1 , defined by 
PIQPx 5Q+SPx Q 
The following simple properties are used later in proofs. 
Proposition 2.3.1 5(PJQ) SPJQ ' PSQ SP x SQ 
Proof: Use Proposition 2.1.5 	 0 
The syntax is 
E ::= X 1 0 1 a.E I bE I E+ El EIE I E\A( I fix XE 
Note that SE is still available as a derived operator, SE fixX (1.X + E). 
We retain it in the syntax to facilitate comparison with ASCCS. There will be 
a profusion of S's when we study how MCCS is related to derived MCCS, and 
it helps to know that none of them arose merely because of syntax. 
Let EM  and P M be respectively the expressions and agents (closed expres-
sions) of MCCS. For the rest of this section, we shall let P and Q stand for mem-
bers of pA  and PM respectively. Clearly, pM c pA, and by Proposition 2.2.4, 
every P in PM is asynchronous, i.e. if P -- P' then P' is idle, i.e., P' SP'. 
Derived MCCS is not closed under -p, because x is used in the definition of 
, and shows up in the derivatives of agents involving this operator; however, it 
appears only in limited contexts, and the calculus is very nearly closed. 
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Proposition 2.3.2 If Q E PM has a proper derivative F', then P' SQ' for 
some Q' E PM . That is, P' - Q" for some Q" E P M .  
Proof: First show, by induction on inference, that if Q -'-- P' then P' SQ' 
for some Q' p •  Two cases are interesting. If Q is of the form a.Q', where 
Q' e PM , we have Q-.-+5Q'and P' SQ'. If Q is of the form Qi 1Q2, we could 
a 	 1 Q 1 —P1 öQ2-8Q2 
have Qi 
x8Q 2 --.P1'x8Q2 
Q1IQ2--3Px 8Q2 
and Q E PM . The induction step follows using using Proposition 2.3.1; 
6Q'1  x 8Q2 5 (QIQ2). 
The rest is easy by induction on the length of derivation of P'. 	 0 
This lemma is just like the one [Milner83] has between the particulate calculus 
and CCS. But because S is in MCCS syntax we get the second statement in the 
proposition as well. 
If A, B are sets and A C B, then an equivalence relation over A, restricted to 
B, is an equivalence relation over B. Thus " and restricted to derived MCCS 
are equivalence relations, but because the calculus is not closed, they cannot be 
bisimulations. But this will not delay us, for we do not intend to work with 
derived MCCS; we only want it to compare with MCCS proper, and thereby 
relate that calculus to ASCCS. 
ASCCS is very different from CCS or SCCS in some ways, and these differ-
ences make it perhaps difficult to use. Its most striking feature is that action 
prefix is a derived operator, a.P a: SP, and therefore a.P -- SP. This rule 
is unusual; for users unaccustomed to S's turning up implicitly in derivatives, 
the situation is initially error prone, particularly because they have to remember 
to put in explicit S's to avoid enforced synchronisation on the first actions of 
non-idle agents. It also has the consequence that even agents without "fix" or 
explicit S's can have infinite derivations, and usually do. A related odd feature 
of ASCCS is that non-idle agents (e.g. 0) can be used as building blocks (e.g. 
a.0), but cannot be proper derivatives of any agent, because all such are idle. 
Lastly, 1.P + P SF, which means that if you ask for one 1, you might get an 
infinity of them, and it is hard to tell which ones were explicitly asked for. 
where by induction hypothesis, F1' 	8Q 
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We can understand these properties of ASCCS as coming about because it 
is simulating an asynchronous machine on a synchronous one. Derived MCCS 
inherits them. Its implementation of MCCS is thus imperfect, and the last 
property above will shortly get us into a lot of trouble. 
2.3.2 Relating derived MCCS to primitive MCCS 
We define MCCS directly, treating all of its operators as primitive, by means of 
a new family of action relations --M. The syntax is the same as for the derived 
version, so we can still use PM and EM  as the set of agents and expressions 
respectively. The new derivation rules are the same as for -- in SCCS except 
for the MCCS operators a. and I (which are derived operators in SCCS); for 





EIF – - E'IF 




Note that 5 can still be produced as a derived operator: SP fixX (1.X + F) 
as usual, but there are no a: and x from which to derive a. and 1 . The synchro-
nisation rule is a generalisation of the communication rule for CCS. We refer 
to the special case of synchronisation where a = as communication. The 
real difference between the — calculus (derived MCCS) and the — calculus 
(MCCS) is in the action rule, because the — rules for I look like the .— rules 
for the derived operator. 
MCCS thus defined is of course a closed calculus; we can show by induction 
that if Q E PM and 	then Q'E PM .  
Definition 2.3.3 Let 'ri be the strong bisimulation corresponding to the 
action relations —* . 	 o 
The following two lemmas show that the — calculus differs from the 
calculus by only a S factor. It is worth noting that if Q E PM , its —+ derivatives 
are idle, but usually not its —* derivatives. 
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Lemma 2.3.4 If Q -- Q' then, for some P', Q -- P' SQ'. 
Proof: By induction on inference. In the case Q QIJQ2 Proposition 2.3.1 
al 	 a2 	
, 




Qt --*P1' with P' 's  SQ for i = 1, 2. Then 
Q1IQ2 Qi x 8Q2 + Q2 x SQ 
al a2 p
1, x P2' SQ x SQ'2 S(QjQ). 	o 
Lemma 2.3.5 If Q -- P', then, for some Q', Q -- Q'and P' '.-' SQ'. 
Proof: By induction on inference. Two cases are of interest: 
Q b.Qi. Then a = b, P' SQ and Q -L Qi. 
Q Qi 1Q2 Qi x 5Q2 + öQi x Q2.  Then by shorter inferences we 
b , 	c 	, 	, 	, have, without loss of generality, Qi - P1 , 5Q2 — P2 , P P1 x P2 
and a = bc. 
There are now two subcases. If c = 1 and P2' 	5Q2, then b = a 
and we use the induction hypothesis for Qi  to obtain Qi  -L where 
b 	, 
Q1 —, Q1 P1' SQ. Then 	b 	and F' Fl x 5Q2 SQ x 5Q2 
Q1IQ2 — Q1IQ2 
S(QIQ2) by Proposition 2.3.1. 
In the other subcase, Q2 --*P2'. By the induction hypothesis, this can be 
Qi - 
 
 -'Q Q2 -— Q matched by 	 where P1' SQ and P2' 45%, and 
QiIQ2 -- QIQ 
so we have P-= x F2' bQ1 x SQ'2 	(QIQ) by Proposition 2.3.1. 
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Compare the above two lemmas with Lemma 9.8 and Lemma 9.9 of [Milner83] 
between CCS (the —* calculus there) and the corresponding subcalculus of AS-
CCS (-+ there). We are taking smaller steps, and the smaller gap between our 
two calculi makes the previous lemma stronger than its counterpart (Lemma 
9.9), and its proof simpler. CCS can match the actions of its - calculus only 
by arbitrary interleavings of the particles in the original action, because its ob-
servers are restricted to seeing only particles. MCCS observers are not thus 
restricted, so we get a closer link between the —+ and the —* calculi. 
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The stronger lemma above leads to the following result. We can pick up the 
correspondence with CCS again only when we get to weak bisimulation. 
Theorem 2.3.6 Let Q1, Q2 E pM Then Qi "H Q2 implies Qi " Q2. 
Proof: Consider s c PA x pA  defined by 
S={(P1,P2)1P1 a112, orP1 bQ 1 and P2 SQ 2 andQi HQ2} 
We have written F1 , P2 and pA  to remind the reader that we are dealing 
with —i, but note that S is actually a subset of P M x PM; "H is defined 
only over PM , and if Q E 1' then SQ E pM  Thus including S in MCCS 
syntax allows us to characterise easily the subset of ASCCS over which the 
induced " is defined; it is just derived MCCS. 
It is enough to show that S is a '-bisimulation upto . That is, we show 
that if P1 SP2 and P1 --* P' then for some F2', P2 --) P and ' - S P'. 
If (Qi, Q2) e S and Qi --i P1' we have by Lemma 2.3.5 that Qi -- Q and 
F1' SQ. Now because Qi "-'n Q2, there is a Q such that Q2 --Q Q. 
Then by Lemma 2.3.4, there is a P2' such that Q2 -- P2' '•- 6Q'2 . Thus we 
have P SQ, Q Q and SQ P2'. Then (8Q, SQ) e S by the 
definition of 5, and so P1 ". S P. 
Starting from (SQ', 5Q2) e S leads to no new pairs. 	 o 
The converse of the previous theorem does not hold. Consider Qi a.S (b.0) 
and Q2 a.b.O. Then 
Q. 
 - S (b.0) and Q2 -- b.O, while Q. -- 55 (b.0) and 
Q2 -- S (b.0). Because SSP #s  6P , we have Qi Q2, but not Qi "-'n Q2. We 
shall return later to conditions under which the converse does hold. 
But first we look at and 	When we have defined the corresponding 
relations on MCCS, we shall see that the translation preserves these in both 
directions. Corresponding to the action rules —*, we define relations =*.. 
Definition 2.3.7 Let u = (a1 ,a2 ,.. .,a) E Acts. Then Q = 	Q' 1ff 
/ 1 \* al 	( 1 \* 	a 	1 1 \* Q (—*) _ ... 
) 
) Q 1. 
 
Then, in terms of the corresponding notion of weak bisimulation, which we 
shall call 11-weak bisimulation, we obtain an equivalence 	over MCCS, the 
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maximum 11-weak bisimulation. We prove that , restricted to MCCS, is iden-
tical to r,-rl. We need a lemma first, which extends the results of the last two 
lemmas to the relations = and =*. 
Lemma 2.3.8 Let Q E PM and u E Act*. 
If Q =u=> P then, for some Q' E PM , Q = Q' and p, .5Q' 
If Q = Q' then, for some P E pA, Q = F' and P 8Q'. 
Proof: (1) From Lemma 2.3.5, it is easy to show by induction on n that 
 an 
if Q—• •—P then, for some Q, Q—••• ))Q
,  with P - W. The 
proof is now immediate from the definitions of ==u:> and 
(2) Similar. 	 0 
Remark We can strengthen the lemma in the case u = (1). The lemma 
guarantees the existence of matching actions, but these could be ='='* and =. 
In fact there will exist matching actions = and =. 
Also, in both cases, if the left hand agent does a non-1 action to start with, 
there exists a match on the right hand side that also starts with a non-1 action. 
Theorem 2.3.9 Let Q1, Q2 e PM . Then Qi Q2 1ff Qi H Q2. 
Proof: ==> It is enough to show that restricted to PM is a II-bisimulation. 
By Lemma 2.3.8, we can easily show that if Q 	Q2 and  Qi = Q then 
for some Q, Q = Q, where SQ 	P' F2' (SQ'2 . We can complete the 
gap here to get Q 	Q'2 because F' SQ' implies F' Q'. 
== It is enough to show that ri  is a bisimulation upto ; the argument 
is similar to that in Theorem 2.3.6, except that we don't have to add pairs 
(SQi, 5Q2) to because F' - SQ' implies F' Q'. 0 
Now define a relation 	on MCCS as follows. 
P 	Q iffVa E Act, 
if P --i P then, for some Q', Q--=*Q' and F' Q', 
if Q -- Q' then, for some F', P---+=P and F' Q'. 
This mimics the definition of weak congruence for ASCCS by means of clause 
3 of Theorem 2.2.9. Now that we can move freely back and forth between and 
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the following theorem is easy. It shows that the relation 	carries over to 
weak congruence in ASCCS. It is a stronger relation than the weak congruence 
we shall define for MCCS shortly. 
Theorem 2.3.10 Let Qi, Q2 e PM . Then Qi cA Q2 1ff Qi 	Q2. 
Proof: = If Q -- Q we have by Lemma 2.3.4 that Qi --* P' and 
P1' 5Q, that is, P1' Q. Now because Qi cA Q2, there is a P2' such 
that Q2-- = P and F1' P. Then by Lemma 2.3.8 and the following 
remark, there is a Q'2 such that Q2--* = Q and P 8Q. Thus we have 
Similar. 
In Theorem 2.4.8, we shall characterise M, the largest congruence con-
tamed in IT , by the following kind of clause: 
a 	. 	 a 	, if P - P then, for some Q, Q Q and P 
We see that ç cM, and that therefore 	is a congruence, and more impor- 
tant, that the previous theorem lets us carry weak congruence results over from 
ASCCS to MCCS. 
Going the other way, define 	on ASCCS by this characterising clause of 
cM By a very similar proof, we then have 
Theorem 2.3. 11 Let Q1, Q2 E PM . Then Qi cM Q2 1ff Qi Al Q2. 	0 
Now if Qi A+ Q2, we have Qi CM Q2, therefore Qi + R cm Q2 + R for 
any B in MC CS, and so Qi + B A+ Q2 + R. Thus, if we keep to MCCS syntax 
(i.e. do not use x), in ASCCS, we have an equivalence preserved by + that is 
larger than cA  In this case, at any rate, congruence seems to depend only on 
the operators admitted. 
2.3.3 Why the translation does not preserve strong con-
gruence 
We have seen that Qi Q2 does not imply Q 'n Q2. We will now study this a 
little more. The main goal is to illuminate the relation between the two calculi. 
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Examples: We have 1.Q + Q SQ, a. (1.Q + Q) a.Q and a.Q a.SQ and 
in none of these cases can we replace ' by —ri. We seek a theorem that will 
characterise either the in these examples, or the agents involved, as unsafe; 
for all safe cases, we should have Qi Q2 implies Qi '-'n Q2. 
We need a lemma first. If 5P1 5P2 , we can of course have P1 P2 , but if 
not, matters can be subtle: 
Lemma 2.3.12 If 5P1 6F2 and P1 F2 , then either P1 6P1 or P2 5P2 
but not both. 
Proof: Since P1 6 P2 , either P1 or P2 has an action that the other cannot 
match. Assume this is P1 . Then there is an a such that P1 -- P11 , say, but 
whenever P2 --* F2', we have P, P2'. If a 1 then SF2 cannot match the 
F1 --P 
following derivation: 	a 	, and we would have 8P1 .t 8F2 . So a = 1. 
SF1 —.F1' 
P, P11 Then 5P1 has the derivation 1 	Now SF2 cannot match this by SF1 —3.P1' 
P2 	2 
1 ; it can only match it by SF2 —p SP2 . Therefore F1' SF2 SF1 . SP2 —,P 
We have shown that there is a F1' such that F1 -- P' and P "- SF1 . Now 
F1 SF1 follows by straightforward bisimulation. 
If F2 were the agent with the extra action, we would get P2 SF2 by a 
symmetric argument. 
If both P1 's-'  SF1 and F2 SF2 , we have F1 F2 . 
Proposition 2.3.13 Let Qi, Q2 E PM , and Qi Q2. If no —* derivatives of 
Q1  Q2 are idle, then Qi "-'n Q2. 
Proof: We proceed by restricting a subset of to MCCS and showing 
that is a III-bisimulation. The subset is defined by the condition on the —+ 
derivatives. Our condition requires Q t SQ, not Q SQ. 
If QiH Q, we have by Lemma 2.3.4 that Qi -- F1' SQ. Now because 
Qi Q2, there is a F2' such that Q2  —3 P P. Then by Lemma 2.3.5, 
there is a Q such that Q2 -- Q and F2' SQ. Thus we have SQ 
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P2' P 	8Q. From Proposition 2.3.12, and our condition, we conclude 
0 
Thus we have a sufficient condition to carry over to 	but it is far from 
satisfactory. Notice the awkwardness of the condition: it refers to derivatives in 
the -* calculus and a property in the - calculus. It is also much too strong: it 
would be enough if at corresponding stages of the bisimulation, the two expres-
sions were either both idle, or neither. Unfortunately, this is not easy to express 
formally and concisely. Lastly, our condition is on each expression separately 
rather than on the pair; thus we are unnecessarily ruling out some pairs. 
Our examples show that a syntactic test to check for the condition in 
Lemma 2.3.13 is hard to find; for example, we cannot try to get the theorem 
to work for all expressions without "fix" —even though this guarantees finite 
derivations in the -* calculus, 1.P is idle in the ­4 calculus! 
It would be nice to have a syntactic test to characterise a class of safe expres-
sions, so that if E and F are safe expressions, and F1 F2 then F1 n F2 . We 
could then take over facts from (A)SCCS without having to establish them di-
rectly by 11-bisimulation. The larger the class of safe expressions, the more facts 
we can borrow. It is just as easy to do bisimulations in MCCS as it is in SCCS 
or ASCCS, so the aim is not to make proofs easier; it is to avoid unnecessary 
work in future redoing bisimulations in MCCS if they can be taken over from 
SCCS; we already know that transfer in the other direction is always possible. 
The immediate bonus, the set of laws already available for the older calculi, is 
also a minor motivation. 
In our three examples, we want to mark LE and 6E as unsafe; the reader 
can check that this is all we need to deal with the examples. 
Unfortunately, we do not have such a syntactic test at present. We only 
have a semantic test on agents. Thus we know Qi + Q2 Q2 + Qi for all 
agents Qi, Q2, but cannot conclude Qi + Q2 '-'rz Q2 + Qi for all agents Qi, Q2 
in MCCS; this would only hold if Qi + Q2 and Q2 + Qi were safe agents. But 
the proof of the comrnutativity of + in SCCS uses only properties of +, and our 
intuition is that nothing goes wrong in the translation of + from the - calculus 
to the -p calculus; therefore we expect the commutative law to hold in MCCS 
44 
by virtue of the same law in SCCS. More dramatically, we cannot even conclude 
1.Q + Q 1.Q + Q; we have to prove that independently! 
The author conjectures that it should be possible to extend Proposition 2.3.13 
to expressions, defining F to be an idle expression if F W. The idea is that 
if F1 and F2 are safe, and F1 F2 , we should be able to substitute even unsafe 
agents for free variables in these expressions, and still have F1 ' F2. 
Safe expressions, if we can define such a class satisfactorily, would be non-
idle, and therefore not proper derivatives in ASCCS. However, their ASCCS 
derivatives would all be idle, and so would not be safe expressions! Any idleness 
in the ASCCS implementation of such an expression would thus be purely in the 
mimicry of asynchrony by a synchronous machine. 
From now on, we shall drop the extra arrow heads, and the n  subscripts 
when writing about MCCS. The notation will be used again, of CCS, when we 
compare it with particulate MCCS. 
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2.4 The facts of MCCS 
The syntax is 
Note that we have dropped 8, so that the syntax is exactly that of CCS, except 
that a. is not limited to ji., and so morphism is not limited either. 








a .E -- E 
•0 E-4E 
EIF - -+E'IF 
E - -E' F-LF' 
EIF?±,EhlF 











E - -E' a,a 1 A 
The special case of the synchronisation rule arising if b is a', giving ab = 1, 
corresponds to the usual communication rule of CCS. We do not need a second 
rule to establish that synchronisation is commutative, as we do for sum and 
parallel, because there are two premises to this rule, and by convention, these 
can be permuted. 
Note that the second rule for restriction above is only a notational conve-
nience. For more general definitions of sum and recursion, see [Milner83]. We 
shall frequently use the form [a'/a] which stands for the morphism which is the 
identity on Act except that a '—+ a', (and therefore a 1 '—i a' 1 and so on). 
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2.4.1 Equational facts 
The following are all standard for CCS and can be shown for MCCS also, by 
bisimulation. Here P means pM• 
Proposition 2.4.2 
(P/ ', +, 0) is an abelian monoid. 
P+PP 
(P/ s,  ,0) is an abelian monoid. 
P\AP\M P\M\.iV 










a. (P + 1.Q) + a.Q cm a. (P + 1.Q) 
UI 
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2.4.2 Weak congruence for MCCS 
Which operators of MCCS preserve ? Not +, as can be seen by taking P a.O, 
Q 1.a.0 and R b.O. We then have P Q but P+R 94,'Q+R. But in contrast 
to ASCCS, all other operators of MCCS preserve . Thus MCCS behaves like 
CCS in this respect. 
Proposition 2.4.4 If Qi Q2 then a.Q1  a.Q2, Q1IQ3 Q21Q3, Q1 \iV 
Q2 \.Af and Qi[c] 
Proof: 	The proofs are by straightforward bisimulation; we only indi- 
cate one step: if Qi a 
	
i 	





Qi -- Q Q- - Q . Q2 —-- *Q 
then 	 ab 	 is matched by 	 followed by 
QiIQ3-'Q1JQ3 	 Q21Q3 — *Q21Q3 
	
, 	 ________ Q2-4Q2 Q 
a 	 b 
-Q3 Q2 )Q2 
b 	 followed by 	 . 	 o 
Q2' I Q3 ) Q2"I Q13 	 QIQ 	)Q2," 1 Q3,  
The largest congruence contained in , written cM, is defined as follows. 
Definition 2.4.5 Qi cM  Q2 1ff for all contexts C[ ], C[Q1 ] C[Q2 ] 	0 
Pleasingly, it turns out that just as for CCS, and in contrast to ASCCS, 
the summation contexts are the only critical ones, resulting in the following 
characterisation theorem, which looks exactly like that for CCS even though 
MCCS is a larger calculus. The treatment follows that for ASCCS in section 8 
of [Milner83]. 
We first extend the definition of and CM  to expressions. 
Definition 2.4.6 Let X include the free variables of E and F. Then E F if 
E[P/] F[P/.k] for all agents P. 	 o 
Definition 2.4.7 E M  F if for all MCCS contexts C[ ], C[E] C[F]. 	0 
Theorem 2.4.8 The following are equivalent in MCCS: 
(1) PCMQ 
48 
For all Rin PM, P+RQ+R 
For all a EAct, 
 if 	--+ P' then, for some Q', Q= 	Q' and P  
 if Q --+ Q' then, for some P', P = 	P and P' 	Q', 
Moreover M  is a congruence, and, if X contains the free variables of E and 
F, then E cm F 1ff, for all agents .', E[i-'/Jt] ,::::cm F[P/.]. o 
Note that clause 3 imposes a stronger condition than weak bisimulation, in 
that 1 actions by the first agent cannot be matched by inaction on the part of 
the other; all actions, including 1, are treated the same. Comparing with , 
(2) there uses x instead of +, and (3) is stronger, insisting that a must be the 
first action by the matching agent. 
Clause (3) gives us the following corollary. 
Corollary 2.4.9 E '-r  F implies E cM  F implies E F. 	 o 
The first main step towards the theorem is to show (2)(3). 
Lemma 2.4.10 In the statement of Theorem 2.4.8, (2) ~*(3). 
Proof: = Assume (3), and let P + R -- P'. Then this action can come 
either from P or from R. If it comes from R, we have Q + R P'. If it 
comes from P, we have Q  ==> Q'and therefore Q + R Q', where  Q' P'. 
Thus (2) holds. 
= Assume (3) is false, so that for example P -- P', but whenever Q =. Q' 
then F' 9b Q'. Can (2) be true now? Choose any B that is not observa-
tionally equivalent to P. Then Q + B cannot match the actions of P + R 
that arise from F; this is ruled out by our assumption. Therefore (2) is false 
whenever (3) is. 
Definition 2.4.11 E 	F if, for all R in P M , E + R F + R. 	 11 
	
The second main step towards Theorem 2.4.8 is to show that 	is a con- 
gruence; it will then follow easily that it is identical with M• 
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Lemma 2.4.12 Let X include the free variables of E and F. Then E + F if 
E[P/X] 	F[P/X] for all agents P. 
Proof: Immediate from the definitions. 	 o 
Lemma 2.4.13 E F implies E F. 
Proof: Take R 0 in the preceding definition. 	 o 
For the following lemma, we have written out only the parts that are different 
from both ASCCS and CCS. 
Lemma 2.4.14 The relation 	is a congruence in MCCS; that is, E + F 
implies a.E 	a.F, E + G F + C, EjG + FIG, E\A1 + F\A1, E[] + 
F[O] and flxXE 	fixXF. 
Proof: Except for the "fix" combinator, it is enough to do the proof for 
agents only. In each case, we may work with the characterisation of clause 
(3) of the theorem, and the details are routine with the help of Lemma 2.4.13 
and Proposition 2.4.4. 
An example: We show that if P + Q, then PIR + QIR; we do only 
the synchronisation case. If P 	P' then there is a Q' such that Q 
and P' 	Q", because P 	Q. Then the derivation 
a 	 b 
ab 
 R—R 
is matched by QIR —-' Q'IR --'Q"IR' --- Q"'IR' where 
PIR—*P'IR' 
Q"IR' P'IR' by Proposition 2.4.4. 
To prove that P & Q implies P + R 	Q + R it is even simpler to reason as 
follows: for every SeP TM ,(P+R)+SnP+(R+s)Q+(R+s) 11 
(Q+R)+S. 
To prove that E + F implies fixXE + fixXF, where at most X is free 
in B or F, consider 
8= {(G[fixXE/X],G[fixXF/X]) IFree(G) ç {X}} 
We will show that if G[fixXE/X] -- F' then, for some Q' and R', 
G[fixXF/X] ==> R' and P'SQ' R'. So $ is a bisimulation upto , and 
taking C X gives us fixXE fixXF, from clause (3). 
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We shall only do one step. Let C 	C0 C1 and we consider only 
the derivation by the synchronisation rule. Then by shorter inferences, 
G1 [fixXE1X] -- P 2' (i = 0, 1), with a0a1 = a and P = Po P1 . By induc-
tion, there are Q and R such that G 1 [flxXF1X] 	R and P11SQ 
for i = 0)  1. Then C has the derivation G[fixXF/X] = RR . Take 
Q 	QIQ and R' R'O jR. Clearly, P'SQ', and Q' R' follows from 
Proposition 2.4.4. 
Proposition 2.4.15 E 	F iffE M F. 
Proof: If E 	F, the preceding lemma tells us that for any MCCS context, 
C[E] + C[F]. By Lemma 2.4.13, it follows that E cM  F. 
If E cm F, then by taking all contexts of the form [1+ R we have, by 
definition, E + R F + R, and thus E 	F. 	 0 
Proof: of Theorem 2.4.8. The preceding proposition shows that (1)s.(2), 
and (2)(3) was shown earlier. The preceding proposition and lemma show 
that M and are the same congruence. o 
Corollary 2.4.16 If E F then a.E M a.F. 	 o 
Corollary 2.4.17 If E 	F then E M F. 
The relation 	was defined over MCCS by using a clause like that of ASCCS 
congruence. It is now perhaps better called ;z,- xm . This last corollary completes 
the weak congruence link from derived MCCS to MCCS. We have already used 
the characterisation of M  to go the other way, carrying M over to ASCCS 
as 
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2.5 MCCS in relation to CCS 
Going from ASCCS to derived MCCS was just a restriction to a nearly closed 
sub-calculus; going from derived MCCS to MCCS involved just redefining the a. 
operator as primitive, and resulted in near isomorphism between the two. Now 
we will define particulate MCCS as a sub-calculus of MCCS by limiting action 
prefixes to simple actions p., and morphisms to simple morphisms that preserve 
simple actions. This gives us the syntax of CCS. CCS is still two steps away: we 
have to redefine I to allow only communication and not synchronisation generally, 
and we have to restrict observers to particles. We can carry out the second step 
without reference to CCS, thus getting a new equivalence on particulate MCCS. 
Armed with this additional equivalence, we study the relation between CCS and 
particulate MCCS and find that while it is not an isomorphism to within , we 
can get closer than the expected isomorphism to within . 
Again, we loosely follow section 9 of [Milner83]. Particulate MCCS differs 
from Milner's particulate calculus basically only in that it has M. as a primitive 
operator, not derived. 
2.5.1 Particulate MCCS 
The syntax is exactly that of CCS. 
Let EU  and pG  be respectively the expressions and agents (closed expres-
sions) of particulate MCCS. For the rest of this section, we shall let P and Q 
stand for members of pM  and pG  respectively. 
Particulate MCCS is closed under -i, because pG  is just an algebra generated 
by a subset of the operators that generate pM•  and our rules for MCCS are well 
behaved—they do not take us from an expression involving one operator to one 
involving another! This is in effect what a derived operator does, and that is 
why derived MCCS and Miler's particulate calculus are not closed (I is defined 
in terms of x). 
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Proposition 2.5.1 If Q E pc has a proper derivative P', then P' E 
Proof: First show, by induction on inference, that if Q -- F' then PE PC ; 
then do induction on the length of derivation of P'. 	 0 
Thus and are strong and weak bisimulations when restricted to partic-
ulate MCCS; and— cm are congruences. 
Particulate MCCS is closed, so we never get a non-simple action prefix; how-
ever, we do have non-particulate actions because of the I operator. But like 
Milner's particulate calculus, particulate MCCS also cannot enforce simultane-
ity. The following proposition tells us that whenever an agent can do a non-
particulate action, it can also do the particles in any order. The reader might 
want to review the definitions of non-opposing actions etc. from Chapter 1. 
Proposition 2.5.2 Let Q E pG  and Q -- Q', where a = Ai ... A, is a product 
of non-opposing particles, n > 1. Then Q--*.. 
Proof: 	By induction on inference. The only interesting case is when 
b 	, 	 c Q 	 Qi - Q1 and  Q2 - Q2 with bc = a. Now suppose 
b = v1.. . vk and a = 	... u,,; by induction we have Qi --" 
and Q2 
'k-I-1 
Q. The non-opposing particles from v1 to v. include 
those of a; permute the v's of Qi  and Q2  so that the remaining particles 
are paired off into complements and are first. Then Q has a derivation that 
begins with an application of the synchronisation rule to cancel out these 
pairs as well as do Ai; the rest of the particles are then produced by the 
parallel rule. U 
Now we can define a series of new bisimulations on particulate MCCS by 
restricting observers to particles, i.e. we systematically change "for all a e Act" 
in the definitions to "for all p E AU {l}". Thus we get 
"JA, A, and . It 
is easily seen that P Q implies P ''A Q, and so on for the other three. 
Now if P 	Q 	.O, and R A 1 .A2 .0 + .X 2 .A 1 .0 we have PIQ "GA R 
but PIQ t R and PIQ R. Also P 1.P but P 1 tA l.P. Thus "'A and are 
neither contained in the other, but both are contained in A- 
—A is not a congruence; consider P, Q and R as above and S = ).O. Then 
A, 
PjQS—O but we only have RJS—l.O. And of course A  is not a congruence, 
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because is not; the reason is the usual one, P 1.P but P + Q 1.P + Q. 
We shall see later that is a congruence, and that therefore is one as well, 
since it is contained in 4. 
We shall use these A relations to establish the connection between CCS and 
particulate MCCS. The key difference between the two calculi is caught by the 
following: )011.0 ' 1.A.0+A.1.0+A.0 and A0 I 1 . 0  "-' A 1.A.O+A.1.0+A.0 but we 
will only have A0 I 1 . 0 "in 1.A.O + A.1.O, where "-'ri is the strong congruence over 
CCS. The difference comes about because I in MCCS allows synchronisation but 
in CCS allows only communication. 
2.5.2 Relating particulate MCCS and CCS 
We define CCS to have the same syntax as particulate MCCS and the same 
inference rules, except that instead of the synchronisation rule for I we have the 
following: 
Communication 	
F 	)) F 
 
E l F 
 
Note the double arrow heads for the directly defined calculus, and that we say 
A instead of u in the new rule. 
The two calculi are related by the following two lemmas. We shall use Q to 
stand for agents in CCS and P for agents in (full) MCCS. 
Lemma 2.5.3 If Q -- Q' then  Q -- Q'. 
Proof: Trivial. Every — rule has a corresponding -+ rule. 	 o 
Lemma 2.5.4 If Q -- Q', where a = A,- . . A is a product of non-opposing 
	
1 1 \* )i 	1 1 \* 	 1 1 \* particles, n > 0 then Q (,-_*) -.-*) •.. ) 	Q
,
. 
Proof: 	By induction on inference. The only interesting case is when 
Q QIQ, Qi -L and Q2 -- Q with bc = a. Compared with Propo-
sition 2.5.2, the difference is that we cannot do the cancelling of opposed 
particles together with anything else; each such cancellation is a communi- 
cation and is a separate action. o 
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Corollary 2.5.5 If Q —3  Q' then 	 QI 
Proof: The particles put out by the shorter inferences before the synchroni-
sation can be permuted so that the lone non-opposed particle, t, is put out 
first, and all the cancelling pairs come afterwards. 0 
This corollary is what we shall mostly use, rather than the lemma preceding 
it. It looks like the defining clause for . The two lemmas here show that 
particulate MCCS is closer to CCS than Miler's particulate calculus, but the 
corollary holds for Milner's calculus as well, and so does a corresponding propo-
sition in the opposite direction. Thus the results that follow also hold between 
CCS and Miler's particulate calculus. 
We have seen that P SA Q and P 	Q do not imply each other. But of 
course P Q if P n Q. 
Definition 2.5.6 Let u = (A 1 , A 2 ,. . . , A,) E A*. Then Q=Q' iffQ 
1 1 \* 	A n 	1 1 	\* I-_)) Q. 
We shall call the corresponding notion of weak bisimulation 11-weak bisimu-
lation. 
Lemma 2.5.7 Let Q E PC and u E A*. 
(1)IfQ=Q' then Q==t,Q'. 
(2)IfQ=Q' then Q=Q'. 
Theorem 2.5.8 Let Q1, Q2 E PC . Then Qi Q2 1ff Qi H Q2. 	 0 
The above lemma and theorem are very similar to the ones in [Milner83] 
except that they are simpler because particulate MCCS is so close to CCS in 
form. They are also similar to the ones we saw earlier linking derived MCCS 
and MCCS. 
Now that we can move freely back and forth between and ri,  the following 
theorems are easy. 
Theorem 2.5.9 Let Qi, Q2 e pc  Then Qi 4 Q2 if Q' 4i Q2. 	 0 
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Theorem 2.5.10 Let Q1, Q2 E PC . Then Qi Q2  if  Qi 	Q2. 	0 
Lastly, an obvious theorem: 
Theorem 2.5.11 If E, F are expressions in pG  that do not involve 1 , then 
PQiffPnQ. 
Here we have a simple syntactic test to say when ".' carries over to ". 
2.6 Discussion 
We have defined MCCS formally and established the congruence cM•  As to the 
relations between ASCCS, MCCS and CCS, we have said nothing which is not 
in some sense obvious. Most of the theorems of the last section can be seen on a 
closer look directly from [Milner83], at least with hindsight. Even the restricted 
forms that permit strong congruence results to be carried from MCCS to CCS 
now involve no l's, and while we have no simple syntactic characterisation of 
expressions for which we can carry over strong congruence from SCCS to CCS, 
we know at any rate that 1. prefixes would not be acceptable. This too is utterly 
unsurprising. 
The major interest appears to be the very existence of MCCS, and its place 
in the chain of calculi. On the evidence of the last section its particulate sub-
calculus is close in form to CCS, but as far from it in substance as Milner's 
particulate calculus of ASCCS is. Thus we might say MCCS is closer to ASCCS 
than to CCS. 
Compared to ASCCS, MCCS seems to the author to have several advantages. 
Certainly to the user the two look utterly unlike in form. MCCS has no implicit 
6's, and no undesirable equivalences like 1.P + P oP. ASCCS has, of course, 
an additional operator, x. The price for the x is a stricter congruence. More 
light will be thrown on these connect ion's when we study the various operators 
in Chapter 5. 
Derived MCCS (ASCCS without x) has the same congruence 	as prim- 
itive MCCS; it looks like that for CCS. But otherwise derived MCCS shares all 
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the disadvantages of ASCCS. In contrast, MCCS seems usable, on the evidence 
of the few programs in this thesis. 
A brief word about the use we shall make of MCCS. We have seen that 
it suits our needs particularly by not forcing either synchrony or interleaving 
on us. We shall usually reserve the term "communication" for synchronisation 
on complementary actions. The great advantage of programming in MCCS (or 
ASCCS or SCCS) as opposed to CCS is that synchronisation is not restricted 
to communication; we can get agents to synchronise on actions that are not 
complements. 
However, we don't want to just permit synchronisation, for that would just 
add to the number of terms in the expansion theorem; we need to be able to 
enforce synchronisation. Thus the use of restriction to do this is even more 
important in MCCS and ASCCS than in CCS. 
In CCS, (PIQ) \\{z} has no inferences that result in a z or z 1 action. If 
either P or Q has such an action, it can only be used to communicate with the 
other. In the other calculi, the restriction is that any action with a z particle in 
it is forced to synchronise with one with a z 1 in it. 
By thus enforcing synchronisation between actions that we would be forced 
to interleave in CCS, we not only reduce the number of states, but also enforce 
a structure on our systems that permits laws that we could not isolate in CCS. 
The Synchronised Displacement Theorems of later chapters are our main tools in 
dealing with the FTS example, and are made possible by the use of synchronising 
contexts (see Section 3.2.2). That MCCS permits us to do this while retaining 
a CCS-like feel (no synchrony or idling), is the key to its applicability. 
2.7 Attempts to define a two-sorted calculus 
A two-sorted calculus is attractive for at least two reasons. One is that it allows 
us to disallow synchronisation between, say the displace actions of the opera-
tors we will define in the next chapter, and other actions: we could do this by 
making displace actions belong to one sort, and all others to another, and dis-
allow products between the two sorts. Another is that if we want a primarily 
57 
asynchronous calculus, one way to achieve this is to have two sorts of actions, 
one synchronous and the other asynchronous, with products (other than com-
munication) defined only for the former. Programmers could then use as much 
of each as they wanted. Keeping down the number of synchronous actions has 
the advantage that the expansion of parallel composition will be tamer. 
The author spent several months attempting to define such a calculus. The 
basic idea was that it should be in some sense derivable from SCCS and CCS. 
This could be through defining a new (two-sorted) synchronisation algebra, and 
then using [Winskel84] to form the category of synchronisation trees induced by 
the new algebra. Among the many problems in defining such an algebra is that 
1 and r, the invisible action in CCS, are algebraically quite unlike, and it is not 
all obvious what to do with the two. If (1, r) is the unit, for example, what 
are (..., r) and (1, _)? There are also further complications arising from inaction, 
represented by * in Winskel's paper, and how it affects the two silent actions. 
The author was finally persuaded to give up only by the discovery of MCCS. 
But much of the enthusiasm went out of the project earlier when the follow-
ing small bug was discovered in [Winskel84]. The way morphism is defined in 
, 	
i 	
a 	 b 	, 
i Winskel s categories s that P —+ P has a morphism to Q —+ Q f the label 
of the target divides the label of the source". While this works excellently for 
monoids that are not groups, it does not work for groups, because every element 
divides every other. Thus we have too many morphisms, resulting in some quite 
unwanted isomorphisms. We should stress that this does not seriously detract 
from the merits of [Winskel84]; to use that paper, we should merely note that 
we should not work with groups. But since we are specifically interested here in 
combining SCCS with some form of asynchronous calculus, it becomes impossi-
ble to use the definitions in that paper. We end by mentioning that no obvious 
patches worked. This is probably just as well because the patches were very 
artificial definitions of morphism. 
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Chapter 3 
The Displace and Audit Operators 
We now develop two operators that together with MCCS will make it easy to 
reformulate and prove the FTS example of the Appendix. The first operator, 
displace, has counterparts in LOTOS and CSP. The second operator, audit, is 
a generalisation of displace. It does not appear to have any counterparts in the 
literature. 
We deal with the FTS in the following chapter. We shall see that a natu-
ral extension to the problem, checkpointing, can be dealt with by means of a 
third operator, checkpoint. The new operators in this chapter are successive 
specialisations of checkpoint, but seem to be interesting in their own right. 
3.1 The Displace operator 
We informally met the displace operator, written t, in Chapter 1. Consider the 
following definitions: 
Q'= f.O + a. (b.Q' + f.0) 
QN =  a.b.QN 
where QN  is the normal behaviour of Q', doing a's and b's alternately, while 
Q' itself is a faulty agent that is prepared to fail at any stage by doing an f. 
As Q' is written above, the relation between it and QN  is obscure. There is no 
obvious way to express this relationship simply, using only the usual operators. 
For example, 
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Q't fixX. (QN  + f.X) 
because the right hand agent is prepared to fail only in its initial state, and 
escapes into Pjrfect behaviour as soon as it does an action of QN.  What we need o 
is some formj'ersistent plus", QN t QE, where QN  cannot escape QE  by doing 
an action. We guess that with such an operator we could define a faulty agent 
Q in the form 
QE =  f.O 
Q = QNQE 
i.e. Q QN f-  f.O, which clarifies the relation between Q and QN.  With the 
following definition of 4f, we have Q '-' Q'. The bisimulation is 
	
{(Q, Q), (b-Q 	- f.O, b.Q' + f-0), (0, 0)}. 
Definition 3.1.1 The operational semantics of the displace operator. j- is a 
binary infix operator pM  x PM  PM .  
a 
Normal 
Af -B---A'f - B 
Displace 	
B ± B' 
A4j-B_LB , 
Al 
We call A above the normal agent, and B the exception agent. ij_  in A t B 
looks like + to B, but rather like I to A. A cannot get rid of B by doing an 
action, but B can wipe A out at any time. Synchronisation between the two is 
not permitted. 
A word about the notation. The t symbol would have captured some of the 
properties of our operator: it is a little like + and a little like I. It suitably 
connotes treachery on the part of B towards A, and foreshadows the doom that 
hangs perpetually over the latter's head. Unfortunately, it is not asymmetric. 
It would have been nice.. to have had a sideways t, but this is unavailable, so 
we have to accept the t symbol as a pale shadow! Notice also that the idea of 
precedence is not irrelevant to the relation between A and B. However, the use 
of -< or any similar symbol would suggest a relation rather than an operator. 
The name displace is non-committal about the relationship between A and 
B, but we shall often have in mind applications where B is an interrupt service 
routine, and the behaviour of A t B after a displace will ultimately be very 
like the normal behaviour of A again. For example, in P fixX (A f f.X), the 
exception event actually restarts A. An interesting special case is when f = 1. 
If P is to look like A, then A restarted must look like A continued, a very 
strong constraint. In more realistic situations, B will need to keep track of A's 
evolution, and this can be done with the audit and checkpoint operators we will 
look at later. 
The "disable" operator of LOTOS [Bolognesi and de Nicola86], [BS185], 
[Brinksma85], has had in the past some proposed variants with exactly the se-
mantics of Displace. Its current version has a third rule that allows the normal 
agent to get rid of the exception agent by doing a "termination" (a distinguished 
action). 
[Hoare85] deals briefly with an operator called the "interrupt operator". It 
has exactly the same operational semantics as displace, though this is not for-
malised as such; the operator is defined instead by axioms. We shall point out 
connections between displace and CSP's interrupt. 
A natural question at this stage is whether t is derivable from MCCS; it is. 
See Chapter 5. 
Let us now put t to use. Consider the following: 
P pa.vb.P 
S.= p.v*S 
Here S is a semaphore, and P is a user of S. It is easy to show that 
(PS) \\{p,  v}r.-. a.b. (P15) \\{p,  v} 
The particles a and b make communication between P and S visible, and we can 
see from outside that P observes the usual semaphore discipline. The equation 
above would still hold as a special case even if a = b = 1, but would tell us less. 
More interestingly, 
(PIPIS)\\{p,v}'-.' (PIS) Up,  v} 
We've deliberately left out any representation of what goes on inside or outside 
the critical region so as to get this simple characterisation of two identical users 
sharing a semaphore. 
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Now consider users Q susceptible to failure. Clearly if they fail inside their 
critical regions, they hold up other users. Restarting such a Q outside its critical 
region will deadlock the system, since S will be left in the wrong state. 
The way out is to insist that S should be restarted at the same time. Call 
the restartable semaphore T. Thus we have 
Q = P4j-f . Q 
T=Sg.T 
F= f 1g 1 .F 
where f and g represent failures and F is the demon agent. With f and 
g restricted away, Q and T are synchronised on their displace actions. We 
expect some simple relation between (QIT!F) \\{f, g} and PIS, and that 
(QIQITIF)\\{f,g} (QITIF)\\{f,g}. 
We develop some algebra and study synchronised displacements before we 
return to this example. 
3.1.1 Substitutive properties of Displace 
That J preserves can be shown by trivial bisimulations. In fact, as we shall 
see in Chapter 5, any structured operator preserves 
Proposition 3.1.2 	 o 
preserves 	on the left. But not on the right. This is for the same 
reason that + doesn't preserve . We have a.O 1.a.0 but while P t 1.a.0 can 
autonomously lose the ability to do P actions, P t a.O cannot. If the equivalent 
agents are guarded, we can substitute on the right, as for +. 
Proposition 3.1.3 P Q = P t R Q t R and 
PQ=Ra.PR+I- a.Q 
Proof: By trivial bisimulations. 	 i 
As we would expect from a derived operator, f preserves observational con-
gruence, which for MCCS looks exactly like that for CCS; both differ from weak 
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bisimulation only in that if J C  Q, 1 actions by P cannot be matched by 
inaction by Q. 
Proposition 3.1.4 P cM Q ==> P1-R cm QfR and RP M  RQ. 
Proof: By trivial bisimulations. 	 o 
3.1.2 Equational properties of Displace 
We can guess from the asymmetry in the definition of t that it is not commu-
tative: P Q 't Q P and P Q 0  Q  tP. After an action by P, P 4-f- Q 
can still do actions by Q, whereas Q t-  P would have lost the ability. 
But j is associative, and has 0 as an identity. 
Proposition 3.1.5 (P f Q) 4-f- R P 4-f- (Q t R). Also, P 4-f- 0 P and 
0 4-f- P P. Hence (P/ , 4-f-, 0) is a monoid. 
Proof: By trivial bisimulations. 
Thus we can write P 4-f- Q 4-f- R without ambiguity. 
Now for f and +. A number of plausible equations do not hold. 
1. P+(Q4-f-R)t(P+Q)4t-R 




For 1, an action by P can lose R on the lbs. For 2, 3 and 4, an action by Q 
can lose P on the lbs. Note that 4 is the same as 3, because + is commutative. 
For 5, an action by P can lose R on the rhs. 
Thus the following is mildly surprising. 
Proposition 3.1.6 (Q + R) 4-f- P  (Q fi- P) + (R 4j-  P) 
Proof: With normal actions, whichever of Q or R acts, the other is lost, and 
it makes no difference whether the choice is internal to the normal compo-
nent of one agent, or between two displaceable agents. With displacements, 
the lhs has of course only one way to act; the rhs has the property that the 
displaced behaviour of both agents is the same. 
A1(P,Q,R) 	((Q+R)+f- P, (Qf- P)+(RtP)) 
Case Normal: 
Q--*Q' 	 Q--Q' 
Q+R!Q' Q 4j-P!.Q'tP 
(Q+R) 4t- P-!-Q1 +f- P 	 (Q1-P)+(Rif- P)--*Q't- p 
leading to I 





P—+ pP 	 Q1-P--+P 
(Q+R)1-P--LP' 	 (Qif-P)+(R1-P)-L p' 
leading to I 
We also note that the following special case of absorption holds. 
Proposition 3.1.7 (A if B) + B A if- B o 
Counterparts to the laws we have seen so far are given in [Hoare85}. The 
semantics of CSP is not given using bisimulation, but the two theories agree on 
all but one of the laws above. We have seen (in 5. above) that P t (Q + R) 't 
(P if- Q) + (P t II), but the corresponding equality in CSP holds if we translate 
the + of CCS into the internal choice operator of CSP. This is not in itself an 
indication of the difference between the equivalences used in the two theories, 
because + is not internal choice in CCS. It might be illuminating to notice that 
P f (a.Q + a.R) .t  (P 4f- a.Q) + (P f- a.R), where the +'s now are "internal" 
in the sense that the outside world cannot determine which choice is made. The 
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inequality remains because the actions by P retain both Q and R possibilities 
on the left, but have to drop one on the right. 
Next we look for exactly similar inequalities between t and 1, and now we 




(Q -  R) IP 7t (QIP) t(RIP) 
 
 
For 1, an action by R can lose P on the rhs. For 2 and 3, an action by P can 
lose Q on the rhs. 4 is the same as 3, because I is commutative. For 5, an action 
by Q can lose P on the lhs, whereas one of the P's on the rhs will remain. For 
6, an action by P can lose both Q and R on the lhs, but can only lose one of 
these on the rhs. 
In MCCS, as in CCS, + is idempotent and is not. It is easy to see that 
isn't either, in general. 	 - 
Restriction distributes over t. As usual, we are interested only in the par-
ticulate form of restriction, and we can guess that this result is true because it 
holds for + and for I in the case where the agents on either side of the I cannot 
communicate with each other. 
Proposition 3.1.8 (P t Q) \A( (P\At) +j-  (Q\ jS/) 
Proof: By the following bisimulation. 





P1- Q - P'*f- Q a  
Case Displace: 
a 




(P\Ar) t  (Q\A1) -- (P'\Ar) j- (Q\iV) 
leading to 1. (F', Q) 
Q--Q' aA( 
Q\.Af--* Q'\ 
(P\iV)4j-(Q\Jv) -- Q'\iV 
leading to 1?. (P, Q') 
a 
An easy bisimulation shows that morphism distributes over 
Proposition 3.1.9 (P ij-. Q) [] (P[]) 4j— (Q[g]) 
3.2 Synchronised displacements 
We now come to the Synchronised Displacement Theorem (SDT) for the displace 
operator. The statement of the theorem is: "In any context that synchronises 
the displace actions of A+jB and PQ, (A t B)I(P 4f  Q) (AIP) - (BQ)." 
We talked about synchronising contexts briefly in Section 2.6; they represent 
our first serious use of MCCS instead of CCS. We must now define what we 
mean by the term. Also, the form of the theorem is open to criticism: it does 
not establish a bisimulation pure and simple; it says rather that a bisimulation 
exists in certain contexts. This needs clarification as well. 
[Larsen86] provides us with an elegant and thoroughly worked out theory of 
parameterised bisimulation and context dependent bisimulation, which we can 
use to explain the SDT. We should say right away that we shall not be using 
the formal machinery of [Larsen86]; our needs are too simple to warrant such 
elaborate apparatus. Indeed, early versions of the SDT with essentially the 
same content were developed before Larsen's theory was available, and even the 
current version was arrived at without using it. However, we will outline a trivial 
version of the theory here to give a clear and secure interpretation of our work. 
The interpretation will help ensure that our informal arguments are nonetheless 
consistent and rigorous. 
3.2.1 Context dependent and parameterised bisimula-
tions 
Consider the following definitions: 
Q=q.Q+fz.Q 
S4= s.S + gz 1 .S 
An observer of (QIS) \\{z} will see q's and s's in any order and either singly or 
together, but f and g always together. Now consider the following agents: 
N q.N + s.N + qs.N 
E= fg.E 
We have (QIS) \\{z} (NIE) \\{z} but not QS NIE. We say "QIS NE 
in the context [ ]\\{z}". In this example, we also have (NIE)\\{z} NIE, but 
that is irrelevant to our present purposes. 
[]\\{z} is not the only context that makes the two systems QIS  and  NIE 
equivalent. Let 
F= f 1 g 1 .F 
Then we have (QSF)\\{f,g} (NEF)\\{f,g}. Thus we have found an-
other context in which QIS and  NIE are equivalent; QIS NIE in the context 
([]F)\\{f,g}. 
These context dependent bisimulations are generalisations of the ordinary 
notion of bisimulation, which can now be seen as "equivalence in all contexts". 
If P Q, we certainly have P\\{z} Q\\{z}, but as we saw above the converse 
is not true: we have (QIS) \\{z} " (NjE) \\{z} but not QJS 's-' NIE. 
Now, QIS by itself can do q, s, qs, fg, and fz, gz 1 , sfz and qgz 1 . NIE 
can only do the first four. If we call the first four actions acceptable and the 
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others unacceptable to the context []\\{z}, we can say that QIS .t  NIE because 
of the unacceptable actions. 
A context is a CCS expression with a hole in it. Contexts can be described 
operationally as transducers [Larsen86]: they accept actions from the agent that 
is put in the hole, and transmit (other) actions to the outside. We are here 
concerned with only half of this description: each context can be thought of as 
inducing a set of acceptable actions. 
Definition 3.2.1 An action a is acceptable to a context C[] if VP, F' such that 
P --i F', Bb, C' such that C[P] -- C'[P']. 	 D 
To take our other example, ([]IF) \\{f, g} can be seen intuitively to accept 
only those that either contain no f, g, f', or g 1 particles, or contain these in 
precisely the combination fg. The b of the definition is the same as the accepted 
action, except in the last case, where the f  is stripped off. In this example, C' 
is the same as C, but this need not be, as we will see in other examples. We can 
check that the unacceptable set includes the four actions fz, gz 1 , sfz, qgz 1 . 
The reader can see intuitively that contexts that have unacceptable actions 
must involve the restriction operator. 
Note that the definition cannot specify what action results, or what the re-
sulting context and agent in the hole look like. Can a context cheat, by producing 
the b and C'[P'] from inside itself, and thus only pretend to accept the action? 
I.e., Can we get C[P] b —* C ' [P], the inference not having used P a —+ P, and the 
context C' happening to have P' in it, so that we can interpret C[P] as C"[P']? 
No, because of the following fact. [Larsen86] proves (Proposition 3.2-4) by in-
duction on the structure of C, that the number of pairs (b, C') for given a is 
finite. (The proof assumes image finiteness). We can extend his proof for CCS 
to MCCS. Thus the context cannot cheat for all F, F'. It can mimic only a finite 
number of P's, whereas we can always find another pair of agents Q ---* Q'; we 
only have to put a. in front of an arbitrary agent. 
Given any pair of agents, we can find out if they are equivalent in a given 
context, by using the idea of parameterised bisimulation. In the trivial version of 
parameterised bisimulation that we use, the agents need only be able to match 
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each other on actions acceptable to the context. We temporarily write A  to 
represent such a bisimulation, where the subscript specifies the acceptable subset 
of Act. (We have usually avoided naming sets of actions, and worked with sets 
of particles instead; the deviation here is a temporary expedient). " would be 
the same as P x P; since all actions are unacceptable and to be ignored, every 
agent can match every agent. At the other end, Act would be the same as . 
In our example above, QIS ''A NIE where A = Act - { fz, gz 1 , sfz, qgz 1 }. 
The reader can see that if we used a larger set in the subscript, the statement 
would be false; if we used a smaller set, we would be making an unnecessarily 
weak statement. For example, if we let HZ represent the subset of actions with 
neither a z or z 1 particle, then rjz has a smaller set of acceptable actions than 
A and so relates more pairs than the latter. In general, if A C 13 then 
-4 is an equivalence relation for any set of actions A. 
A parameterised bisimulation itself refers only to the two agents involved; 
it tells us which actions we need consider. Then any context (that induces a 
parameterised bisimulation) that marks at most those actions acceptable, will 
equate the two agents we started with. 
To return to the examples, we can see intuitively that X\\{z} ' Y\\{z} if 
X -rz Y. So because HZ C A, X "'A Y X 'JtfZ Y X\\{z} Y\\{z}. 
Thus because QS -A NIE, we have (QIS) \\{z} (NIE) \\{z}. Similarly, 
the set of actions acceptable to ([] ]IF) \\{f g} explains why (QISJF) \\{f, g} 
(NIEIF) \\{f, g}. 
Let us look again at the theorem to see how far we have got: "If the restart 
actions of AfB and PfQ are synchronised, then (A f B)  I (P t Q) (AIP)I-
(BIQ)." We now think of this as establishing a parameterised bisimulation, one 
of the simplest sort: it marks a subset of Act unacceptable. It allows us to 
substitute the rhs for the lhs in any context that marks the same or a larger 
subset of Act unacceptable. 
3.2.2 Synchronising contexts 
We make a preliminary definition first, a verbal abbreviation. 
Definition 3.2.2 Let A be a set of particles. We say a is an A-action if a E A. 
[I 
Thus if f is a particle, an {f}-action is an action with an f particle in it. We 
abuse notation and write {a}-action for any action a, to mean Part(a)-action. 
Let us modify the example of the last subsection as follows. 
Q=q.Q+rf.Q 
S= s.S + tg.S 
F= f 1g'.F 
We now refer to rf as Q's {f}-action, and to Ig as S's {g}-action. Note that 
an agent P might have an {a}-action, but yet not have an action P -- F'. 
In the context ([]F) \\{f, g}, the agent Q I S is restricted in the following 
way: Q can do its {f}-action only when S does its {g}-action and vice-versa. 
We say the context synchronises {f }- and {g}-actions (of Q and S in this case, 
but the context doesn't care). The formal definition follows shortly; first what 
an observer of (QISIF) \\{f, g} sees: 
Definition 3.2.3 Let A and B be sets of particles. The A-actions of an agent P 
are said to be synchronised with its B-actions if whenever P--, a E A a E B. 
So the {r}-actions of (QISIF) \\{f, g} are synchronised with its {t}-actions. 
The definition of synchronisation allows other possibilities, but we shall only 
see cases where the F' uses either no A-actions and no B-actions, or precisely 
one A-action and precisely one B-action. 
1 cannot be synchronised with any action, since 1 It A for any A. The 
result of a synchronisation can be a 1; the definition allows us to synchronise 
an {a}-action with an la- '}-action. In other words, communication is a spe-
cial case of synchronisation, as usual. It could be of interest to define external 
synchronisation as a special case of synchronisation: we add the restriction that 
A fl 9 = 0 = fl B. This means that the result of a synchronisation is always 
a visible action. Most of our applications will be of this nature, but we do not 
need the restriction for the SDT. 
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In the example above, {f}-, {g}-, {r}- and {t}-actions all occur together, but 
the most significant synchronisation there is that between {r}- and {t}-actions; 
this is what is seen outside the context, and a common programming scenario is 
that this synchronisation is the raison d'etre for F and the f and g particles in 
the actions of Q and S. That {f}- and {g}-actions are synchronised inside the 
context is characteristic of the context: 
Definition 3.2;4 Let A and 13 be sets of particles, and C[] a context. A-actions 
and 8-actions are synchronised in the context C if whenever a is acceptable to 
C,aAsaB. 	 0 
If the condition above is the defining condition for acceptability of an action 
to C[], we say C[] is a synchronising context. Note that 1 is always an acceptable 
action to such a context since it fulfils the synchronisation condition vacuously. 
We are almost done. To tie up the discussion, consider the following variation 
of the example of the last subsection. 
Q= qr.Q t rf.Q 
S=s.Stg.S 
N= qr.N + s.N + qrs.N 
E= rtfg. (NIE) 
F= f 1 g 1 .F 
Now we cannot say that ([]F) \\{f, g} synchronises the {r}-actions of Q with 
the {t}-actions of 5, because both of Q's actions are {r}-actions, and only the 
second is synchronised with the {g}-action of S. While we can say that it 
synchronises the {f}-actions of Q with the {g}-actions of 5, we have seen that 
- this is not a very meaningful statement for the programmer. It is better to 
characterise the situation thus: the context synchronises the displace actions of 
Q and S. 
We are at last ready to formulate the statement we want: "in any context 
C[] that synchronises the displace actions of Q and 5, C[QIS] C[NIE]". We 
prove the statement by showing a parameterised bisimulátion between QJS and 
NIE. 
The acceptable actions of QIS are those generated by inferences that use 
either both or neither of the displace actions. Note that this is an intensional 
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description. To find out the acceptable set, we have to look at the (insides of) 
the agents Q and 5, in order to tell when they are doing displace actions. Thus 
the "if" part of the statement tells us explicitly which inferences of QIS are 
acceptable: normal actions singly or together, displace actions together. We can 
find matching inferences for NJE; since they match, they will be acceptable, so 
we don't have to worry about acceptability for this direction of the proof. 
The question is: what are the acceptable inferences of the rhs (that the lhs 
has to match)? The condition does not tell us directly, since neither Q nor S 
appear in the rhs. One way is to list out the acceptable actions resulting from 
the lhs, and consider all inferences of the rhs that produce one of these. This is 
possible for concrete examples, but is not possible for the SDT, which, like all 
useful general theorems, sets up an equivalence between expressions rather than 
given agents. There, we use the structural relation between the lhs and the rhs 
to determine which inferences of the latter are acceptable. 
Once we have proved the SDT, the next question is: how do we know when 
it is applicable? It is usually quite easy to see when we have a context that 
synchronises the displace actions of two agents, but let us formalise once and for 
all the situation we will meet in our applications of the SDT. 
Proposition 3.2.5 Let Q, 5, D be agents and f, g, h actions such that 
g, h It Q, f, h It 8, and f, g It V. Suppose also that f 1 , g, h Q, and 
similarly for S and V. Let F = f_lg_ih_l.F. Then the {f}-actions of Q and 
the {g}-actions of S are synchronised in the context ([ ]IDIF)\\{f, g, h}. D 
In fact these actions will be synchronised with the {h}-actions of D, but that 
might not be relevant to the immediate application of the proposition. Putting 
D = 0 and h = 1 in the proposition gives us the case where Q and S are the 
only agents in the context ([ ] IF) \\{f, g}. 
We shall program so that an action of Q carries an f particle if it is a 
displace; and similarly for S and D with g and h. Note in particular that none 
of the agents has a 1 as a displace action. 
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3.2.3 The Synchronised Displacement Theorem (SDT) 
Theorem 3.2.6 SDT (for the Displace operator) 
In any context C [ ]  that synchronises the displace actions of A t B and P t Q, 
C [(A t B) I (P 4j- Q)] C [(AP) j-  (B IQ)]. 
Proof: The form of the statement is chosen to show up the relation to the 
general versions of the SDT to follow. The condition can immediately be 
simplified to "If B and Q are synchronised", because the displace actions of 
A +f-  B are precisely those of B. 
The left hand agent can act in the following ways: 
A[P]: Either component can do a normal action; 
AP: two normal actions can synchronize; 
BQ: two displacements can synchronize. 
The displacements cannot occur independently because of the constraint; 
similarly, A cannot synchronize with Q because B is forced to act with Q, 
and that precludes an action by A. 
We start with the acceptable inferences of the rhs. It can do a normal action 
in three ways: A alone or P alone (covered by case A[P] above), or A and P 
together (case AP). A displace can happen with B and Q acting together 
(case BQ). Note that we do not bother to prove separately that these are 
acceptable inferences; we shall just see that they can be matched. 
We have to show that inferences with B (or Q) acting alone are unaccept-
able. For this simple theorem, we need only say that this is directly given 
by the condition. Notice that the condition of the theorem implies that 





which cannot be matched, and can- 
(AIP) 4 I- (BIQ)-1-B'IQ 
not be ruled unacceptable because 1 is always acceptable to a synchronising 
context. 
The bisimulation for the acceptable inferences follows. 









(AIP)j-(B IQ) ---)(A'JP) 4j- (BIQ) 
leading to .'V(A',B,P, Q) 
Case AP: 
a 	 P A—IA P-4P 
, AIP— 
ap
A, J P 
(AJP)t(BIQ)_(A'Ip') 4j- (BIQ) 
leading to A1 (A', B, F', Q) 
Case BQ: 
B— ) B' 
, 	 q 
A 4j— B—LB' PtQ!Q 1 




(AIP) 4i- (BIQ) - -)B'IQ' 
leading to A1 (A, B', F, Q') 
FE 
The role of the synchronisation condition in the proof 
The synchronisation condition rules out the awkward cases in the bisimulation 
where one side cannot match a move by the other. If the components in the left 
hand agent are allowed to do independent displacements, or if one component 
can do a normal action and synchronise with a displace action by the other, we 
get into trouble. The condition is refined; it rules out just these cases and no 
others. We could say our specification of the contexts in which the equivalence 
holds is as weak as possible. 
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Case B[Q]: Independent Displacement, leading to agents differing in form: 





leading to MISMATCH 
Case AQ[BP]: Normal combining with Displace, leading to agents different in form; 
actions also differ: 
Q--'Q' 
Aj -B --A'j-B PtQ!+Q 1 
Q --3 Q, 
BJQ--BjQ' 
(AIP)j- (BIQ) --!- BjQ' 
leading to MISMATCH 
U 
Consider other conditions under which the theorem could hold. For instance, 
could constraints on sorts rule out Case AQ? We might then be able to have 
an ordinary bisimulation, and avoid context dependent bisimulations. It is not 
obvious how to do this in MCCS, but in a two sorted calculus we could have 
all displace actions belong to one sort and normal actions to the other, with 
products between different sorts undefined. But such conditions can only rule 
out synchronisation, not enforce it. So Case B would still lead naturally to 
enforced synchronisation as a condition, and Case AQ would then get ruled out 
automatically. Thus we have nothing to gain in this case from a two-sorted 
calculus. 
We now give two corollaries of the SDT. 
Corollary 3.2.7 In any context C[] that synchronises B and F, C[(A t B) IF] 
C[A 4j_  (BIF)] 
Proof: F.sO+fF. 	 U 
So if the displace actions are all triggered by a demon, we can put the demon 
in parallel with the exception agent. Note that the synchronisation condition 
implies that the demon does not synchronise or communicate with the normal 
agent. Further, if the exception agent does immediate restarts, we get a system 
that restarts autonomously. Put p = 1 in the following corollary. 
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Corollary 3.2.8 Let P = A f-  pf.P, F = f 1 .F, and f, f 1  E A. Then 
(PIF)\\{f} -S, where 	 0 
Asymmetry in the statement of the SDT 
The synchronisation condition of the SDT is not only intensional, it is also 
asymmetric, since the contexts under which the equivalence holds are specified 
in terms of the lhs. Thus given a context and the lhs, we can easily see whether 
we can replace the lhs by the rhs, but if we start with a context and the rhs, we 
cannot immediately see if the theorem is applicable. 
Predictably, then, we will always use the theorem left to right. 
The lhs also has more of the flavour of an implementation than the rhs, 
since the intensionality in the condition applies only to it. This is borne out 
by our applications, where the rhs is usually a simplification (specification) of 
the lhs. Given the directionality of application, this seems to make the SDT 
a "bottom-up theorem"; in so far as an equivalence can be either top-down or 
bottom-up. 
Since in our applications of the SDT we always use one particular form of 
context, we could consider a form of the theorem that started with it and specified 
the acceptable set. We would then avoid specifying the acceptable inferences, 
and our justification of the proof method could be less long-winded. Some earlier 
versions of the theorem can with hindsight be interpreted as attempts in this 
direction. But those versions still equated two agents with the same forms as 
in the present SDT, and the end result was that the agents were specified very 
much more tightly; for example, with only one given displace action permitted. 
Thus no feeling of top-down-ness resulted automatically because we started with 
the context. A further price was that the notion of synchronisation remained ill 
defined. The theorems were symmetric, but this was not particularly valuable. 
A more basic asymmetry in the SDT is that we cannot in general guess 
at the lhs starting from the rhs, because I is symmetric: from (AlP) 4j_  (BIQ) 
we cannot construct the lhs, because we cannot tell whether A goes with B 
or with Q. There is more information in the lhs, which is another reason for 
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considering it the implementation. If it were not for this loss of information, the 
earlier asymmetry would only be an inconvenience in that given the rhs and a 
context, we would have to construct the lhs before we could check the context 
for suitability. 
As it turns out, the symmetry of I leads to a curious result for 4f- . Suppose 
that we start with the rhs of the SDT, and foolishly try to construct the lhs 
anyway. For 4f- , we can't go wrong! 
Proposition 3.2.9 In a context that synchronises the displace actions of A t B 
Proof: 	A context that synchronises the displace actions of the lhs also 
synchronises the displace actions of the rhs. Both are then equivalent to 
(AlP) t (BIQ), by the SDT. 11 
Which says that it doesn't matter if the programmer attaches exception 
agents to normal agents wrongly! Is this a disaster? No. The result is true 
only under the synchronisation condition, and then only because with t the 
exception agents don't interact at all with their normal wards. We just have 
a set of normal agents, all of which will be wiped out simultaneously and be 
replaced by the set of exception agents. 
This curiosity does not hold for the audit and checkpoint operators, because 
there we have a linkage between normal and exception agents. Technically, the 
attempt to run the SDT backwards is also worse with those operators because, 
as we shall see, there is greater loss of information from left to right. 
3.2.4 The semaphore example 





F= f 1g'.F 
the perfect user 
the semaphore 
the faulty user 
the faulty semaphore 
the demon 
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AN (PIS) \\{p,  v} 
A4 (QITIF) \\{f, g, p, v} 
AN a.b.AN 
A ((QjT) \\{p,  v} IF) \\{f g} 
the perfect system 
the fault tolerant system 
moving \\{p,  v} over F 
(QIT) \\{p, v}.—' ((PIS) t fg. (QIT)) \\{p, v} 	by SDT 
AN t fg.(QT)\\{p,v} 
distributing restriction over t; SDT eq 
A ((QIT) \\{p, v} IF) \\{f } 
((AN t fg. (Q IT) \\{p,v}) F)\\{f,g} 	SDT in context 
AN t LA 	 by Corollary 3.2.8 
Thus the faulty system A has a simple relationship to the original system 
(P IS) \\{ p, v}, but they are not observationally equivalent, for Q might fail after 
an a, and get backed up to before it, thus producing two consecutive a's. We 
have to be able to back up to different points to be able to avoid this. (Note 
that we will not get two b's. The asymmetry is because of the restart state.) If 
we put a = 1, we get A AN. 
But we can prove that the system recovers from faults without deadlocking, 
and that two users look like one in this context. The demon must now cause both 
to fail at the same time as the semaphore. (Obviously, we would like to exempt 
the user outside its critical region from this community failure! But more of this 
later). 
Let 
F2 4= f 2 g 1 .F2 
BN= (PIPIS) \\{p, v} 
B= (QIQITIF2) \\{f, g, p, v} 
fails semaphore and both users 
two user perfect system 






AN 	 as expected for the fault-free users 
and 
(QIQT) \\{p, v}.--'  (QI ((PS) t fg. (QIT))) \\{p, v} 	by SDT 
((PIPIS) 41- f2g.  (QIQIT)) \\{p, v} by SDT 
Bp,r t f 2g. (QIQIT) \\{p,v} 
distributing restriction over f; SDT eq. 
B.— ((QJQIT)\\{p,v}F 2 )\\{f,g} 
((BN t f2g.  (QIQIT) \\{p, v}) IF2 ) \\{f, g}SDT in context 
.-- BN 41- 1.B 	 by Corollary 3.2.8 
111.1 A 	 defined by the same equation as B 
Thus the two-user fault-tolerant system is congruent to the single-user fault 
tolerant system. 
3.2.5 Would a restart operator do better? 
Consider how the previous example would look without the new operator, par-
ticularly in CCS with interleavings and protocols. We appear in comparison to 
have done better, but our modest little success has come at a price: MCCS, 
and a strong constraint, the synchronisation condition. Worse, all three seem 
linked. It is time to take stock. 
The move to MCCS from CCS has ruled out the protocol problem by fiat, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, but because it is not a "natural" part of the problem, we 
don't feel too guilty about this. Both MCCS and 41- might be useful elsewhere 
as well. It is the SDT and the synchronisation condition that need comment. 
The SDT is as significant for the conditions under which it holds, and the 
general framework necessary (MCCS, some form of synchronisation, a simple 
version of context-dependent bisimulation), as for its statement. In fact the 
design decisions underlying the three checkpoint operators are interwoven with 
the SDT, and both operators and theorem need synchronisation; since SCCS 
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and ASCCS are unsuitable, this leads to MCCS. While it seems reasonable to 
suppose that MCCS is independently applicable, the same cannot be said of the 
other components of the package, particularly the more complicated audit and 
checkpoint operators. The whole lot should thus be seen together as a suggested 
analysis of restartable systems. 
Can we do better with a different operator? We are using 4j_  in only a limited 
way, to restart. Suppose we define a restart operator directly. Would its more 
restricted behaviour give better theorems? 
Definition 3.2.10 The operational semantics of the binary restart operator, 
rest. 
Normal  





We can use this operator to represent faulty versions etc. very much as we 
used t. Most of the properties of the f carry over to rest, some with minor 
modifications. The SDT carries over as well, with the same condition. Thus we 
cannot do any better with this more structured operator. 
In fact any attempt to analyse exception handling along these lines leads 
naturally to the SDT condition. If we want an operator p to have the property 
p(Ni ,Ei ) Ip(N2,E2) p((N 1 N2 ) ,(E1 IE2 )) 
where the semantics of p involve a suspension of normal processing upon the 
exception event, we see that the rhs cannot suspend normal processing in just 
one component. Which leads us to ask why we want such a theorem in the 
first place. Our long list of inequalities shows that other ways of analysing the 
structure are not likely to be very successful, at least with t or rest. The sort 
of distributivity we have in the SDT is the best we have done so far towards 
a simple analysis of distributed restartable systems. Thus we seem to be stuck 
with synchronised displacements. The semaphore example shows that they are 
not unnatural. 
We conclude this section by mentioning some related work. We have already 
mentioned CSP's interrupt operator and the disable operator of LOTOS. CSP 
also has a restart operator which can be translated as restart1 (P) '-' P + f.P. 
However, this translation suggests that there is a family of operators, one for 
each f. In fact, CSP uses a distinguished action instead of any f, and so has 
only one restart operator. 
[He, Jifeng and Hoare861 solve a problem closely related to the FTS problem 
of [Prasad84]. Differences in framework and formulation, as also the difference 
in the equivalence relation used, make the connection between the two papers 
non-obvious. For our purposes, we note only that [He, Jifeng and Hoare86] also 
use a synchronised displacement condition, thus strengthening our confidence in 
its naturalness, if not inevitability. 
3.2.6 The displaced environment theorem 
Here we use parameterised bisimulation, [Larsen86], a little less trivially, but still 
very simply. Readers who wish to can skip this section without loss of continuity. 
First we finish our elementary introduction to Larsen's theory by pointing out 
how grossly we have simplified it. The parameterised bisimulation of [Larsen86] 
is far more powerful than our simplified version above. The subscript is in general 
an environment (we simplify immediately again, and think of it as just a CCS 
agent), and the set of actions it can immediately perform is our acceptable set 
above. But on the next step, the set of acceptable actions might change: to show 
P ' Q we have to show for each a such that 0 -- 0' and P -- P that we 
have a Q' such that Q -- Q'and P o' Q', and also of course that P can match 
Q. If 0 is the family of 0 and all its derivatives, we need an 0-indexed family 
of bisimulations, not just one parameterised bisimulation. 
Definition 3.2.11 Let 0 be a family of agents closed under —.Then an 
0-parameterised bisimulation, 7Z., is an 0-indexed family of binary relations, 
1, c  P x P for 0 E 0 such that whenever P7 0Q the following holds: 
Va E Act if 0 -- 0', then 
if P -- F' then, for some Q', Q -.+ Q' and P'R01 Q', 
if Q 
---) 
Q' then, for some F', P -- P and P"R 0 Q' 
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P and Q are said to be equivalent in an environment 0 E 0 2  1ff 3 an 0-
parameterised bisimulation, R, such that PR oQ. Then we write P o Q. 0 
o is an equivalence relation for all 0. Any two agents P and Q are re-
lated by P '-o Q, because the environment 0 does not care about any actions 
at all, and the relation u, where U is the universal agent that can do every 
action at every stage, is the same as , because now the environment cares 
about all actions. The more possibilities the environment has, the stronger the 
parameterised bisimulation. P Q implies P o Q for all 0. 
Thus our special case can be thought of as dealing with environments of the 
form 0 >aEA a.O where the sum is over the set of acceptable actions. Thus 
the environment does not change as the matching agents evolve, and our family 
of environment agents is a singleton set. The form of our environment agents 
shows that they can each be characterised completely by their sets of acceptable 
actions, which justifies the notation we adopted briefly a little while ago. 
We will only use strong parameterised bisimulation. For completeness, we 
mention that we have merely touched on a small area of [Larsen86]. Among 
the many topics he deals with, are, for example, extension of the theory to 
weak bisimulation, a generl study of contexts as environment transformers, and 
modal properties of parameterised bisimulation and of contexts. 
We have already seen some examples of parameterised bisimulations. The 
semaphore example gives us another instance, this time not characterisable by 
a set of actions. 
P4= pa.vb.P 
	
the perfect user 
S= p'.v'.S the semaphore 
	
Here PIP P, but (PIPIS) \\{p,  v} (PIS) \\{p,  v}, and of course P 	PIP. 
What other environments equate the two? 
One suitable environment is P itself: PIP p P. But this is silly; if we 
had a more detailed specification of P, we would certainly not want to restrict 
consideration to such a limited environment. We expect that the semaphore 
does not care about actions other than p or v; for these, it enforces its discipline. 
The following environment meets this intuition: 
N Ir r.N + x.N' 
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N'.= E,. r.N' + EY y.N 
The sum over r is over all actions that have no p or v particles, x is over all 
actions with a single p particle, and y is over all actions with a single v particle. 
As the reader can check, we have PIP "N P. This parameterised bisimulation 
is in fact the strongest we can get, and is what is predicted for the context 
([]IS)\\{p,v} by Larsen's theory. 
Now we have already proved that two faulty users Q are congruent to one 
in the context of a faulty semaphore T if the failures are synchronised, though 
we did not at that stage separate out the semaphore: we proved that (QIT) 
(QIQIT) in the context of suitable demons. 
We would like to do the proof over again. We ask if we can prove QQ Q 
in the context of T (and the demons). If we consider the demon context as 
outermost, enclosing the semaphore context, which encloses the faulty users, we 
see that QIQ and  Q are in a context that has normal and exception states, and 
that a "displace" in the context (i.e. transition to exception state) is synchronised 
with the displace actions of the users. We also know that PIP '-' P in the 
environment N of a normal semaphore. Can we complete the proof by dealing 
with just the exception agents in their exceptional context? Yes, because of the 
following theorem. Note that because we haven't said formally how a context 
induces environments, this theorem should be taken as an outline of how such 
an argument might made formally. 
Theorem 3.2.12 Let 
P=PN 4 fPE 
Q = QNQE 
Let C[ ] be a context that synchronises the displace actions of P and Q, and 
induces the environment 0 = N t E, where E accepts only the displace actions 
of either P or Q, and N accepts no displace actions. Suppose PN N QN and 
PE E QE. Then C[P] r-. C[Q]. 
Proof: The parameterised bisimulation is as follows: For every agent 0 of 
the form N f E, 10 consists of all pairs (P, Q) where P is of the form 
PN t FE, Q is of the form QN t QE, and PN N QN and PE E QE. Add 
in the pairs o  for all 0 E 0, where 0 is the family of all derivatives of 0. 
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We outline the proof. 
Start from P o Q. If 0 does a normal action, N -a-. N', P can only do 
a normal action, because all displaces are synchronised. If p  ---* Ph, we 
have because PN N QN, QN -s--' Q'N, such that Pb "N' Q' . We reach the 
pair (F', Q') in 'R-0 , where P' is Pbt PE, Q' is Q'N t QE and 0' is N't E. 
If 0 does a displace action, so does P, and Q can match this because 
PE E QE. We reach the pair (P, Q' ), which is in E'. 	 0 
Here are the definitions again for the semaphore example. We've included a 
new faulty "double" user Q2  that needs an f 2  to fail. 
P4= pa.vb.P the perfect user 
S4=p 1 .v 1 .S the semaphore 
Q4= P t f.Q a faulty user 
Q24= P 4j_ f 2 .Q the faulty "double" user 
T4= S t g.T the faulty semaphore 
F4= f 1 g 1 .F the demon 
F2 4= f 2 g 1 .F2 the double demon 
to prove prove QJQ and Q2  congruent in the context of T and F2 . 
We proved earlier that a two-user fault tolerant system is congruent to a 
single-user one. We had (QQITIF2)\\{p,v,f,g} '.-' (QITJF)\\{p,v,f,g}. We 
can show easily that (Q2ITJF2) \\{p, v, f, g} is also equal to these two. 
Now we want to do the proof over again, showing that Q I Q ''o Q2 where 0 
is the environment corresponding to the context ([ ]TF2) \\{p,  v, f, g}. Call this 
context C. To be fussy, C is really the context of the semaphore enclosed in a 
context about which we only know that it synchronises the displace actions of 
the semaphore and the users. 
We outline the proof informally. The environment corresponding to C is 
0 N t & e.0, where N is the environment of the perfect semaphore. The 
second term (call it E) is summed over all actions e that have precisely two f 
particles in them. The demon synchronises the displace action of the semaphore 
with any such action. The context then looks exactly as it did at the start. 
We have PIP 	P. We have to show f.QII.Q ''E f2  42- The left hand side 
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is forced to synchronise (E is not interested in actions with just one f), and we 
finish up in the same pair of the bisimulation as we started. 
Now apply the above theorem. 
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3.3 The Audit operator 
We want to generalise the f operator so that the exception agent can keep track 
of the progress of the normal one, and thus restart it at different states. In our 
semaphore example, if the errant user could be restarted inside the critical region 
or outside depending on where the failure occurred, we might get observational 
equivalence between the fault-free and faulty systems. 
With the displace operator, the exception agent cannot change state to keep 
track of normal processing, because any action by it immediately aborts the 
normal agent. So the new operator must allow the exception agent to perform 
actions that are not displacements. There seems little reason to allow the excep-
tion agent to change state by itself, except for displace actions as usual. Thus 
the new actions by the exception agent will always be in synchronisation with 
the normal agent. We could even allow communication between the normal and 
exception agents; this is in fact what happens with the checkpoint operator we 
define later. But it is quite complicated and is unnecessary for our immedi-
ate goals. The exception agent needs only to eavesdrop on some actions, the 
significant ones that require a change of state on restart. 
For example, most modern text editors have significant commands that 
change the file being edited, such as insert and delete, and several insignificant 
commands that do not, such as scrolling, viewing, helping, etc. The exception 
handler should now be thought of as an audit trail mechanism ("journal file" and 
"log file" are other commonly used terms) that records significant commands. It 
does not save the state of the edited file; should failure occur, recovery consists 
of re-running all the commands in the journal file. 
We propose a variant of the displace operator to program such applications. 
Insignificant actions of the application do not need to be recorded in the journal 
file, so the exception agent ignores them; i.e. they become normal actions as 
seen by the operator. 
Significant actions, or audited actions as we shall call them, are handled by 
the audit rule for the new operator. The simplest kind of auditing would be for 
both agents to do the entire action. This would be like the parallel operator in 
CSP, or like various other synchronisation and conjunction operators in LOTOS 
and SCCS. This is a little too restrictive for most purposes. In text editors, 
deleting a line usually causes the display to change as well. One action is audited 
and the other normal, but it is natural to synchronise the two, to prevent others 
from intervening. 
The exception agent acts alone for displacements, precisely as with the dis-
place operator. The resulting state will not in general be that it would have 
been had a displace occurred earlier; more commands would have gone into the 
log file. 
Definition 3.3.1 The operational semantics of the audit operator. 4j is a 
binary operator pM  x pM that is parameterised by a set C of particles, 
called the audit set. 
Normal 	 A--A' aC 
Displace 
	 B -- B' rC 
Audit 	 B B' aCb bEC 
0 
The normal and displace rules differ from those for the displace operator. 
They now insist that there should be no particles from the audit set C. The 
reason for this will become clear shortly. 
In the audit rule, the resulting action is what the normal agent does, thus 
giving an external appearance of normalcy. This action has at least one particle 
from the audit set,. and possibly some not in it. The exception agent keeps track 
by doing an action consisting of all the particles from the audit set. These last 
two statements are what the side conditions express, as we shall now see. 
To define the predicate aCb, we begin by defining the auxiliary relation equal-
ity over C. Consider two actions a and b expressed as products of non-opposing 
particles. Informally, we would like to say that they are equal over C if the parts 
of the two products that use particles from C are equal. Thus if we define these 
parts of the products as ac and be,  where c  is a unary operator called projection 
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on C, we can define equality over C conveniently as ac = bc, rather than define 
a series of parameterised equality relations. 
Definition 3.3.2 Let C be a set of particles, and a =. . . Al-be an action 
where the A, are all distinct, and the; are all non-zero integers. Suppose that 
A 1 ... A i E C and that A 1 . . . C. Then the projection of a onto C, ac, is 
defined to be 
Thus the projection of a on C is the product of all particles of a that are in 
C. Our use of the term "projection" is roughly the same as in geometry or linear 
algebra, but the analogy is incomplete and dangerous because our sorts are based 
on submonoids instead of subgroups. Thus the projection of a 1 on Part(a) is 1, 
not a 1 , which would have been the result with sorts based on subgroups. For 
another example, note that (ab)c = acbc is false: if a is particulate, b = a 1 , and 
C = {a}, the left hand side will be 1 whereas the right hand side will be a. 
Definition 3.3.3 Two actions a and b are said to be equal over a set of particles 
C if ac = b. If further, these projections are not 1, we say a and b are checkpoint 
equal over C and write aCb. That is, we denote "ac = bc and a E C" by aCb. 0 
Checkpoint equality is the sole side condition of the checkpoint rule for the 
checkpoint operator. We have chosen to separate it out, and have two side 
conditions for the audit rule to facilitate comparison. 
The first thing to notice is that the checkpoint equality condition insists that 
every significant particle in the normal agent's action is to be tracked by the 
exception agent. The side condition in the displace rule enables us to look at 
any action of the exception agent and say unambiguously whether it is a displace 
or part of an audit. The same reason motivates the side condition in the normal 
rule all actions of the normal agent are separated unambiguously into either 
significant or insignificant. We now see that the side condition on the normal 
rule prevents any leaking away of significance. 
We decide that 1 cannot be a significant action. In the editor application, 
autonomous actions by the editor (garbage collection, for example) should not 
alter the file! This explains why the audit rule insists that there should be a 
visible particle from the audit seth It follows that the exception agent cannot do 
a 1 as its contribution to an audit action. These decisions also mesh well with the 
SDT; see the discussion following the theorem. That the visibility condition and 
equality of projection are presented together as a single predicate, checkpoint 
equality, is just an abbreviation. 
Since we are keeping audits and other actions mutually exclusive for both 
normal and exception agents, and since we don't want to limit ourselves to rigid 
agents, 1 is allowed as a normal or displace action, as with the displace operator. 
1 It C for all C. 
Proposition 3.3.4 A B A t B 
Proof: All actions of A are acceptable as normal actions, because any a 
vacuously satisfies the condition a It 0. Similarly, any action of B can be a 
displace. There are no audit particles, so the audit rule never applies. D 
Obviously, we have to program to avoid having actions of A or B that are 
not allowed to contribute via any of the three rules. Similarly, we could put in as 
many particles into C as we like, but including particles that are not in B will not 
affect either displace or audit actions; it will only restrict some normal actions. 
Similarly including particles not in A will merely restrict B's displacements. A 
more sensible way to program these cases is to use the restriction operator! It 
pays to keep C as small as possible, because it will then be easier to check that 
the conditions for the SDT apply. 
So far the discussion applies equally to the checkpoint operator. The first 
consequence of the second side condition is that the resulting action is just what 
the normal agent did. Matters are considerably messier with the checkpoint 
operator, and we have sometimes to prove action equality in bisimulation proofs. 
Another consequence of the second side condition is that the normal and 
exception agents cannot communicate. With the checkpoint operator, the nor-
mal agent can actually pass values to the exception agent, for example, some 
indication of its current state. In the audit rule, the exception agent can only 
keep track by stringing along and making its own estimates as to where the nor-
mal agent would have got to. With deterministic agents, we can program this 
RIC 
very well, because the exception agent knows all the significant actions that have 
happened. 
A third consequence, that we shall sometimes use in proofs, is that a in that 
rule can be written in the form bx, where x It C. Thus the two conditions 
together are equivalent to "a can be written as a product of non-opposed actions 
b and x, where x It C, b E C, and b 1." (Remember that b E C means that all 
the particles of b are in C.) 
In the next two sections, we briefly examine substitutive and equational prop-
erties of tc before studying synchronised agents. Desirable properties which fail 
to hold for fi–  of course also fail for the more general 4j,  so we refer the reader 
back to Section 3.1 for these. 
We shall often say "audit operator", or "j", to mean the family 4j  indexed 
by C. This informal usage parallels that of "action prefix". In this sense, the 
audit operator is a generalisation of displace, because one instance of the family, 
A to B, is the same as t. 
3.3.1 Substitutive properties of the Audit operator 
Proposition 3.3.5 
As for t , is substitutive on the left but not on the right of tc . 
Proposition 3.3.6 P Q = P tc R Q tc R. 
Proof: 	By bisimulation. Remember that 1 is acceptable as a normal 
action. For the audit case, if P---P', 
a 	, 
Q —+ Qi 
i 
— Q2 —Q and P Q , . 
Tc match 
— 	
th h s d 
P -,P' R?  R' aCb bEC 	 QQ 1 1* -~- C 
, 	 e roes 	k 
PteR--*P'jcR' 	 QcRL4Q l 4lcR 
Qi'Q2 R--R' aCb b C 	Q2Q' 1 1 1t c then and 
Q 1 R--Q 2 flR' 
+jc does not preserve even 	on the right. If Q cm 5, consider P tc Q 
and P 4j  S. To match an audit action of Q's, S might begin by doing l's. But 
there are Q1,Q2,Q'  such that 
M 
•i 
these will be displacements, and will abort F! For the same reason, tc fails to 
preserve As we shall see in Chapter 5, this means that tc is not derivable 
from either MCCS or ASCCS. 
3.3.2 Equational properties of audit 
Restriction distributes unconditionally over tc because the normal and exception 
agent do not communicate; i.e. the actions they do as their contributions to an 
audit action (the only time they act together), have no opposing particles. 
Proposition 3.3.7 (P ta Q) \JV (P\AI) tc (Q\A1) 
Proof: By bisimulation. Normal and displace actions are as for t. For 
audit, if P p- P/ , both sides need p It iV. 	 0 
Morphism distributes over jz if it is a relabelling, i.e., if it is an isomorphism. 
We use the notation q5(C) to mean {blb = qba,a E C}. 
Lemma 3.3.8 a < C 4==0(a) E q5(C) and aCb 	cb(a)q(C)q(b). 	0 
Proposition 3.3.9 If 0 is an isomorphism, (P tc Q) [q] (P[O]) to(c) (Q[q]). 
0 
tc  is obviously not commutative, but is it associative? We shall see that 
(P tc Q) tc R P ta (Q 4fr R) holds, but that (P tc Q) R P tc (Q R) is 
not true in general. It is instructive to investigate the conditions under which it 
is, for we use the same kind of argument as we need for the SDT, and motivate 
several lemmas about particles and checkpoint equality that we need for that 
proof. 
We quote the one we need for the proof below: 
Particles 3. If P fl V C C and 	and p It C then p V. 
Remember that we use P for the sort of an agent P. 
Proposition 3.3.10 IfPflV cc and 'R.flC C V then (P4f_Q)4j_R 
Ple(QjvR). 
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Proof: The condition is needed because if V has particles of P not in C, i.e., 
the outer agent audits particles not audited by the inner, the lbs will stop 
normal actions of P permitted on the right. If C has particles of 1. not in 
D, i.e., the inner agent protects itself against displace actions permitted by 
the outer, R can do some displace actions on the lbs not permitted on the 
rhs. 
The first condition is needed for audit actions by P and Q. If V is too big, 
the lbs might stop an audit by P 4j Q because of the non-C particles in 
P's action; Q's contribution has to pass through V on both sides, so is no 
problem. 
No conditions are needed for audit actions by Q and R; this is because the 
result looks like a normal action by Q, which has to pass through both C 
and V on both sides. 
More subtly, the conditions also ensure that P and R cannot do an audit 
together, without a contribution from Q. If this were allowed, P's contribu-
tion on the ]hs would be a normal action to P flcQ,  whereas R's contribution 
on the rhs would be a displace to Q R, wiping out Q. The condition pre-
vent this disaster by ensuring that a normal action by P (filtered through 
C) can have no particles in V, and similarly for R filtered through V. 
For both sides, an inference can be labelled unambiguously by saying which 
of F, Q or R contributes. For example, PR can only mean a normal action 
by P 4f Q contributing to an audit action by (P te Q) R, and can only be 
matched by P tc (Q R) by its PR inference anyother inference would 
use premises not used on the lbs. The table below lists all the cases, giving 
for each the additional assumptions on side-conditions needed by the lbs 
and rhs. The reader will find it easier to follow the table in conjunction 
with the bisimulation, also given below. 
An arrow -' labels the case where we consider how the rhs might match the 
lhs; - the other way. 
P - Unconditionally. 
- Need P -- P' and p It C = p V. See Particles 3. 
Q 	Unconditionally. 
B - Need R --f  R' and r It V ===> r It C. See Particles 3. 
- Matches the rhs unconditionally. 
PQ -* Need q 1E V. Every particle in q is in p, which has no particles in 
V. 
i- Need p It V. p can be written qx where q It V and x It C. By 




~ R' pVr rEV PR -p The lhs inference is 
is not to act, any inference on the rhs will lose it. Fortunately, the 
PR inference on the lhs is impossible because by Particles 3, p  It C 
and P --* F' imply p It V. Then we cannot have pVr. 
RrR' rV 
- 	 4j-v R !: ~ R' 	pCr r C 
	




inference on the lhs can get rid of Q alone. Fortunately, the PR 
inference on the rhs is impossible because by Particles 3, r V 
and B --p R' imply r A C. Then we cannot have pCr. 
PQR - Need qVr. We have pCq and pVr. Every particle of P that is in 
V is in C, by Particles 3. Every particle of q is in p. 
- Need pVr from pCq and qVr. We can write p as qx and q as ry, 
where x It C and y V. By Particles 3, x E V. 
The bisimulatiori below lists all but the case ruled out. 
A1(P,Q,R) 	((PIcQ)R ) Ptc(Qf , R)) 
Case P: 
p_!p' p9C 
pV 	 pC 





q t E) 
Q)Q' qV 
QDR - --Q'fVR  q C 
P1c(QR) -- Q'vR 






leading to I 
Case PQ: 
p p' 	L, ' pCq q E C 
pt CQI 	pV  
QQ' qV 
p-! -p' QvR --+Q'vR pCq q E C 
P4 c(Q 4 R)-P'c(Q'ftj,R) 
leading to A( (P', Q', R) 
Case QR: 
Q-!-+Q' qC 
PtcQ---Q' Rr * R qDr rEV 
(PflcQ)R--Q'f v R' 
qDr rEV 
qC 
leading to I 
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Case PQR: 
p_!p' Q?,QI pCq q E C 
PcQ--*P' 4fcQ' 	R--R' pDr rEV 
Q 2 'Q 	 qDr rEV 
p-!-p' 	QvR--*Q'vR' 	pCq q E C 
leading to Iv' (P', Q', R') 
0 
Corollary 3.3.11 (P 4j Q) tc R P tc (Q tc R). 	 11 
Thus we can write P fj Q tc R without ambiguity. (P/ '-', , 0) is not a 
monoid, however, because 0 is an identity for 4j  only in the following practically 
useless case. 
Proposition 3.3.12 	 0 
As for 4f,  most absorptive and distributive laws do not hold for 4,  but the 
following exception for 4f  survives. 
Proposition 3.3.13 (Q + R) te P (Q tc F) + (R tc P) 
Proof: 	By bisimulation. Normal and displace actions as for j- . Audit 
actions can occur in two ways, with either Q or R contributing, but it 
still doesn't matter whether the choice between the two is made within the 
normal component of one agent, or between two agents. o 
But we no longer have the following: (A tc B) + B A tc B, for now the 
behaviour of B as an exception agent is curbed by C. A more sensible viewpoint 
is that B in the audited agent is programmed to update journal files, say, but 
outside such a context this becomes an independent activity. 
3.3.3 Particles and checkpoint equality 
We now come to some lemmas used mostly in the proofs of the two SDTs to 
follow, as well as in the proofs of associativity for 4f  and 4,  grouped together 
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under headings "Particles", "Checkpoint Equality", etc. They are in the general 
setting of actions a, b, p, q and sets of particles C and R such that a, a 1 , bi b- ' 
1Z. and p,p 1 , q, 	C, and the subset of these required for each proposition 
are written out in the heading. 
The proofs are simple but tedious and we have to be on guard against over-
looking cases. We give outlines of only the less obvious cases. 
Lemma 3.3.14 Particles 
Suppose a,a 1 1. and p,p 1 C. Let U=CUR. Then 
 
 
IfPnDc C and 	and pC then p.. V. 
Proof: 1 is a special case of 2; put p = 1. 
2.(==.) We have Part(ap) CPart(a) U Part(p) and the conditions assure us 
that neither Part(a) nor Part(b) has any intersection with either C or R. 
('==) ap It C is immediate; from this we get the result because p 	C 
means p cannot cancel out particles in C. 
3. Immediate. 	 FMI 
Lemma 3.3.15 Projections 
Suppose a, a- ' 	and p,p' It C. Let U= CU1.. Then 
ac=au 
ac = (ap)c 
p 1Z. 	ac = (ap)u 
Proof: 2. Note that p can neither contribute particles in C nor cancel out 
any particles in it. 
3. As for 2, the C particles match up. Similarly, a can neither contribute 1 
particles nor cancel them, so any of these have to come from p. 	 o 
Lemma 3.3.16 Checkpoint Equality 





If p Itz V and p and x have no opposing particles, then xVy =' pxVy. 
Proof: 1. a, b It 1Z implies ac = au and bc = b. The result follows. 
(==>) (ap)u = ac. (==) All the particles in C come from a and none of 
these can be cancelled out by p. Any particles in R have to be from p and 
none of these can be cancelled out by a. But b has no 1. particles. 
Similar 
If aUq then ac = au = = qu. But no particle from a can be equal to 
a particle from R. 
(px) 1, = XV. 	 . 
3.3.4 The Synchronised Displacement Theorem 
We begin with a comment about sorts. The sorting of agents is described in 
[Milner83], and we follow the same scheme, with the added rule that Sort(P tcQ) 
= Sort(P) USort(Q). This does not necessarily produce the smallest sort for the 
agent P tc Q, of course, but the reader can readily prove that it does produce a 
sort. 
Before we look at the SDT, consider how we synchronise displace actions in 
practice. Let D = AcB and S = PQ. Suppose .and care sets of particles 
such that of the four sorts A, 13, 2 and Q, .F has a non-null intersection only 
with B, and g has a non-null intersection only with Q. The idea of course is to 
get the displace actions to synchronise by ensuring that the context synchronises 
.-actions with c-actions. The only new detail is that here we ensure Vb such 
that B' -L B", b It C = b E 2, where B' is any derivative of B. This ensures 
that any possible displace action by B, even after some audit actions, carries an 
.T particle. Similarly, ensure that any displace action by any derivative Q' of  Q 
carries a 9 particle. 
Theorem 3.3.17 The Synchronised Displacement Theorem 
Let D=AcBandS=Pfr,Q. Suppose CflS=Cfl=7nV='Rn=Ø. 
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Then if X[ ] is a context that synchronises the displace actions of D and 5, 
X [(A tc B) I (P tiz Q)] X [(AP) ICUR  (BIQ)]. 
Proof: We write U=CU7. 
We shall refer to the condition on the sorts as "the sort condition". 
As in the proof of associativity, the sort condition enables us to derive 
side-conditions from each other, and is used in almost all the cases of the 
bisimulation. For instance, A in the lhs can produce a normal action if it 
has no particles in C; it doesn't have to meet any condition involving R. 
It does in the rhs; but the sort condition says there will be no interference 
from 1. 
The sort condition also says that D can neither do any actions with audit 
particles of S in them, nor complement such particles. All audit particles 
from AlP  will thus be seen by BIQ, and vice-versa, and so the rhs can match 
audit actions by the lhs. 
For both sides, an inference can be labelled unambiguously by saying which 
of A, B, P, or Q contributes. For example, AQ can only mean a normal 
action by ACB synchronising with a displace action by PfrRQ, and can only 
be matched by (AlP) jzi (BJQ) by its AQ inference, an audit action—any 
other inference would use premises not used on the lbs. The synchronisation 
condition rules out the lbs AQ, so it is essential that the rhs AQ be ruled 
out as well. This is done using the sort condition; see below. 
Awkward cases on the lhs are always ruled out by the synchronisation con-
dition. This rules out displacements by just one of D or S (Case B below), 
and also displacements of D in synchrony with normal or audit actions by 
S (Cases AQ and ABQ below). The sort condition is needed for the rhs, 
alone for case AQ, and in conjunction with the synchronisation condition 
for B and ABQ. The two conditions are thus intertwined. 
The table below lists all the cases, giving for each the additional assumptions 
on side-conditions needed by the lbs and rhs. Symmetric cases are indicated 
in brackets. We also give the interpretation on the lhs, such as the one for 
AQ above. The reader might find it easier to follow the table in conjunction 
with the bisimulation, also given below. 
M. 
Note that the sort condition expands to a, a, b, b' It  7. and p, p, q, q 1 
C, where a is any action by A, b any action by B, p any action by P and 
q any action by Q. This means that the conditions of Lemmas 3.3.14, and 
3.3.16 (Particles and Checkpoint Equality) are all satisfied. 
A[P]. Normal action by one. 	a It C 	a It U. See Particles 1. 
B[Q]. Displace action by one. 
r 	 is ruled out by 
(AB)I(PQ) -.-4 B'I(pQ) 
the synchronisation condition. 
B B' 
BIQ-LB'IQ bU 
i— The rhs inference 	 is ruled out thus: by 
(AIP)tu(BIQ) — B'IQ 
Particles 1, b A U implies b C. Then apply the synchronisation 
condition. 
AP. Normal actions by both. +- By Particles 2, ap U if a It C A p It  7. 
BQ. Displace actions by both. 	As for Case AP. 
AB[PQ]. Audit action by one. -+ By Checkpoint Equality 1, aCb if aUb. 
Since b - R., b E C iffbEU. 
AQ[BP]. Normal action synchronised with displace action. 
____ aC Q+Q' qR 
PtQLQ' 
—~ The lhs infer-n-- is ruled out 
(ACB)I(P + Q) - (A'+fCB)IQ' 
by the synchronisation condition. 
q Q--4Q 
AIP -- A'IP BIQ -i-*BIQ' aUq qEU. — The rhs inference 	 is 
(AIP)(B JQ)- -*(A'IP)+j- (B IQ') 
ruled out because the side condition can never be satisfied: see 
Checkpoint Equality 4. 
APB[APQ]. Normal action synchronised with audit action. 
By Checkpoint Equality 2, aC A p It R if apUb. Since b - 7Z., b e C 
iffbE U. 
—* The lhs inference 
B-LB' rC 
A 4I-cB!:B 1 
a 
ABQ[PBQ]. Audit synchronous with displace. 
A--.A' B B' aCb beC Q+Q' q it 1z 
-+ The inference 	 is 
ruled out by the synchronisation condition. 
aUbq bqEU. 
-- 	 is 
APuBIQ -3A'IP 4juB'IQ' 
ruled out thus: Since a It R. and q It C, aUbq implies q R and 
aCb. This last implies b E C. Thus the whole derivation is finally 
ruled out by the synchronisation condition. 
APBQ. Audit synchronous with audit. 
By Checkpoint Equality 3, aCb A pR.q Hf apUbq. Because b 
and 	C, b  CAqE1Z.iffbqeU. 
The bisimulation below shows the six cases remaining. 




AIP -- A'IP aU 
(AIP)(B IQ) -- (A'JP) +fr(BlQ) 
leading to .A/(A',B,P, Q) 
4-. The inference 
a 
AIP - A'IP 
B B' QiQ' 
BlQ --*B'lQ' 
Case AP: 
A-s-A' aC P--4P' P1l 
AB-4A'I -c B 
a 	 P 
A—A P—+P 
AIP -- A'IP' apU 
leading to A1(A',B,P',Q) 
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Case BQ: 
B - -*B' bC Q!+Q' q1 
Aj - B-LB' 	Pj- Q--Q' 
(AB)I(PQ)__B'lQ' 




leading to I 
Case AB: 
B--B' aCb bEC 
A A' 	B B' 
AIP - - A'IP BIQ.±,BFIQ aUb beU 
(AIP)(BjQ) -- (A'lP)t(B'JQ) 
leading to V (A', B', P, Q) 
Case APB: 
A---A' B-LB' aCb b E C p ,p' 
A --A' p.Lp' 	B-LB' 
'PiA'IP' 	BIQ -LB'JQ apUb beU 
(AIP)(B IQ) -- (A'IP')fl(B'JQ) 
leading to .Af(A', B', F', Q) 
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Case APBQ: 
A - -+A' B B' aCb b E C P!,P' Q-!+Q1 plZq qE'R 
(AtB)I(PQ) - (A' f  GO) I(P'4l-Q') 
A--A' P p' B B' Q--Q' 
AIP -- A'IP' 	BIQ! , B h IQ' apUbq bqeU 
(AIP)f(BJQ) -LP *(AIpI)tu(B 1 IQ 1) 
leading to A (A', B', P', Q') 
Fol 
Discussion 
We see that the corresponding theorem for t, Theorem 3.2.6, is a special case 
of this one; there, there are no audit particles, so the sort condition is vacuously 
satisfied, and the synchronisation condition is the sole condition in that theorem. 
Again since there are no audit actions it is easier to program this condition there 
than here; now we must ensure that the synchronising particles are carried by 
all displace actions in all derivatives of the exception agent. We shall see in the 
examples in the next chapter that this is quite simple. 
If we had the simpler condition "B and Q are synchronised", Case ABQ 
would be permitted; we have seen that this is impossible to patch up without 
making fundamental changes in the theorem. It would also have the unfortu-
nate effect of ruling out case AB, i.e. audit action by one component of the 
system, and we don't want to lose a practically useful case. Thus the condition 
of synchronised displacements seems quite deeply embedded in our whole set-up. 
Comparison with the awkward cases for t makes two interesting points. In 
Case B, where one of D or S does a displace alone, the difficulty in both theorems 
is that the inference on the other side leads to a system of agents that cannot 
be matched. In Case AQ for the earlier theorem we had both this structural 
difficulty and the fact that the action was different. Here it is conceivable that 
by changing the audit rule to produce ab instead of a, we can get a matching 
action. But the structural difficulty remains, and can thus be seen as the more 
102 
basic. The other point is that the new theorem needs the sort condition as 
well as the synchronisation condition to rule out the rhs inferences. So the sort 
condition is needed not just for the new inferences. 
Case AQ also shows that it is important not to allow the exception agent to 
do a 1 as its contribution to an audit. If we did, the rhs could do an a by A, 
and a 1 by Q, the result being an audit. The lhs in matching this must displace 
P as a result of Q's action. 
If we see the SDT as a tool to separate out normal and exception handling 
in a system rather than to decompose a system into its components, i.e., if we 
expect to use the theorem left-to-right rather than right-to-left, it is easy to see 
the synchronisation condition as a restriction on the separate components, and 
the sort condition as a discipline that curbs unwanted inferences on the rhs. 
Compare the condition that permits restriction to distribute over 1. (AIB) \A1 
has more derivatives than (A\Jv') I (B\.AI), and the condition A fl 9 fl i/ = n 
13 fl iV = 0 rules out precisely these additional possibilities. There is some truth 
in this assignment of roles to the two conditions, but we only have to look at the 
cases that work to realise that condition and theorem are much more intricately 
interwoven: every case in the bisimulation invokes the sort condition to assure 
us of a match! 
Lastly, a further comment about applying the SDT. For audit actions, the 
sort condition means that any agent communicating with the system DIS  can 
always tell which of D or S produced the various audit particles. 
3.3.5 Difficulties in assessing operators 
The proofs about 4j  are characterised by excruciating case analyses. So matters 
are quite delicate. Casually redesigning operators can easily lead to errors in 
such propositions, and is an indication that we need to develop notation to 
encapsulate some of the logic here. Checkpoint Equality is an attempt at such 
a notation. 
First, some technicalities. We saw that audit does not preserve weak congru-
ence on the right. This can be remedied by including a fourth rule, settle, that 
allows the exception agent to do l's without displacing the normal agent. This 
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would imply that displaces will always have to be visible, no bad thing in itself. 
We have not carried this out because we do not need to substitute on the right 
of tc very often, and agree just to be careful when we do this, rather than have 
our case analyses blow up still further. 
There is quite a jump from displace to audit. What about simpler intermedi-
ate operators? The -y-conjunction operator from [Milner83] and similar looking 
operators in LOTOS are good examples. In our terms, the simplest obvious 
audit would be for both agents to do the entire action. The audit rule would 
then be exactly the join rule we mentioned earlier. We have already said we 
would like normal particles to be allowed to synchronise with audits (eg. delete 
• line and change the display). The technical reason we do not want to enforce 
• join like audit is that the SDT won't hold if we do. (A tc B) I (P fi Q) will 
be able to do a normal action by the first agent and an audit by the second, but 
(AlP) tu (BQ) will not have an audit action to which A, P and Q contribute. 
One way to still have the SDT then is to insist on synchronised audits as well! 
Similarly, if we restrict the projection on C in the definition above to a single 
particle, )., we get into trouble because the first of our two agents here will be 
able to do audits by both components simultaneously, whereas the second agent 
will be forced to do audits in sequence. 
This is also a good place to say how calculus design gets into the game. Some 
troublesome cases are caused by agents acting independently; these we cure by 
synchronising, as we do for displacements. But the two cases in the previous 
paragraph arose because of synchrony. There is no way to explicitly say two 
actions should not synchronise, in any of SCCS, ASCCS or MCCS. Hence the 
attraction of a two sorted calculus where we could rule out certain combinations, 
and then have for a condition to the SDT that audits should be one kind of action, 
and normal another. 
Another idea that comes immediately to mind is machine assistance. The 
only problem with this is that it takes a lot of time to develop a system that is 
flexible enough to let you play with different kinds of operator definitions; almost 
any system is likely to increase your resistance to exploring if you know you will 
have to change the system or live without it for the new operator you have in 
mind. It is also not clear that the investment in such a system is worthwhile 
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until some such proofs have been carried out by hand ... There is no doubt some 
golden mean, but the author has not found it. Early versions of some of the 
proofs here were checked by the Prolog system referred to in Chapter 1, but not 
the current versions. 
But we are not entirely without intuition! And the only justification we offer 
for our design choices is that they are consistent with a reasonable interpretation 
of the examples we have in mind. 
Applications of the audit operator are postponed to the next chapter. We 
end with a theorem that extends the displaced environment theorem to the audit 
operator. One of the interesting things about it is that it does not extend further 
to the checkpoint operator. We shall discuss that fact later. 
Theorem 3.3.18 Let 
PNICPE 
Q = QNCQE 
Let C[] be a context that synchronises the displace actions of P and Q, and 
induces the environment 0 N tc E, where E accepts only the displace actions 
of either P or Q, and N accepts no displace actions. Suppose PN N QN and 
PE E QE. Then C[P] C[Q]. 
Proof: If 0 does a displace action, P and Q have to as well; rest follows 
as before. A normal action of P can only be of interest to 0 as a normal 
action, because the presence or absence of particles from C labels an action 
unambiguously as either normal or audit. That leaves audit actions of P. 
Q has to match those that are of interest to 0; when it does both QN  and 
QE have their contributions uniquely decided by the side conditions. QN 
has to do all of the action, and QE,  it's projection on C. The rest is routine. 
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Chapter 4 
FTS Revisited, and the Checkpoint 
Operator 
In this chapter, we study an example of a restartable system that we will later 
informally relate to the FTS example of the Appendix. We will not translate the 
latter into our new formalism; we will directly model an informal description of 
the "log file method" of error recovery using MCCS and our new operators, and 
then compare the two versions. 
We repeat the caveat from Chapter 1: we shall continue to use terms like 
"fault tolerant system" and "restartable system" interchangeably, meaning by 
both the very restricted kind of system defined formally here. Related terms like 
"failure" and "error recovery" also refer always only to the specific interpretations 
we place on them. "FTS" means the particular example we develop here, and 
its older version in the Appendix. 
4.1 Restartable systems 
Our restartable systems are all fallible versions of rigid, strongly determinate 
agents (the formal definitions follow). The infallible versions, or perfect agents 
as we shall call them, thus have extremely simple behaviour. 
The fallible versions Q of perfect agents P will be of the form QN f QE, 
where QN  has a simple relation to P. Failure is represented by a displacement. 
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Thus the fallible agent works correctly until failure, when it is effectively reset to 
its starting state—we will not use the displace to do anything else. This seems a 
reasonable way to model fail-stop [Schlichting and Schneider8i.] processes, and as 
we saw in earlier chapters, the f operator was invented to exhibit this structure 
clearly. 
The basic idea is to augment a fallible strongly determinate process with 
stable storage, a fault free backup agent that records all significant actions in 
a log file. The audit operator was designed to do just this. Upon failure, the 
fallible system can be restarted in its initial state, and fed back all the actions 
in the log file. This completes recovery, and processing continues as usual until 
the next failure. An obvious efficiency concern is to be able to dump the current 
state upon a checkpoint command, so that future failures do not take us all the 
way back to the start state. Later in the chapter, we develop the checkpoint 
operator, and show how to use it to achieve this. 
Strongly determinate agents are necessary for this method to work; otherwise 
the restarted computation might be different from the original one. 
Where the significant action is an output from the fallible agent, the backup 
doesn't have to record what action was done, just the fact that one was done. 
If we think of actions as messages, the content of the message need not be 
recorded—it will be generated again. What the backup agent must do is to 
absorb the action, otherwise the environment will receive multiple copies. 
The definition below is actually a proposition in [Milner8O], but in fact the 
property it expresses is used there in applications as the defining property of a 
strongly determinate agent. 
Definition 4.1.1 An agent P is strongly determinate if 
P --+ F and P -- i P" implies F' e 
P --+ P implies F' is strongly determinate. 	 0 
We can therefore characterise a derivative of a strongly determinate agent P 
upto strong congruence thus: if P .--+ F' we can write P (a) instead of P. 
Rigidity is primarily a technical necessity: invisible actions cannot be audited. 
A suggestion for further work is to see if an audit operator with a settle rule, i.e. 
107 
one that allowed the exception agent to do l's without causing displacements, can 
handle non-rigid perfect agents. The only real difficulty with such a programme 
is that it would entail even worse case analysis than we already have with the 
present operator. 
Definition 4.1.2 An agent is said to be stable 1ff it has no I actions. An agent 
is said to be rigid if all its derivatives are stable. 	 0 
4.1.1 Restartable systems without input 
We begin with a proposition about restartable agents that accept no input. 
We have not distinguished between input and output actions so far, and for a 
good reason—we have been using only a pure calculus without value passing. 
With value passing, input actions can be distinguished from output, because 
the accepted value in an input can affect the behaviour of the agent: consider 
a (v) .P (v). Without value passing, the difference between input and output is 
purely conventional; in CCS, one usually calls a an input, and a 1 an output. 
But this convention is not meaningful for SCCS, ASCCS or MCCS: there is no 
obvious way to extend it to a2 b 1 . 
We shall continue to use only pure MCCS, so an action by itself is neither 
input nor output. But we can regard an agent as accepting input during an 
external choice. a.A + a.B decides autonomously which branch it will take, but 
a.A + b.B in a context ([]JE) \\{a, b} has a choice only if E offers it both a 1 
and b-1 . If E offers only one of them, the choice is said to be made externally. If 
we define "input" as accepting information from the environment, then external 
choice is input. Now, + cannot be read automatically as "external choice" even 
in strongly determinate agents, to which we restrict ourselves. However, such 
an agent can be put in a context where the choice is made externally, and thus 
every + is potentially an external choice. 
We see that the only way to ensure that a determinate agent accepts no in-
formation is to insist that it should have no +'s. We shall remove this restriction 
in the next subsection. 
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Thus the distinction we are making is actually about the use of +, but we 
shall not label it as such. The input-output distinction is a natural one, as we 
saw informally in our message passing interpretation, and the link to + is specific 
to pure CCS. 
In the proposition below, Po  is a strongly determinate agent without in-
put. So the tree representing Po is a chain. Let F' and P be points along it, 
P0—.. —4P. We will therefore use a special case of the notation P (a) 
that we introduced a little while ago. Since there is only one derivative for every 
derivative of F0, we merely write P (..), showing that we don't need to know the 
action to know what the derivative is. Also, we can write ap for the sole action 
that is possible for P. We use just P rather than Po to stand for the sort of P0 . 
The perfect agent is thus defined by a set of equations like this one: 
P4=ap.P(...) 
ap can be regarded as a function from states to actions, and is really what the 
perfect agent computes. 
Now P t f.P is a stuttering version of P. It makes some progress, does 
an f and starts over again. We always assume f P. The f's are external 
manifestations that stuttering is taking place, and will be absorbed by a demon in 
applications. In fact, the demon is usually regarded as triggering the stuttering. 
But P t f.P is visibly different from P even if the f's are absorbed. We could 
think of the stuttering as arising from the inability of the exception agent to 
keep track of the normal agent's evolution. 
The following agent stutters silently, and its external behaviour is the same 
as that of P, except that it also does an arbitrary number of f's interleaved with 
the actions of P. We call such agents restartable versions of P. 
QD (P')  F) QDN (F', F) t' QDE (P) 
QDN(P',P) if P'= P then 
else l.QDN(P'(...) ,P) 
QDE (P) f.QD (F0 , P) + >Ia1 a.QDE (P()) 
QD (P', F) is a restartable version of P; i.e., it represents the external behaviour 
of a fallible agent plus backup agent! QD (F, P) is the normal state of the 
restartablesystern; here it can immediately do the sole action ap of F, the 
1111 this section, whenever we use the letter a for an action, a < P holds. 
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"external state" seen by the observer. Since all actions of P are in the audit set, 
and P is rigid, all actions of the system during normal processing are actually 
audits. (This system has in fact no normal actions except during recovery). 
Thus when failure occurs, the exception agent knows how far the system has 
got. Notice that the exception agent needs to know the behaviour of the perfect 
agent to the extent of being able to compute P (...), but not to the extent of being 
able to compute ap. It is prepared to do anything the normal agent does. 
Upon failure we get QD (F0, P); the "internal state" reverts to the start state. 
We regard P0 as fixed for QD, and so avoid a third parameter. The only effect 
P0 has is that the longer the chain from Po to P, the further back we go upon 
failure, and the longer the recovery. 
The action f represents the occurrence of failure as well as the initiation 
of recovery, during which the agent is represented QD (F', F), with P' 0 P. 
During recovery, invisible moves replace the original actions along the chain—
this explains the term 1.QD (P'(-), P). Recovery lasts until QD gets to the 
furthest point it had previously reached, i.e., until it evolves to QD (F, P). More 
failures can of course occur during recovery, wiping out that attempt at recovery, 
and starting a fresh one. Once QD has successfully completed a recovery, it 
returns to normal execution and continues along the chain until the next failure. 
Thus QD repeatedly starts down the chain, making varying amounts of progress 
before it fails and starts over again. We show below that the visible behaviour 
of QD (F, P) is that of P, apart from the f's. 
We abbreviate an agent C = f.G by f*• 
Proposition 4.1.3 Let P0 be a strongly determinate, rigid agent expressed 
without using +. Let F' be a derivative of F0, and F a derivative of F'. Let 
QD (F', P) = QDN (P', P) tp QDE (P) 
QDN(P', F) = if F' = P then ap.QD (P (...) , P(..)) 
else 1.QD (F'(_) , F) 
QDE (F) 4 f.QD (F0, P) + >a01  a.QDE (P (...)) 
Then QD(P',P) PJf*. 
Proof: 	The (weak) bisimulation consists of all pairs (QD (F', P) , pJf*) 
where P is a derivative of F' and both are derivatives of F0 . 
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.Af(P',P) 	(QD (PI )P), PIP) 
Case Recovery, F' 0 P. (Normal rule for lhs). 
QD(P') P)-!4QD(P'(..),P) 	 PIf*=,PIf* 
leading to A1(P'(1) ,P) 
Case Normal, P'= P. (Audit rule for us). -: 
QD(P,P)--QD(P(..),P()) 
	
P11* --P() 1* 
leading to J.f(P(_),P(_)) 




leading to JV (F0, F) 
a 
The proof shows that failure freezes the "external state" P of the restartable 
system, and that all states (P', P) corresponding to the same external state 
are equivalent. The only visible behaviour a failed system is capable of is that 
of the frozen external state, though repeated failures and the resulting infinite 
stuttering might prevent it from ever completing recovery. However, recovery is 
always possible. 
The proposition also shows in the simplest way why observational equiva-
lence is particularly suited to our model of restartable systems. It is a strong 
equivalence, so we are of course happy to be able to make a strong statement. 
Yet the equivalence has a blind spot that we need: it ignores infinite chatter. 
Testing equivalence would not equate the above two systems. 
The above proposition captures the spirit of all the systems we will discuss 
in this chapter, though we will usually not be able to apply it directly. The 
following form of the proposition is very much more representation oriented, but 
reflects what the FTS looks like. 
With every agent on the chain that is the derivation tree of F0, we can 
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associate a number: the number of moves that separate it from P0 . If a derivative 
is m moves away from Po , we can call it P (m). Thus Po is P (0). Then instead 
of ap(m ) we can write am . The program takes advantage of the representation to 
use rn" = m - in' as a (smaller) counter that represents how much work is left 
during recovery. At this abstract level, we don't see any representation of the 
internal state, but it can of course be computed from the information available 
to QDN. 
Corollary 4.1.4 Let P (0) be a strongly determinate, rigid agent expressed 
without using +. Let P (m) be the derivative of P (0) separated from it by m 
moves. Let P be the sort of P (0). Let 
QD (rn", m) = QDN (m", m) QD E (m) 
QDN (rn", m) if rn" = 0 then am.QDN (0, in + 1) 
else 1.QDN(m"— 1,m) 
QDE (m) = f.QD (m, m) + a,61  a.QDE (m +1) 
where 0 < m" < m. Then QD.(m', m) P (m) If 
Proof: In the proposition, put P (m - rn") for P, P (in) for P, P (m + 1) 
for P(...), P(0) for P0 , and am for ap. 	 0 
Another proof would of course be directly by bisimulation. This would also 
prove that all derivatives QD (i,j) of QD (ml', m) where 0 < rn" :5 m, have the 
property that 0 _< i < j, a fact worth proving because the definitions are not 
guaranteed to make any sense otherwise. A similar remark and proof apply to 
the earlier version with states instead of counters. 
It is easy to show by induction on m" that QDN (rn", m) lm".QDN  (0, m), 
which says how many l's the recovery will take. 
4.1.2 Restartable systems with input 
We now permit + in the perfect agent P, but it is still strongly determinate 
and rigid. It could therefore be subject to external choice, and we say that it 
can accept input. P is now represented by a tree, in general not a chain. Our 
notation P (J) is no longer valid, and we revert to P (a) to mean the a-derivative 
of P. If P does not have an a action, P (a) is of course undefined. We can no 
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longer refer to derivatives of P by a single number. Lastly, we cannot write ap to 
uniquely identify an action, since P might have a choice. We let v (F) represent 
the set of actions P can do (the initial actions of P as they are sometimes known). 
Note that v (P) is a subset of the sort of P. 
The perfect agent is thus defined by a set of equations like this one: 
P = 	a.P (a) 
Each state of the agent offers a choice to the environment of a set of actions 
which it is prepared to do. This set is determined by v, which is a function from 
states to sets of actions. The environment might either force an external choice 
on P or offer it an internal choice, by being prepared to accept more than one 
of the actions in v (P). 
Contrast P with the perfect agent of the last subsection, which can be thought 
of as a special case of this one: there, v (P) is always a singleton set. In the light 
of our earlier discussion, that agent can be seen as accepting no information from 
the environment, whereas P here does. 
v (P) is the real computation that P performs. If v (P) is a singleton set, 
P (q) can be thought of as a "pure output state". If v (P) = Act, the state can 
be thought of as a "pure input state". Any state where v (P) Act provides 
information to the user: if the environment restricts P's actions to a set that 
does not intersect v (F), P deadlocks. It follows that if P (q) never offers a 
restricted set of actions, i.e., if it were prepared to do any action at any stage, 
it would be a useless agent. U (q) = EaEACt a.0 (q: a) is just an information sink 
from which the user can learn nothing. 
We now define a restartable version QS of F. The problem in programming 
QS is that during recovery it has to know which branch to take. We solve this 
by using as parameters, not just the external and internal states, but the entire 
state histories that lead to these states. We still write just P rather than Po  to 
mean the sort of P0 . 
QS (q", q) 4= QSN (q", q) +f' QSE (q) 
QSN (q", q) 4= if q" = e then aEv(P) a.QSN (e, q: P (a)) 
else 1.QSN  (ti (q") , q) 
QSE (q) .= f.QS (q, q) + EaO l a.QSE (q: F (a)) 
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Here q and q" are sequences of agents (paths along the tree of P0), and q 
represents P in the sense that the last agent in q is P. The fixed starting state 
is represented by c, the empty sequence. 
Again, QN does not have any explicit representation of the internal state 
during recovery, though it can be computed. Consider the equation q'©q" = q 
where © means list-append. When there are q', q" such that the equation is true, 
we say that q' is an initial subsequence of q and that q" is a final subsequence of 
q. We shall show that the above agents preserve the property that q" is a final 
subsequence of q. Then there is always a q' so that q'©q" = q, and we interpret 
the last element of q' as the internal state. Thus the sequence representing the 
internal state is just an initial subsequence of that representing the external. It 
is instructive that at this abstract level, QSN does not need to represent the 
internal state; the behaviour of the whole system is after all that of the external 
state. 
Under normal execution, both QSN and QSE build up q. QSN  needs it in 
order to compute v (P), and the QSE  to keep track; as usual, there are only 
audits, no normal actions. q: P appends the agent P to the sequence q. We also 
write P as an abbreviation for the last element of q. 
Upon failure, the exception agent starts off the normal agent in the start 
state (i.e. q' = e). During recovery, the (recovering) normal agent effectively 
accumulates elements from q in q'. (ii (q) is the sequence consisting of all but 
the first element of q). As we go forward along q, we reconstruct the path that 
lead from P0 to P. q" says how much is left of q that hasn't yet been moved 
into q'. q' is always a leading subsequence of q, so this process brings q' closer 
and closer to q. Recovery is over when q'= q. We can show by induction on Iq"I 
that QSN (q",q) " Here lI is the length of q. 
Proposition 4.1.5 Let P0 be a strongly determinate, rigid agent. Let q be a 
sequence of derivatives of P0  and let q" be a final subsequence of q. Let P be 
the last element of q. Let 
QS (q", q) = QSN (q", q) +I' QSE (q) 
QSN (q" ) q) = if q" = e then aEv(P) a.QSN (e, q: P (a)) 
else 1.QSN (ti (q") , q) 
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QSE (q) .= f.QS(q, q) + Ea,61 a.QSE (q: P(a)) 
Then QS(q",q) P11*. 
Proof: The (weak) bisimulation consists of all pairs (QS (q", q) , Pjf*) where 
q" is a final subsequence of q. 
Al (q", q) 	( QS (q", q), PIP) 
Case Recovery, q" 54 e. (Normal rule for lhs). 
QS(q",q) ---.QS(tl(q"),q) 
	 pf* =Pf* 
leading to Al (ti (q") , q) 
Case Normal, q" = e. (Audit rule for lhs). —*: 
QS(c,q) _?_QS(e,q:P(a)) 	 PIf* --P(a) If* 
leading to Al ( e , q: P (a)) 
Case Failure (displace) —+: 
QS(q",q) .L+QS( q,q) 	 PIf*!,PIf* 
leading to Al (q, q) 
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Corollary 4.1.6 On Deterministic Histories 
If q" is a final subsequence of q, then t" is a final subsequence oft for all derivatives 
QS (t", t) of QS (q", q). Also, if q'©q" = q and q" 0 e then q': hd(q") is an initial 
subsequence of q. 
Proof: The first part is by looking at the lhs of the bisimulation above. The 
second is merely a property of sequences. (hd (q) is the first element of q). 0 
There is very little difference between the proofs for systems without and with 
input, though it is obvious that recovery in the latter case is more expensive to 
implement, since the backup agent (which we have not yet separated from the 
fallible one) has to store sequences of states instead of single states. 
We will consider implementations of QD and QS in the next section; this 
will bring us down to a concrete level of description corresponding to that we 
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use in the Appendix. We will consider first a restartable system (FTS) without 
input, since, in our peculiar terminology, output is a special case of input! 
4.2 FTS with no input 
We begin by giving the perfect agent an explicit definition: 
P(rn).= av (m).P(m+ 1) 
This is a special case of the perfect agent in Corollary 4.1.4: P above is strongly 
determinate, rigid, and has no +'s used in it. We think of P as communicating 
along a set of channels a 1 , a2 ,... and v is effectively a function from states to 
channels; it incorporates the real computation that a user wants from P. 
We will now show that a restartable version of this perfect agent can be built 
up from a simpler faulty agent Q: 
P (m') [c/a] 4f f.Q (0) 
and a backup agent D', to be described. Q renames the a's to c's, these being 
hidden communications with the backup system which does the actual a's on 
Q's behalf; our notation for this relabelling is informal but unambiguous. The 
set of c's and the set of c 1 's are both disjoint from the set of a's. Apart from 
the renaming, Q is just a fail stop version of P. 
During recovery, Q will repeat outputs that it had already done previously. 
Thus the backup system consists of just a duplication suppressor, D', an agent 
that filters out all output during recovery, but permits it during normal execu-
tion, translating c's to a's. 
D' (in", m) = if m" = 0 then >, c'a1 .D' (0, m + 1) 
else E i ci 1 .D 1 (m" - 1, m) 
+g.D' (m, m) 
Here rn" and m are counters, local and external, by which D' keeps track of 
recovery and normal execution. m, which never decreases, is the number of a's 
done, and rn" is the number of silent moves needed to complete recovery. Normal 
execution is restored when m" drops to 0. The sum over i spans all the labels P 
might output. We shall synchronise g with the f in Q (m'). 
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The abstract version QD (rn", m) of the previous section (see Corollary 4.1.4) 
is here modelled by (Q (m') ID' (m", in)) \\{c}. We have at the start 0 < rn" < m 
and m'+ in" = m. We shall show that these properties are preserved by the 
agent. Note that D' can work with any Q that communicates along c's, wanting 
to get them translated to a's. The restriction ensures that none of Q's actions 
go untranslated. 
Failure is modelled as being caused by a demon, F f'g 1 .F. 
Now we see intuitively that the behaviour of (Q (m') ID' (rn", m) F) \\{c, f, g} 
is observationally the same as that of P (in). As long as no failure occurs, 
there is no difference between the two. Failure results in (Q (0) ID' (m, in)) and 
starts recovery, when Q's actions no longer result in externally visible a's. Once 
recovery is complete we get back to normal execution. All of this is exactly as 
in the last proposition, and we only have to establish a connection. 
The connection is easily made using the SDT. We first show that D' can 
be written using 4j. We could of course have written it so to start with, but 
we wish to establish the connection with the original version in CCS, of which 
our first definition here is an adaptation to take advantage of MCCS. Also, the 
original version is simpler to start with, and seems obvious as a backup agent to 
do the task at hand. The structure in the 4j version is part of the analysis of 
this naive implementation of a backup agent. 
Lemma 4.2.1 Let 
D (m", in) 4= DN (m") %} DE (in) 
DN (m") 	if in" = 0 then >, c;-1 a.DN (0) 
else Ej ci 1 .DN (m" - 1) 
DE (M) 4= g.D (in, m) + Ej a.DE (in +1) 
and 
D' (m", m) = if in" = 0 then Ej c 1 a.D' (0, m + 1) 
else >c 1 .D'(m" - 1,m) 
+g.D' (m, in) 
Then D (rn", in) '- D'(m", m). 
Proof: By the following bisimulation. 
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.Al(rn", in) 	( 1) (in", in), D' (in", in) ) 
Case Normal, in"> 0: 
c_i 	 c_i 
I I 	l 	__ 	I D(m",  m) 	)D(m ,,  —1,m) 	D (m ,in) 	)D (m l  —1,m) 
leading to Al (m" - 1, m) 
Case Audit, m" 0: 
c 1 a 
D(0,m) 	)Djy(0) a1 )DE(m+1) 	D'(O,m) ' 	D'(O,m+l) 
leading to ./V(0, in + 1) 
Case Displace: 
D(
,, 	9 	 II m ,m)—*D(m,m) 	 D(I m ,m)—*D F(m,m) 
leading to H(in, m) 
This shows us the advantage of using the new operators; if we choose our 
representation carefully, m" here, we get a clear separation between normal and 
exception processing. Henceforth we will use only the version DN (m") tai j 
DE (m), where DN and DE are defined as in the lemma. 
Proposition 4.2.2 FTS with no input 
Let 
P (in) .4 av ( m).P (m + 1) 	 perfect agent 
Q (m') '= P (m') [c1/a1] t f.Q (0) 	fallible agent 
Ff 1 g 1 .F 	 demon 
backup agent (duplication suppressor) 
D (m", m) = DN (m") tai) DE (m) 
DN (rn") = if rn" = 0 then E j C 1 a.DN (0) 
else >c'.DN(m"— 1) 
DE (M) g.D(m,m)  + >Ia.DE(m + 1) 
Then (Q (m') ID (rn", in) IF) \\{c 1 , f, g} P (m) where 0 < m' < m and m" = 
m - m'. 
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Proof: We introduce the following abbreviations. 
QD (m", m) = (Q (m') ID (m", in)) \\{c} 
QDN (in", m) <= ( (in') [c/a1] JDN (in", m)) \\{Cj} 
QDE (m) = (f.Q (0) ID E  (m)) \\{c} 
where we assume 0 < rn" < m and m'+ rn" = m in the first two. As the 
abbreviations suggest, we will relate QD (m', m) here to the more abstract 
version of Corollary 4.1.4. 
QDN (rn", m) can be expanded 
QDN (in", m) (P (m') [c/a1] J' rn" = 0 then E i C 1 1 a1.DN (0) 
else E i  C 1 .DN (M" -  1)) \\{c 1 } 
The then part expands to av (m). ( (m + 1) [cj/aZ]IDN (0))  \\{c}; the else 
part to 1. ( (m'+ 1) [cj/aj]IDN (m" - 1)) \\{c}. It is easy to see by induc-
tion on m" that 
QDN (in ", in) if in" = 0 then av ( m).QDN (0, m + 1) 
else 1.QDN (rn" - 1, m) 
since the conditions on the parameters of QDN are preserved. QDN is 
exactly like the abstract normal part except that the action here is more 
explicitly written av ( m) instead of just am . The exception part will be like 
the abstract one only in a context that synchronises the displace actions of 
Q and D; we also need the SDT to say this is all we have to prove. But we 
have such a context. 
Write C[] for ([]F) \\{f, g}. {f}-actions and {g}-actions are synchronised 
in this context. That is, the displace actions of Q and D are synchronised. 
Also, Q (m') has no a 1 or a actions. We then have, 
C [QD (m", m)] 
'.0 [(Q (in') I  (m", in)) \\{c}} 
r.jc [((P (m') [c/a] t f.Q (0)) (DN (m", m) tai l DE (m))) \\{c}J 
'C [QDN (m", m) 1aj}  QDE (m)] 
by SDT, and distributing \\{cj over tail 
'c [QDN (rn", m) tail (fg.QD (in, m) + a.QDE (in + 1))] 
f and g also synchronised in expanding QDE 
Now comparing the quantity in the context with the restartable agent of 
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Corollary 4.1.4, we get 
C[QD (rn", m)] C[P (m) I (fg)} 	C respects ; it has no + 
Write out the context, and expand the rhs. 
Then (Q (m') ID (rn", m) IF) \\{c, f, g} P (m) 1* P (m). 	 0 
Thus a single application of the SDT allows us to separate normal and ex-
ception processing. The context is also needed to tame the expansion in the 
exception agent after applying the SDT, but it is not doing anything new here, 
it is only insisting once again that {f }- and {g}-actions should be synchronised. 
At this stage, after we apply the SDT, they have lost their structural interpre-
tation as displace actions of the component parts. The expansion clarifies the 
picture: f  is the displace action of the restartable agent. 
Note that the context is not synchronising "failures", it is synchronising dis-
place actions, one of which is a failure, and the other a detection of failure and 
initiation of recovery. The SDT replaces two exception agents by a single one. 
Exception agents (DE) should not be confused with backup agents (D). In an 
application where we plan to replace several backup agents by a single one, the 
SDT demands that all failure detections should be synchronised, and hence all 
failures also. 
4.3 FTS with input 
4.3.1 Definition of the perfect agent 
We begin by giving the perfect agent an explicit definition. 
P (q) = >IiEv(q) a2 .P (q: a,) 
We think of it as communicating along a set of channels a1 , a2 ..... 
P (q) is a special case of the perfect agent in Proposition 4.1.5. It is strongly 
determinate and rigid. The representation here builds on the fact that if P (q) 
has the move P (q) --+ F', we can characterise F' as (P (q)) (a). Indeed this is 
what our definition says, except that we abbreviate (P (q)) (a) to P (q: a). P (q) 
itself is an abbreviation for "P (e) having done the actions in q one by one". 
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The q of this representation is not a sequence of states, but a trace of actions. 
If we take P (e) to be fixed, corresponding to P0 of the abstract proposition, q 
completely characterises any of its derivatives, and so we write just v (q) instead 
of v(P(q)). 
We shall assume that v (e) and therefore P (e) are always defined. But just 
as P (a) is defined only if P has an a action, v (q) and P (q) are not defined for 
every q. Suppose v (q) = 11, 2}. Then P (q: a3) is undefined. Notice that q: a3 is 
not a trace of F, and that q: a1 and q: a2 are traces. e is a trace of any agent. 
• (q), and hence P (q), are always defined if q is a trace of P. Finally, note that 
• (q) = 0 just means that the computation terminates with q. Then q itself is a 
trace of F, but extensions of it are not. 
Lemma 4.3.1 The Trace Lemma 
With the agent definition above, if q. is a trace of P, so is any initial subsequence 
q' of q. If q: a 1 is a trace of P, then i E v(q). 	 0 
The faulty agent Q is similar to the previous one. 
Q (q') 	P (q') [c/a] 4f f.Q (e) 
Note that the parameter to Q is a trace of P, not a trace of Q. 
4.3.2 Stable storage 
During recovery, the backup agent now has to feed back to Q all the information 
it consumed during normal processing. This it does by maintaining its own copy 
of the sequence q of inputs. Since q in fact characterises the state of the perfect 
agent completely, this is equivalent to maintaining a state history just as QS does 
in Proposition 4.1.5. We shall refer to this backup agent as the stable storage. 
S (q", q) 4= SN (q") tai}  SE (q) 
SN (q") 	if q" = e then Ei C 1 (L.SN (e) 
else hd (q") - 5N (ti (q")) [cr'/a1] 
5E (q) 4= g.S (q, q) + E i  a 2 .SE (q: a) 
Note that during normal execution, the then clause of SN,  any action by Q is 
acceptable. The restriction to v (q) is known only to Q, and S can work with 
any Q that communicates along c's, wanting to get them translated to a's. 
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It can be shown by bisimulation that S (q", q) 5' (q", q), defined below. 5' 
is the MCCS version of the stable storage, of (the spirit behind) the original 
CCS version. 
5' (q", q) = if q" = e then E i c'a1 .S' (e, q: a1 ) 
else hd(q") .5' (ii (q") , q) [c 1 /a] 
+g.S (q, q) 
The relation between S and 5' is the same as that between D and D'.. We 
shall only use 5, not 5'. 5' itself is so much more succinct than the original 
CCS version (see the Appendix) that even working without the new operators 
or the SDT, one might get a manageable proof. The gain is largely in using 
synchronous actions whenever we are not interested in intermediate states that 
would result from interleaving; we are also using only the pure calculus now. 
Duplication suppressors simulate stable storage 
It is instructive to compare stable storage with the duplication suppressor: 
D (rn", m) = DN (rn") 1[a} DE (m) 
DN (in") = if in" = 0 then E i C 1 a.DN (0) 
else >c 1 .DN(m"— 1) 
DE (m) g.D (m, m) + >, a1.DE(m +1) 
If in S we replace the sequences q, q" by their lengths, and call them m, rn", we 
almost get D. Only the else clause of 5N causes trouble. This is the part that 
deals with recovery, and feeds back to Q the exact input it got previously. D 
does not know what actions were done during normal execution, and is prepared 
to accept any action by its recovering ward. 
Formally, the relation between the two is that D (Iq"l, II) simulates S (q", q). 
Definition 4.3.2 A simulation R. is a binary relation on P x P such that 
whenever PRQ and a E Act then: 
a 	 ' 	 a P —p P implies Q such that Q —p  Q and P
.  RQ. 
is said to simulate P 
I 
if there is a simulation IZ. with PRQ. 	 0 
Note which agent simulates which! Every agent simulates 0. A simulation is 
thus "half a bisimulation". But note that if P simulates Q and  Q simulates P, 
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it does not follow that P Q. Consider 
P a.0 + a.b.0 and Q a.b.0 
Then {(P, Q) , ( b.0, b.0) , (0, 0), (0, b.0)} is a simulation that shows that Q sim-
ulates P, and {(Q, P) , ( b.0, b.0) , (0, 0)} is a simulation that shows that P sim-
ulates Q. But P t Q, because P can do an a and reach 0, whereas Q cannot. 
The simulation between S (q", q) and D (m", m) is {(S (q", q) , D (Iq"I, IqI))}. 
D can afford to be more tolerant than S because the wards of D can do only 
one action at each step. D in charge of an agent with input will allow it any 
input it likes—it will convert every + into internal choice, and it will do this 
during recovery as well. Thus the Q (0) might take a different path down the 
tree each time, and (Q (q') ID (Iq"I, II) F)  \\{f, g} only simulates P (q); it is not 
equivalent to it. This attempt an FTS could behave just like the perfect agent, 
but it need not. Since even Q simulates P, QID is not much of an improvement. 
Note that since output only agents are special cases of agents with input, S 
put in charge of one would work as a backup. 
4.3.3 Proof of equivalence 
This is very like the previous one, except in one detail. We know that stable 
storage differs from the duplication suppressor in that during recovery, the former 
is prepared to offer only one action at each stage to its ward. How do we know 
these values will be acceptable to Q? That they should be seems intuitively 
obvious; if they are, it is easy to see that Q will trace the same path down the 
tree. 
Proposition 4.3.3 FTS with input 
Let 
	
P (q) 	>iEv(q) a.P (q: a) 	 perfect agent 
Q (q') P (q') [c/a] t f.Q (e) 	 fallible agent 
F 	f_1 9_'.F 	 demon 
backup agent (stable storage) 
S (q", q) 	5N (q") 4ftaj} 5E (q) 
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SN (q") 4= if q" = 6 then Ei c;-1 a1.SN (e) 
else hd(q").SN (ti (q")) [ci'/a 1 ] 
SE (q) '= g.S (q, q) + Ei a1.SE (q: a) 
Then (Q (q') IS  (q", q) IF) \\{c, f, g} 	P (q) where q is a trace of P (e), and 
= q. 
Proof: We shall only do one bit, the expansion of 
QSN (q", q) = (SN (q") I P (q') [cj /aj]) \\{cj} where q' ©q" = q 
Then 
QSN (q", q) 
((if q" = e then Ei cT'a.SN(e) 
else hd (q") •SN (ti (q")) [cZh/aj])  P (q') [cj /aj ]) \\{c} 
if q" = C then >IiEv(q) a. (P(q:a1) [cj/aj]ISN(e)) \\{c1} 
else (iEv(q ') cZ 1 .P (q': a.) [ci/ai]I hd(q") .SN  (ti (q")) [ch/aj])  \\{c1} 
The then part does an action >1iEv(q) a1 , which is the normal action for P (q). 
For the else part, suppose hd (q") = a1 . Now, q'©q" = q, so ti (q") is a final 
subsequence of q. So q': hd (q") is an initial subsequence of q, and therefore 
itself a trace. By the Trace Lemma, if hd(q") is a, then i E v (q'). Thus 
5N (q")'s offer of ai will be accepted by the context ( (q') [cj/ai]I[ ]) \\{c1 } 
and a 1 results. 
We have shown the first actions of QSN (q", q) are what we expect. Now 
we have to show that the resulting agents have respectively the form 
QSN(e,q:a) and QSN (tl (q"), q). 
For the then case, note that if q" = e then (q': a1 ) © q" = q: a1 . For the else 
we need (q': hd(q")) ©tl(q") = q, which follows directly from q'©q" = q and 
q" e. Then it is easy to see by induction on Iq"I that 
QSN (q", q) -if q" = e then >lEv(q) a.QSN (e, q: a-) 
else l.QSN  (ti (q") , q) 
which is exactly like the abstract normal part of Proposition 4.1.5 except 
that the sequences here are of actions rather than of states. The rest of the 
proof is analogous to the proof for FTS with no input. Cl 
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4.4 Further variations of the FTS 
We shall not deal with these in detail. A version with both input and output 
can be dealt with by programming a version that ignores the difference between 
the two, and records output actions also on the sequence of inputs. This can 
then be handled as in the previous section. But this is not really satisfactory, 
for it is of course of interest to study an FTS with two kinds of backup agents. 
These proofs too proceed along the same lines as the previous ones. Here is an 
outline of one for input and output. 
Proposition 4.4.1 FTS with input and output 
Let 
P (q, in) <= if o (q, m) then >iEv(q,m) a2 .P (q: a, in) 
else bj( q , m).P (q, in + 1) 	perfect agent 
Q (q', m') = P (q', m') [c2/a1 , d/b1] t f.Q (e, 0) fallible agent 
F = f 1 9 1 h 1 .F 	 demon 
stable storage 
S (q", q) = SN (q") fTas}  SE (q) 
SN (q") = if q" = then Ei  c 1 aI.SN (e) 
else hd(q") -5N (ti (q")) [c 1 /a] 
SE (q) 4= g.S (q, q) + Ei a. SE (q: a) 
duplication suppressor 
D (rn", m) = DN (rn") tbi l DE (in) 
DN(m") = if m" = 0 then E i d'bI.DN (0) 
else > 1 d 1 .DN(m"— 1) 
DE (m) = g.D (m, m) + Ei  bI.DE (m +1) 
Then (Q (q', m') IS (q", q) JD (rn", m) IF) \\{c, d1 , f, g, h} 	P (q, m) where 
P (q', m') and P (q, in) are both derivatives of P (e, 0), and P (q, m) is a derivative 
of P (q', in'). q'©q" = q and m'+ m" = m. 
Proof: In the context C[ ] = ([ 1 ]IF) \\{f g, h}, the displace actions of Q, S 
and D are all synchronised, and none of them can do actions that either 
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have particles in or cancel particles in an audit set of one of the others. We 
can thus apply the SDT twice and distribute restriction to get 
(Q (q', m') IS (q", q) ID (rn", m) IF) \\{Cj, d, f, g, h} 
''C [iv (q' ) q", q, m', rn", m) tIaj,bj}  E (q, m)} 
where 
N (q', q", q, m', in", m) <= (QN (q', m') ISN (q", q) IDN (rn", m)) \\{c 1 , d} 
E (q, m) = (f.Q (e, 0) ISE (q) IDE (m)) \\{Cj, d} 
The expansion of N has four cases instead of two, and the argument about 
acceptability of past history and preservation of form is a little more tricky, 
but otherwise there are no new ideas required. The expansion of E poses 
no problems. 
The rest of the proof is easiest done by brute force bisimulation, which again 
is tolerable because the worst agent is N, with four cases. 	 o 
The above proof is an obvious area for further work. Preliminary investi-
gations suggest the following will work. Any deterministic agent with two sets 
of disjoint channels, of which it chooses one or the other at every stage, can 
be transformed into an agent with just one set of channels and therefore one 
sequence as history instead of a pair. This should ease both the details in the 
proof of acceptability of past history, as well as allow us to transform the final 
four case N into a two case agent with the exact form of QSN of the last section, 
thus allowing us to avoid a brute force bisimulation. 
There remains one issue, that of checkpointing. We deal with this in the 
following pages, but first we compare the current state of the FTS proof with 
the Appendix version. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The first thing to note about the FTS proofs in this chapter, is that the difficult 
parts did not involve any feature peculiar to CCS, but were about data structures, 
induction and the like. The SDT is applied once, separates out the normal and 
exception processing, and the rest is similar to reasoning about any other sort 
of program. 
The proofs so far have been structured, and each bit has been a small step. 
Each captures some concept or property; for example, the only weak bisimulation 
that actually appears is at the last stage, where we refer to the abstract versions 
first dealt with, and even this has only to be carried out once. Subsequently 
we just substitute formally similar expressions. All the other equivalences are 
strong bisimulations. 
Even a hard to prove fact such as that the sequence of past inputs is accept-
able on recovery, is broken up: in the concrete stages, we actually proved it only 
for the normal processing; the fact that the whole agent has a similar property 
was done at a more abstract level. 
What is the price we have paid for this structure? The technical apparatus 
(MCCS, new operators, an awareness of context dependent bisimulation) is a 
little more elaborate than just CCS. But this is a price we only pay once; and 
we might argue that the tools have justified their existence. 
So a more serious question is what parts of the problem we have not solved 
satisfactorily compared to the old version. The first simplification here is that we 
are using a pure calculus. The second is that we may have failed to model features 
that some might consider necessary. The key to the reduction in complexity is 
the ability to synchronise actions whenever we need to, as for the SDT, and also 
when we are just not interested in the intermediate states. But states we termed 
"uninteresting" may not be so to everyone. All we can say is that the MCCS 
model is a reasonable representation of an informal description of the problem. 
The author's own dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs is only about 
the brute force still necessary for the last extensions of the problem. 
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4.6 The Checkpoint operator 
This is a generalisation of the audit operator that allows the normal and excep-
tion agents to communicate during an audit; the new action is called a check-
point. 
Definition 4.6.1 The operational semantics of the checkpoint operator. 4j  is 
a binary operator PM x PM PM that is parameterised by a set C of particles, 
the checkpoint set. 
A--A' aC 
Normal 	




A--A' B—LB' aCb 
Checkpoint 	 a(b/C) 
A B 	)A'B' 
The side conditions on the first two rules are as for the audit operator. The 
side condition on the last is a generalisation of the one for the audit operator: 
here we do not have the restriction b E C. Thus the exception agent can con-
tribute to a checkpoint action particles other than those in the checkpoint set 
C. 
All of the discussion following the definition of the audit operator applies, 
except for the parts dealing with the effect of the second side condition b e C for 
the audit rule. 
Communication between normal and exception agents as part of a checkpoint 
action does not mean that a 1 might result: communication between A and B 
above is only possible as part of an (externally visible) checkpoint action. This 
is because of our definition of aCb; a and b have equal non-zero projections on C. 
This projection cannot be cancelled out. (The actions cannot carry the cancelling 
particles!) Note also that A and B cannot communicate via a particle in C. 




We begin by defining an ancillary quantity, the quotient of a by C. It is the 
product of the particles of a not in C. 
Definition 4.6.2 Let C be a set of particles, and a =. . . ) be an action 
where the A i are all distinct, and the z 1 are all non-zero integers. Suppose that 
'1 . . . Ai E C and that 	. . . 	C. The quotient of a by C, denoted by (a/C). 
is defined to be )4j' ... 	 0 
A subscripted notation would in some ways have been better, because our 
choice suggests a(b/C) = (ab) /C and even a(b/C) = (a/C)b, both of which are 
false. (Take a and b to be particulate, and C to be {a}.) To avoid such mistakes, 
we have to use parentheses and usually treat (a/C) as an indivisible quantity. 
Despite these drawbacks, we stay with the division notation because subscripts 
on actions, which frequently appear on top of arrows, are messy and hard to 
read. 
The submonoid problem crops up here as well. (ab) /C 0 (a/C)(b/C) in 
general; take a to be particulate, b = a 1 , and C = {a}, the left hand side will 
be 1 whereas the right hand side will be .4. 
Now we can define the checkpoint product of a and b over C. It need only be 
defined if a and b are checkpoint-equal. Its main property is that it suppresses 
the duplication of particles from C that would result in an ordinary ab. The 
quantity a(b/C) is a candidate, because it has the latter property if a and bare 
equal over C, as the following proposition assures us. However, it is defined even 
otherwise, so we will have to treat it as an extension of checkpoint product. Note 
that, while duplication is suppressed, a(b/C) retains particles in C, which is of 
course essential. 
Proposition 4.6.3 If ac = bc then a(b/C) = (a/C)b. Also, if aCb then 
a(b/C) E C. 
Proof: Expand the two sides; ac(a/C)(b/C) = (a/C)bc(b/C). 
Definition 4.6.4 The checkpoint product of a and b over C is a(b/C). 	o 
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The proposition above says that if ac = bc, the quantity a(b/C) is symmetric 
between a and b. It follows that under this condition, and therefore also if aCb, 
the checkpoint product is commutative, which we certainly want. 
Our definition settles for the extension instead of the less defined function we 
had in mind. This is no problem. We merely note that the expression a(b/C), 




A B—B .  aCb So we can use it as the derived checkpoint action in 	
a(b/C) 
AcB 	)A'cB' 
Otherwise we treat it exactly as would any product and quotient, using the 
proposition above, if needed and applicable, in algebraic simplification. 
Another advantage is that we have not introduced further notation. We could 
have introduced a quantity a xc b, defined only if ac b. This would have been 
awkward to handle, for we would have had to check for the condition before we 
used the expression. Nor would it have saved us the parentheses, because we will 
often need, say, p x (q xc r) where q and r are equal over C, but p is not equal 
over C to these two. Indeed in this case our use of ordinary products is positively 
preferable: it makes it easy to see that pq(r/C) = qp(r/C), for example. 
Lemma 4.6.5 Quotients 
Suppose a,a 1 7Z. and p, p- ' It C. Let U=CU1. Then 
a/R=a 
a/U=a/C 
(a/C)(p/'R) = (ap) /U 
aCb =' (a(b/C)) /C = (a/C)(b/C) 
Proof: I and 2 are special cases of 3, but they are easy to prove indepen-
dently, and we use them in the proof of 3. Consider two subcases. Either 
a and p have some complementary particles or they don't. If they don't, 
it is easy to see the result from 1 and 2. If they do, note that the comple-
mentary particles cannot belong to either C or R. Hence the cancelling out 
takes place on both sides. 4. The result is obviously true if a and (b/C) 
have no complementary particles, or such particles in a don't belong to C. 
The remaining case is interesting. Example: a is particulate, C = { a} and 
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b = a 1 . This would produce 1 on the left and a on the right. But such a 
case cannot arise, because we have aCb. Therefore any particles in a which 
belong to C also occur in b. We cannot have both these particles and their 
complements in b 0
4.6.1 Properties of Checkpoint 
We shall often say "checkpoint operator", or "f", to mean the family jtc indexed 
by C. This informal usage parallels that of "action prefix". In this sense, the 
checkpoint operator is a generalisation of displace, because one instance of the 
family, A to B, is the same as t. 
The relation between the checkpoint and audit operators is a little more 
difficult to show. The more general operator can simulate the special case. 
Proposition 4.6.6 A B simulates A tc B. 
Proof: The simulation is R U where R. consists of all pairs of the form 
<AflcB,A 4 c B>. Normal actions byAB can be simulated byA' -jB 
to reach a new pair in R. Displace actions by A te B can be simulated 
by A tc B to reach . Lastly the inference P- -,P' Q_ 
L Q' aCb b e C 
PQ--P'+Q' 
can be matched by the inference 
P- -*P' Q_ L Q' aCb
a(b/C) 	 because the side Pit PcQ 
condition is automatically satisfied; we reach a new pair in R. Because b E C 
from the lhs, a(b/C) = a. 
The checkpoint operator shares many properties with the audit operator. 
Desirable properties which fail to hold for either t or for tc of course also fail 
for the more general , so we refer the reader back to the relevant sections for 
these. 
Proposition 4.6.7 P Q = P R Q 9 R and R +tc P R 4 Q. 	11 
Like j, 	is substitutive on the left but not on the right of . 
Proposition 4.6.8 P Q = P 4-u! R Q -f R. 	 El 
131 
does not preserve either M or cA  on the right, because tc does not. 
4-j is obviously not commutative. We shall postpone associativity till after 
we have looked at restriction. 
The displace and audit operators allow restriction to distribute uncondition-
ally. Restriction \.,V distributes over tc under the condition that P and Q in 
P +tC3 Q cannot communicate via a member of Al. Here for the first time we 
pay a price for allowing P and Q to communicate during a checkpoint action. 
However, the condition is a familiar one from CCS and SCCS, and not too much 
of a burden. We can weaken it a bit because communication cannot occur via 
particles in C as we saw above. The resulting condition is still too strong, be-
cause the complementary particles are a problem only if they occur as part of 
checkpoint actions. Unfortunately, this is awkward to state concisely. 
Proposition 4.6.9 If P fl U fl (A( - C) = P n Q fl (Al - C) = 0 then 
(PQ)\Al(P\Al)(Q\Al) 
Proof: By bisimulation. Normal and displace actions are as for Ff..  For 
checkpoint, we need a(b/C) E Al 	a E Al A b Al. == is always true, 
and 	true under the theorem's condition. 	 o 
As for ff,  most absorptive and distributive laws do not hold, but the following 
exception for t and tc still survives. 
Proposition 4.6.10 (Q + R) tc P (Q tc P) + (R tc F) 	 El 
We now look at associativity. Here again the possibility of communication 
complicates matters. A checkpoint action of the form a(b/C) might have no 
particles in V even if a or b do so, because these particles can be cancelled 
out in the checkpoint product. We did not have to consider this for the audit 
operator because there the final action was equal to the normal action. Another 
complication in this proof is that for one case, we even have to prove that the 
actions on both sides are the same. 
Proposition 4.6.11 If P fl V c C and R. fl C C V, and P and Q cannot 
communicate via V, and Q and R cannot communicate via C, then (P tc Q) 4-f 
RP(QR). 
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Proof: The reader might want to look over the proof for 4j  again. Here we 
point out only the differences in the proofs. 
Of the 7 possible cases, P, Q, R, PQ, QR, PR and PQR, the first three 
(permitted) and PR (ruled out) are exactly the same as in the earlier proof. 
Here is the table of case analysis followed by the bisimulation for the re-
maining three cases. 
PQ -* Need q It V. We have p(q/C) V. Therefore (p/C)q It V. Since P 
and Q cannot communicate via V, we get q it V. 
i- Need p(q/C) V. By Particles 3, (p/C) 4 V. We have q - V. So 
(p/C)q V which implies result. 
QR i- Need q(r/V) C. By Particles 3, (r/V) C, and we have q C. 
Result follows. 
- Need q E C. By Particles 3, (r/V) C, and we have q(r/V) 4 C. 
Because Q and R cannot communicate, result follows. 
PQR First we have to show that the actions are equal. By Particles 3, 
(nV) C. Then (r/V) = (r/V)/C. The result follows by Quotients 4. 
-' Need qVr and pCq(r/V). We have pCq. By Particles 3 (r/V) E C; 
also R and Q do not communicate via C. So pCq(n/V). We also 
have p(q/C)Vr, which can be written (p/C)qVr. By Particles 3, 
(p/C) V; also P and Q do not communicate via V. So qVr. 
*- Need p(q/C)Vr. From qVr and (p/C) It V and because P and Q 
do not communicate via V. We also need pCq. Follows similarly 
from pCq(n/D). 
The bisimulation below lists these three cases. PR is ruled out and the F, 
Q and R are exactly as for te . 
H(P,Q,R) 	((PQ) v R, P(QR)) 
Case PQ: 
p,p' Q!Q' pCq 
PcQ_
p(q/C) 




p-!-p' Qt R--Q' v R pCq 
P(QR)_
p(q/C) 
 P'tc  




P c Q!*Q' R--R' qDr 
(PQ)DR_
q(r/D) 
Q--Q' R--R' qVr 
q(r/D) 





leading to I 
Case PQR: 





(PQ) v R 	)(P'Q') v R' 
Q Q' R--*R' qDr 




leading to Al  (F', Q', R') 
01 
Corollary 4.6.12 (P tc Q) tc R P (Q R) 
Proof: This is still unconditional! The conditions on the intersections of 
the checkpoint sets with the sorts of the agents are automatically satisfied, 
as for jc,  and the constraints on communication are automatically satis-
fied because the normal and exception agents cannot communicate via the 
checkpoint set. U 
Thus we can write P tc Q R without ambiguity. 
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4.6.2 The Synchronised Displacement Theorem 
This is very similar to the proof for the audit operator, and we will only point 
out the differences. 
Theorem 4.6.13 The Synchronised Displacement Theorem 
LetD =AB andS=PQ. Suppose CflS= Cfl= RflV=1fl_ 0. 
Then if X[ ] is a context that synchronises the displace actions of D and S, 
X [(A 	B) I (P  -f Q)] x [(ALP) t culz (BIQ)]. 
Proof: We write U = C U R. 
The general ideas and even the cases are exactly as for the audit operator. 
Cases A, AP and BQ are identical to those in the first proof, as are the 
ruled out cases B, AQ and ABQ. That leaves AB, APB and APBQ. 
In the bisimulation below, the case headings show that the side conditions 
on the two sides imply each other, and that the actions done by the two sides 
are equal. Note that the sort condition can be expanded to a, a', b, b' It 1Z. 
and p, pL,  q, q' C, where a is any action by A, b any action by B, p any 
action by P and q any action by Q. This means that the conditions of Lem-
mas 3.3.14, 3.3.15, 4.6.5 and 3.3.16 are all satisfied. (Particles, Checkpoint 
Equality and Quotients). 
AI(A, B, F, Q) 	((A 	B) I (P tp Q), (A  I F) - (B I Q)) 
Case AB. aCb 	aUb from Checkpoint Equality 1 and b/C U R = b/C from 
Quotients 2: 










leading to Al (A', B', F, Q) 
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Case APB. aCb A p It 1 	(ap) Ub from Checkpoint Equality 2, and b/U = b/C 
from Quotients 2: 
A - -jA' B B' aCb p! +p' pt1 
ACB 
a(b/C) 
A'B' PQ --*P'Q 
(Afj-B) I (P'jQ) 
a(b/C)p 
 )(A'B') I(P'1iQ) 
a 	 P 	 b A—IA P—P B—B ,  




(A' I P')j(B'  I Q) 
leading to Al (A', B', F', Q) 
Case APBQ. aCbApRq 	apUbq from Checkpoint Equality 3 and (b/C)(q/R) = 
(bq) /U from Quotients 3: 
A - -*A' B--*B' aCb P - --P' QQ' plZq 
AfcB 
a(b/C) 
A' 4-jB' 	P4-fQ 
p(q11j 
(A -- B) l(P1Q) 
a(b/C)p(q/1) 
)(A'tc.B') (Ptiz  
A--A' p.Lp' B±B' Q--*Q' 
AIP - A'IP' 	BlQ - B'lQ' apUbq 
(Al P) -f(B I Q) 
ap(bq/U) 
(A' I F')+tu (B' I Q') 
leading to IV (A', B', P', Q') 
1 
The forms of the two theorems are exactly alike, and this suggests that check-
point is in some sense a more stable point in the design space, and that we had 
stopped rather artificially short with audit. Indeed, in their present forms, the 
audit was invented as a simplification of the checkpoint operator. 
However, the proof of the SDT needs even more finicky attention to particles 
and side-conditions, and we have to prove action equality sometimes. Such con-
siderations also affect the user who wishes to carry out proofs. A few theorems, 
notably the distribution of restriction over are also not as easy to use as the 
unconditional versions for tc, though these constraints are no worse than what 
we are used to from CCS. 
The main motivation was to carry out as much work as possible with as 
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simple an operator as possible, and so the audit is interesting as the simplest of 
its kind that does satisfy the SDT. 
The displaced environment theorem for the checkpoint operator does not 
hold. If we look at the proof for the audit, we see that in the last step we say 
that given an action a and an audit set C, the contribution by both normal 
and exception agents is determined. This is not so with the checkpoint, as the 
particles of a not in C could come from either agent. Now if PN tc PE does an 
action a, and it is of interest because the environment ON tC °E also does an a, 
the particular b that PN does may not be of interest to ON.  The conditions of 
the theorem now do not let us conclude that Q can produce a checkpoint action 
rom 
Thus the unique factoring of the audit action has some effect, at least. 




Q '=a.Q + b 1 .Q 
Then (AIQ) \\{a, b} 	(B IQ) \\{a, b}, which can be read as "in a context that 
does not care about a'a and b's, A and B are equal". For example a or b might 
be a bit telling us whether the x is upper or lower case, and if we are printing 
on an old-fashioned printer that prints only upper case, we have a model of 
the equivalence induced by the printer—larger than that induced by a modern 
one. Now the only environment under which A and B are equal is 0, which is 
prepared to equate any pair of agents. This may be regarded as disappointing, 
but it is consistent with Larsen's theory, for the environment does not "interact 
identically" with the two agents A and B. This is related to why the displaced 
environment does not hold for the checkpoint operator. In both cases, we are 
using the structure we have on the action set, and this is not considered in 
[Larsen86]. It remains to be seen whether this is a fruitful area for future work. 
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4.6.3 Application of the Checkpoint operator 
Checkpoints are accepted by the restartable system, and cause it to throw away 
all history prior to the present state. No future failure will ever take it further 
back than the present state. Since in our programs we are representing the 
current state itself by a trace, the only visible effect here is that of resetting the 
state to which the normal agent is taken back upon failure. 
The normal agent has to pass its current state to the exception agent, and 
we do it simply by using a value passing version of MCCS. 
Proposition 4.6.14 Let 
P (q) = >-IiEv(q) a.P (q: a1 ) 	 perfect agent 
QS (q", q, q) = QSN (q", q) tP QSE (q, q) 
QSN (q", q) = if q" = e then iEv(q) a.QSN (e, q: a) 
else 1.QSN (ti (q") , q) 
+tx 1 (q") .QSN (q ", q) 
QSE (q, qc) = f.QS (q, q )  q) + EaO, a.QSE (q: a, q) 
+tx (q") .QSE (q, q") 
where qc is a final subsequence of q, and q" a final subsequence of q.  q is a trace 
of P(e). Then QS(q",q,q) 
Proof: The (weak) bisimulation consists of all pairs (QS(q", q, q) PIf*It*) 
where the subsequence conditions are fulfilled, and q is a trace of P (e). 
./V(q",q,q) 	( QS(q",q,q), P(q) If*It* 
Case Recovery, q" 0 e. (Normal rule for lhs). 
QS(q",q,q) _! +QS(t1( q h1) ,q , q ) 	 P(q) If* ir ='.P(q) If*It* 
leading to .ftsf(tl(q"),q,q) 
Case Normal, q" = e. (Checkpoint rule for ibs). —:
ai 
QS(c,q,q) —--)QS(c,q:a 1 ,q) 	 P(q) If* itI _a+P(q:a) if* It 
leading to Jsf(e,q:a,q) 
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Case Failure (displace) -': 
QS(q "I ,q,q) / —+QS(q,q,q) 
	
P(q) lf*It* --*P(q) If* It* 
leading to J%f(q, q, q) 
Case Checkpoint (checkpoint rule) -,: 
QS(q",q,q) -- QS(q",q,q") 
	
P(q) If* It* _!_P(q) If* jr 
leading to Al (q", q, q") 
U 
	
At a more concrete level, a similar exchange of information across 	takes 
place both in the fallible agent and the backup agent, and as long as new particles 
t and x are used, the SDT applies routinely to give us separation as before. 
4.6.4 Can we now do without displacements? 
Since there is a way for the exception agent to affect the behaviour of the normal 
agent, we could now try to avoid the displace. Obviously, the system should be 
programmed so that the normal agent cooperates! There are many issues to be 
discussed here; the only point we wish to make for now is that it is an inter-
esting formal exercise to try this. The result is a sort of symmetric checkpoint 
operator, where we cannot formally tell which is the exception agent. It has 
some interesting properties; it is commutative, and the SDT holds without any 
synchronisation conditions, which is to be expected: there are no displacements 
to be synchronised. 
This operator shows very close similarities to the -y-  and T- conjunction oper-
ators of [Milner83]; in particular a special case of the checkpoint product appears 
in connection with those operators. 
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Chapter 5 
On the Non-Derivability of Operators 
in CCS 
5.1 Different notions of derivability 
We have seen so far several examples of derived operators: SP fixX (1.X + F) 
in all our calculi, PQ P x SQ + SP x Q in ASCCS and derived MCCS, 
and a.[ ] a: S[ ] in ASCCS. In all these cases, we have an expression not 
involving the new operator that is strongly congruent to an expression with the 
new operator outermost. As the last example emphasises, we have a context, not 
involving the new operator, and with as many holes as the operator's arity, that 
is strongly congruent to a context involving just the new operator with holes for 
its parameters. 
This is a purely algebraic notion of derivability. We only need remember that 
it is parametrised by -; any other equivalence will do just as well. However, we 
will not need this generality in this chapter, and we keep our notation simple by 
ignoring this aspect. Thus we will only say "derivable", not ""-derivable". 
Definition 5.1.1 Let E be any signature, and p 	be an operator of arity n. 
Then p is said to be derivable from E if there is a context e, with n holes and 
generated by E , such that e[P1 , . . . , P,] 	p(Pi ,.. . ) P) for all P1 ,.. . , P,. If no 
such 5 exists p is said to be non-derivable from E. El 
Thus the three operators 8, I and a. above are straightforward examples of 
derived operators according to our definition. Now consider the following proof 
of derivability. 
tVTe allow e to use new names not in Act; in that case we extend Act to include these 
new names and correspondingly adjust the definition of , which depends upon Act. 
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Proposition 5.1.2 t is derivable in MCCS. 
Proof: Assume that the elements of Act are a1 , a2 ,.. 
Let b 1 , b 2 , ... and c 1 , C2, ... be new names. 	-. 
P t Q (P[b1a]jQ[c11a]IZ) \\{b, c} 
where Z= Ej ba.Z + >j, c'a.Z' 
and Z'= Ec'a.Z' 
In the expression equivalent to PQ, P and Q have their action translated 
into b's and c's respectively by the morphism operators. Z is a synchroniser 
which picks up these translated actions and retranslates them into a's; P 
and Q cannot act except through Z because of the restriction. After the 
first action by Q, Z moves to a state where it refuses to pass on any actions 
by P. It is easy to formally show the bisimulation. 
The expression replacing the t operator is strikingly different from our three 
examples at the start because of the condition it poses on the action set. 
- 	- I 	As it happens, this way of showing derivability is often 
used; [Milner83] uses it to show the derivability of the 7-conjunction operator, 
and [de Simone851 uses it as the basis of his proof that any new operator whose 
operational semantics is given by structured inference rules is derivable from 
MEIJE-SCCS. 
A third, and this time apparently different, notion of derivability is used by 
[Milner83]. To prove that morphism is derivable, we note that "for any morphism 
4: Act -+ Act, the actions of E[4] are characterised as follows: 
(1) if E 	i E', then E[4] 	E'[çb], 
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(2) if E[q5] -L G', then E/ — - E' for some a and E' such that b = q5 (a) and 
E'[cb]. 
Therefore we must find a derived operator satisfying these two properties". The 
derived operator is a syntactic form using other operators of the calculus, so it 
would appear that our contexts would be acceptable, and the two conditions 
above then are no more than a restatement of a strong congruence relation 
between the new and old forms. We conclude that there is no real difference 
between our notion of derivability and this one. In passing, we note that the 
proof of derivability of morphism also needs to extend Act. 
5.2 (HoW to prove operators non-derivable 
The only general method the author knows to prove an operator p non-derivable 
from a signature E is to find a property that is preserved by equality and by all 
the operators of E, but which is not preserved by the new operator p. 
Examples are easy to find: Given N, the set of natural numbers, and add2 
N x N - N, the function that adds 2 to any number, we can show that the 
successor function succ cannot be derived because any expression we build with 
add2 preserves oddness or evenness, while .succ does not. No composition of 
bishop's moves on a chessboard will ever give a knight's move because the former 
preserve colour while the latter does not. Using only the operators of CCS other 
than "fix", we can only produce agents with finite derivations; this proves that 
we cannot derive "fix" from the others. And so on. 
Formally, the version we need for CCS is this. We need to find a property 
11 of agents preserved by strong congruence, i.e. if 11(P) and P Q then 
11(Q). We also demand that for any binary operator o e E, 11(P) and 11(Q) 
should imply 11 (o  (F, Q)). Similarly for other arities. Then any expression e 
(binary, say) composed of the operators in E will have the property that 11(P) 
and 11(Q) imply 11 (t. (P, Q)). If we claim that E is the derived form of p, we 
must have £(P,Q) ' p(P,Q) and therefore 11(p(P,Q)). If p does not preserve 
11, so that we know that for some P and Q, E (p (F, Q)) does not hold despite 
11(P) and 11(Q), we have a contradiction, and there cannot exist any such E; p 
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is non-derivable. 
Strong congruence in this argument is our "equality"; it is the equivalence 
relation we use in our definition of derivability. 
But even the use of this standard mathematical technique seems compara-
tively rare, at least in the author's experience. This might explain why some of 
the observations we make in this chapter have apparently not been made before, 
despite their being obvious from the literature; proving operators non-derivable 
appears not to have been a concern, though proving them derivable is common 
enough. 
In this chapter, we will present a special case of this general technique that 
seems particularly well suited to transition systems, and use this as well as 
other versions of the general technique, to prove several of the operators we 
have encountered non-derivable from various others. The applicability of our 
technique is a sufficient but not necessary condition for non-derivability, so there 
are many interesting questions we will not be able to answer. Those we do tell 
us more about the relationships between the various calculi we considered in 
Chapter 2. 
5.2.1 A new technique for non-derivability proofs 
This is to find an equivalence relation that is preserved by all the operators in 
but not by p. That is to say, we find a congruence wrt E that the new operator 
sees through. 
Theorem 5.2.1 Let E be a signature generating expressions E and agents P, 
and let >< be a congruence relation, ' . Let p be an n-ary operator. If there 
exist F, Q and i such that PiQ but not 
P (PI ,... , .P....1 , F, P+17  . . . , 	 ieip(Pi, . . . , P_1, Q, P1+1, . . . , F,,), 
then p is non-derivable from E . 
Proof: This is just a special case of our general argument above. If p were 
derivable, we would have had an n-ary context e such that e p. Then 
since E would preserve x, we would get 
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E (Pi  ,.. ,P) 
me (Pi, 	•,P1.-..i,Q,P+i,... ,P) 
Since 	rx, we can replace by x in the above equation, and we have 
our contradiction. 	 o 
As an immediate corollary, let us name the most well known case. 
Proposition 5.2.2 + is non-derivable from the other operators of CCS; it is 
also non-derivable from the other operators of MCCS. 
Proof: In each case, all the other operators preserve ; + doesn't. 	0 
The technique is not necessarily applicable. Consider the natural numbers 
generated by 0 and succ. Suppose we try to prove that + is not derivable 
from this signature. Let x be any equivalence relation over N, such that =*i 
and preserved by succ, i.e. nrim implies suce (n) r1succ (m). That nm implies 
(p + n) x (p + m) can be shown by induction on p. (Obviously, we have to have a 
definition of + for all of this to make sense. It could be axiomatic, or operational, 
in terms of succ.) Thus addition cannot see through any equivalence preserved 
by succ. But + is not derivable from succ because from just 0 and succ we 
cannot generate a context with two holes in it! 
Now observe that in our technique we need to show that the erstwhile con-
gruence ti is not preserved by the new operator. Thus we need an equivalence 
relation for which there is a failure test. So an equivalence defined by equational 
axioms will not do, for they can tell us when two terms are equal, but never 
when they are unequal. However, an axiomatisation of m over the signature E 
can be useful to show that the example agents P and Q are in fact '<-related. 
We shall see such an application later. 
This is why our technique is particularly suited to use with any formal system 
where the equivalences are set up operationally, for then we have a simple way to 
prove that two agents are not related. For example to show that a.O + b.O '7t  a.O, 
we just have to find one action, b, that prevents the bisimulation conditions from 
being fulfilled. 
Milner shows in [Milner83] that 	is preserved by the operators of SCCS, 
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i.e. that it is a congruence. The only difficult part of this proof is the case 
of the "fix" construct. To show that the other operators preserve - is easy. 
This is because .- is in fact preserved by any operator defined by the usual 
transition semantics. Consider an n-ary operator p, and let Q 	R. Then 
p(Pi,. . •,-i,Q,P1+1) ... ,P) 	p(Pi , ... ) P1_i ,R,P1+1 ,. . ., P,). For every ac- 
tion of the left hand side that is not a derivation from an action of Q, the right 
hand side can do the same action by an identical derivation. If Q contributes to 
the left hand side, R can match this action, thus ensuring that the right hand 
side has an exactly similar derivation. Further, the resulting states on both sides 
continue to have the same form, and so lead back into the bisimulation. 
5.3 Some derivability and non-derivability re-
suits 
Before we begin on our results, we quote a result from [de Simone85], which 
says that SCCS augmented with the A operator gives a complete calculus from 
which any operator defined by structured inference rules can be derived, using 
a technique rather like our proof of the derivability of Fj_.  The L operator is 






We shall refer to SCCS augmented with this operator as SCCSL. 
We organise our results by operator, and prove non-derivability from the rest 
of the calculus if possible, or from smaller subsets of the rest if that is of interest. 
Proposition 5.3.1 The action prefix operator a: is non-derivable from the rest 
Of SCCSL, ASCCS, MCCS and CCS. 
Proof: 	The property of asynchrony is this: P is asynchronous if all its 
proper derivatives are idle. In ASCCS, a : is the only operator that does 
not preserve asynchrony. The action prefix operator a. of ASCCS is derived 
from that of SCCS, and is designed to do so. The other operators all preserve 
asynchrony. Example: If P and Q are asynchronous, we have PxQ—.P'xQ', 
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where F' and Q' are both idle. So is F' x Q' by Proposition 2.2.2. Therefore 
P x Q is asynchronous. 	 0 
In any calculus, we can show that the action prefix used in that calculus is 
non-derivable from the rest of it simply because all other operators preserve the 
property "has no actions" of any agent. 
We know that + is not derivable from the rest of CCS or MCCS. Its deny-
ability from the rest of ASCCS and SCCS is not clear. [de Simone85] remarks 
that it can be derived from SCCS, but does not give a proof. 
Proposition 5.3.2 Restriction is not derivable from the other operators of 
SCCS (or any of the other calculi). 
Proof: Because the rest only build contexts that will accept all actions. 	0 
Proposition 5.3.3 x is not derivable from the rest of SCCS, MCCS or CCS. 
Proof: The rest of SCCS is the same as the rest of MCCS minus I; therefore 
it is enough if we prove the result for MCCS. All we need to do is to observe 
that x can detect any delay discrepancies, and therefore can see through 
cM A similar proof goes through for CCS. 	 n 
Proposition 5.3.4 x is derivable neither from derived MCCS nor from the 
rest of ASCCS. 
Proof: Syntactically, of course, the rest of ASCCS looks like MCCS minus 
the 1 . But the action rule makes a difference; if it did not, the cA  would 
have been the same as Now we know that M is a congruence for 
derived MCCS as well, i.e. for the rest of ASCCS with the I thrown in. 
We have P + 1.P M 1.P but taking P a.O and R b.O, we have 
R x (1.P + P) --+ 0 but R x (1.P) has no such move. o 
Call I as defined as in MCCS IM•  We know that it can be derived from SCCS. 
So can 1' which is I in CCS. If P and Q do only a's, we extend Act to b's and 
c's and then 
IQ' ((P[b1/a] x 8Q[c1/a] + 5F[b1 /a1 ] x Q[c1/a1]) Z) \\{b, c 1 } 
where Z= E j b 1 a1.Z + >1, c 1 a1 .Z' + E j b'c1.Z + E j b1c*Z 
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Either P or Q is allowed to act alone and have its actions relayed through Z, 
but they can also act together by the third and fourth terms, when they must 
do complementary actions. 
Ic can also be derived from IM by a very similar method: P J C Q 
(P[b1a 1 ]IQ[cu 1a 1 ]IZ) \\{b, c} where Z is the same as for the derivation from 
sccs. 
But can ', be derived from particulate MCCS? 
It is obvious that IM  cannot be derived from I; within CCS there is no way 
of inferring non-particulate actions, whereas particulate MCCS, with the same 
syntax, does produce them. This is confirmed by the following: 
Proposition 5.3.5 IM  is not derivable from CCS. 
Proof: The rest of the operators preserve "JA  but IM does not. 	 0 
Proposition 5.3.6 Non-particulate action prefixes are not derivable from 
particulate MCCS. 
Proof: 	Particulate MCCS cannot enforce synchronisation; with non- 
particulate action prefixes, we can. 	 o 
Proposition 5.3.7 The action prefix a: of MCCS cannot be derived from the 
a. of derived MCCS. 
Proof: What we mean by a: here is just that it has the rule a: P -- P as 
opposed to the rule a.P -- 6P for a.P. We have a strong congruence 
on derived MCCS and a strong congruence "-'ri  on MCCS, reverting to old 
notation for a moment. We know that a. (1.P + F) P but a. (1.P + F) .tn 
a.P. Now on MCCS define a relation "- which relates those agents that are 
congruent in derived MCCS. It is preserved by all operators of MCCS and 
by a., (this is what happens in derived MCCS), but not by a: 	 0 
Proposition 5.3.8 (due to Robin Milner) 
is not derivable from the other operators of SCCS. 
Proof: Suppose A (X) - E (X). Pick a not used as a guard in E, i.e. a 
does not occur non-negatively in any guard in E. Let A = a: 0. We show 
that A (A) .E[A/X]. 
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In fact we show that for any B, with Free (E) 9 {X}, such that a is not 
used as guard in B, that E[A/X] -- P implies P - 0. Here ab is an action 
such that a occurs non-negatively in it. 
The proof is by induction on the inference E[A/X] —--* P. We show three 
cases. If B b: E', then a does not occur non-negatively in it. So the 
inference is impossible. If B E1 + E2 then we must infer the same for B1 
or E2  by a shorter inference. 
Lastly consider E fixYF. If Y X, then E[A/X] B. So F[E/X] —EL 
P=(F[E/X]) [A/X] —L P. Hence P ' s.' Ø• If Y 0 X, then this case is an 
application of the inference rule for fix; and we need to assume the action 
for a shorter inference. Ruled out by induction hypothesis. 0 
Lastly a proof that demonstrates the usefulness of axiomatisation to set up 
congruences that we can then see through with the new operator. The following is 
particularly instructive since it clarifies the importance of I in CCS; just because 
there is an expansion theorem, we should not conclude that I is derivable, even 
in the absence of recursion. 
Proposition 5.3.9 1 is not derivable from + and action prefix in CCS. 
Proof: Without 1 , we can get a tighter congruence. See [Hennessy and Milner851. 
If we define in terms of =, where A 54 1, the congruence contained in 
it can be characterised by a set of 6 axioms, of which we only quote the 
relevant one here. 
p. (x + 1.y) = p. (x + y) + p.y 
This is not preserved by 1 . A counterexample is c.OJa. (b.0 + 1.0) 
c.0I (a. (b.0 + 0) + a.0); again please note that this uses defined by obser- 
vations other than 1. 	 11 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusions 
We have studied bisimulation proofs and developed a new layout for bisimulation 
proofs, both for agents and expressions, the latter being useful for clearly laying 
out the side-conditions. Ensuring that the side conditions imply each other in 
matching pairs in a bisimulation is usually the crucial part of proving general 
laws. 
We introduced a new calculus, MCCS, that can be seen as lying between CCS 
and ASCCS; like the latter, it allows synchronisation but is not a synchronous 
calculus. We have studied its properties, deriving most of them from the related 
calculi, SCCS, ASCCS and CCS. In the process, we clarified the relations between 
these older calculi, finding them to be closer than had been previously expressed 
in [Milner83]. In particular, we studied why strong congruence laws do not carry 
over from SCCS through to CCS (via ASCCS and MCCS). We have also isolated 
the discrepancies introduced by the translation from a particulate sub-calculus 
of ASCCS to CCS. 
Despite being a more powerful calculus than CCS, MCCS has the same ob-
servational congruence as the former. Otherwise, MCCS shares several features 
with ASCCS, but not those we see as troublesome; thus it is possible to regard 
MCCS as a more usable version of ASCCS. From this point of view, the rest of 
the thesis contributes the first examples of use for ASCCS, or at any rate for an 
asynchronous calculus that is not restricted to particulate actions. 
We defined a class of new operators to capture the structure of systems sepa-
rable into normal and exception processing. New operators have been frequently 
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suggested as the obvious way to attack specific applications; unfortunately there 
are not very many examples in the literature. But the few there are, are fairly 
simple, and so it is at first sight surprising that our new operators should have 
proved so troublesome. One reason certainly is the need to argue about sorts and 
particles of audited or checkpointed actions; this leads to large numbers of cases 
and matters are quite delicately dependent on the exact definitions we use. It is 
far from obvious that our definitions and chosen method of analysis, separating 
the normal and exception processing, are the best possible. We hope we have a 
made a contribution to all these questions by beginning a study. 
The two examples we have, the semaphore example and the FTS, convince 
us that we have made significant progress: the new proofs are notably smaller 
and clearer than the old ones. Neither is a large or impressive example, but 
that is the point, considering how matters look in the Appendix, where the 
same FTS appears enormous. We can report that most of the structure one 
might hope to see in the FTS is now explicit in our solutions. Among notable 
features are the localisation of the weak equivalence to a single final step, and 
the ability to state the intermediate lemmas and propositions in an individually 
meaningful way. Perhaps most interesting is that the difficulty in the old proof, 
apart from interleaving, now seems to lie mostly in the data structures. That 
these difficulties were hidden under several other lesser ones only made them 
harder to isolate and deal with. 
We must point out that we have not yet dealt satisfactorily with several 
backup agents in an FTS; in this respect we revert to a modest amount of brute 
force! To compensate, we are now able to deal with checkpoints, which seemed 
quite hopeless to us earlier. We conclude that we have a good basis on which 
to proceed to further extensions, including distributed checkpointing, mentioned 
by [He, Jifeng and Hoare86]. 
As for the Synchronised Displacement Theorem, we show that the absence 
of other natural distributive laws, etc., makes it about as good a law as we are 
likely to find. We have also shown that the condition is not as iestrictive as 
initial appearances suggest; at least, we do not need to insist that the exception 
agents all have to act together all the time, but a failure of one component has 
to be taken note of by all the others. 
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Our new technique for proving operators non-derivable, while it is very sim-
ple, seems to be a bit of a novelty because the whole issue of proving anything 
non-derivable seems to have received rather little attention in Computer Sci-
ence. Our technique emphasises the importance of operational definitions of 
both operators and equivalences. 
We continued our closer look at the calculus of [Milner83] by studying the 
operators involved. We proved many of the operators in SCCS and CCS to be 
primitive, and also developed a better understanding of the way synchrony and 
asynchrony are related in this chain of calculi. 
6.2 Future Work 
The "Future work" section of [Prasad84] (the Appendix) expresses a definite 
unwillingness to deal with examples like the FTS too often, particularly in view 
of the meagre returns, and suggests looking at other formalisms for the same 
problem. This we have done, and found worthwhile; we are now ready to look 
around for examples with greater confidence. 
Thus an immediate goal is to complete the extensions to the FTS satisfac-
torily. This is important not only to complete a demonstration of the power of 
our tools, but also in order to go on and tackle variations of the problem, or 
additions to it. The most significant contribution this thesis makes is that it 
breaks down a very large and almost monolithic proof into acceptable steps, as 
well as reducing the size of the whole very significantly. It is obviously important 
to know whether the same tools we used here can have good effects elsewhere. 
As we said in the introduction, we do not expect in the near future to affect the 
practice of fault tolerance, but we hope to learn from new examples more about 
CCS and programming and proof techniques. 
Issues to be explored include other ways of analysing exception handling; 
both with related operators as well as with other laws than the SDT. The settle 
rule for the audit operator is a good example of variations on the design decisions 
we have presented in this thesis. 
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On the slightly more theoretical side, completing the study of operators is 
one obvious suggestion for future work. Further work on the relation between 
ASCCS and MCCS (the search for safe expressions) might also prove rewarding. 
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Appendix 
SPECIFICATION AND PROOF OF A 
SIMPLE FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEM IN CCS 
K.V.S.Prasad 1 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Edinburgh 
Edinburgh EH9 3JZ 
ABSTRACT 
We model failure, and a fail-stop version of a 
deterministic agent, in CCS. Augmenting this last with 
stable storage gives us a fault tolerant system, which we 
prove observationally equivalent to the original agent. We 
thus make a contribution to the small list of applications 
of CCS. However, the proof is disappointingly long and 
complicated for such a simple example. We develop new 
notation and techniques for the proof, and also apply 
standard methods such as step-wise refinement and 
parametrisation. We notice a relation between data 
transformation and strong bisimulation, and find that 
inductive definitions for auxiliary functions go well with 
bisimulation. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we use CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) to formulate 
a simple fault tolerant system ('FTS') and to prove that its behaviour is 
equivalent to that of the corresponding fault free system. We have two aims: one 
is to understand how to model failure and fault tolerance in CCS, and to 
understand precisely in what senses the two systems referred to are equivalent. 
We also want to pave the way for further modelling. The second aim is to develop 
the techniques necessary to carry out a large proof in CCS. 
We begin, in this section, with a brief look at fault tolerance. We then rapidly 
review bisimulation, and survey what has been done so far in the field of proof 
techniques for CCS. 
Section 	2 presents 	our 	first 	simple system 	and proves 	that 	a 	suitable 
equivalence 	is observational equivalence. The proof uses a mixture of algebra 
and 	bisimulation, with 	some 	stepwise 	refinement. The bisimulations 	here 	are 
fairly complex, despite the use of indexing and parametrisation to simplify them. 
Following 	the first 	CCS 	formulation, 	this section 	also relates 	our 	FTS 	to 	the 
practical 	system [Prasad, 	Ramani 	and 	Abraham 	82] that 	was 	the 	original 
motivation for this work. 
Section 3 	generalises 	the first 	system, 	and uses 	more 	sophisticated 
techniques in the proof as well as a more elaborate sequence of steps, breaking 
the proof up into smaller, more meaningful bits. Readers can therefore skip 
Section 	2, but are encouraged to glance through it, particularly the 	first two 
subsections. 
The final sections review what we have achieved, and present some 
conclusions. 
1.1 Fault Tolerance 
The work on fault tolerailt software complements that on correctness, formal 
specifications, proof systems and so on. The distinction becomes clear if we 
consider the operation of a correct program, formally proven to satisfy its 
specification, on unreliable hardware. Its results will obviously be unpredictable. 
Thus a fault tolerant system should be programmed to handle anticipated 
hardware failures, at least. 
More recently, attempts have been made [Anderson and Lee 81] to try to 
handle unanticipated faults as well, including residual design (algorithmic) faults 
in the software. Obviously, this does not mean the system takes care of "all" 
situations, but that a broad class of error situations is covered. We shall not be 
taking this approach. 
1.1.1 Fail-stop processes 
Consider distributed programs consisting of processes communicating with 
each other by messages. Failures can occur either in the nodes on which the 
processes run, or in the communication channels, and can be the result of 
either hardware fault or design fault. 
A failure is detected by an acceptance test either by the faulty process itself 
or by a communicant. Acceptance tests are done, for example, by redundant 
computations and consistency checks, or by computing assertions. We shall not 
go into the techniques of error detection; we shall just assume that failures, 
defined as deviations from the specified "normal" behaviour, are detected by 
some means at some point after they occur. 
If all failures are detected by the faulty node itself, and the failed process is 
withdrawn from active service until it is remade, we call the process a fail-stop 
process. Fail-stop processes are formally defined by [Schlichting and Schneider 
81]. who also consider the problem of implementing them. We will not concern 
ourselves with this problem. For our purposes, the main feature of a fail-stop 
process is that it never sends out any erroneous information, and therefore 
errors do not propagate in a system consisting solely of fail-stop processes. 
Detection of failure by a process other than the faulty one always takes the 
form of recognising that the failed process has failed to communicate when it 
should have done so. 
If we do not make the fail-stop assumption, erroneous information might be 
passed between processes and acted on. resulting in erroneous states in more 
than just the faulty process. By the time the error has been detected, we will 
need damage assessment techniques and backward error recovery in order to 
transform the system state back to a well defined and error free one. If 
consistency of the state is defined, we will have to ensure it is restored as well 
[Merlin and Randell 77]. 
In either case, we have to treat the fault, for example by "remaking" the 
faulty process and resuming service. 
1.1.2 A simple error recovery scheme 
We 	now describe 	a 	simple 	error 	recovery scheme that can be 	used with 
deterministic 	fail 	stop 	processes. Suppose such 	a process is augmented by a 
reliable 	backup 	system 	("stable storage"). 	It 	can 	then checkpoint itself 
periodically; the checkpointed states are held on the stable storage, as is a log 
of all messages sent to the message since the last checkpoint. Upon failure, the 
process is initialised by the backup system to the most recent checkpoint. After 
this, it is fed back all the messages in the log, allowing it to relive the 
computations it should have gone through since the last checkpoint. This brings 
the process up to date and completes the recovery. Note that any messages 
generated by the failed process during the rerun have to be suppressed. 
The rationale behind restarting a program that has just demonstrated the 
presence of bugs in it is familiar to anyone who has ever re-booted an operating 
system. Of course if the fault is not in the software, but is instead a transient 
hardware fault, there is no objection at all to restarting the affected program, 
and since this is what we shall do in our CCS models later on, the notion 	of 
'fault' in those models is best taken as representing a transient hardware fault. 
This is the basic scheme used in Sections 2 and 3, and presented formally 
there. 
1.2 Bisimulation 
We assume that the reader is familiar with CCS [Milner 80], [Milner 83a]. We 
will be using the original asynchronous calculus. 
Observational equivalence can be proved by algebra, including the use of laws 
such as 
BT.B 
B + T. B 	T. B 
a. T. B 	a. B 
a. (B + T. C) + a. Ca. (B + T. C) 
is a congruence with respect to all operators except +, and we can get around 
this in practice by putting guards in front: 
B 	C ==> a. B 	a. C 
However, algebra cannot show the equivalence of recursively defined agents. 
For these, we have to use the technique of least fixed points. An alternative 
technique is bisirnulation. 
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Definition 1.2.1: .' is a weak bisimulation iff whenever PYQ 
if P-4P' then for some Q' Q-Q' and P'.fQ' 
if Q- Q' then for some P' P-'P' and Q'fP' 
Note: In this paper, we allow P-Q to mean P-Q. Thus, if P--!>P', Q might be able 
to match this by doing nothing: Q-4-Q. 
If we can find such an f, we write PQ. We refer to this as observational or 
weak equivalence. 
Definition 1.2.2: ,f is a strong bisimulation iff whenever P.FQ 
if P-P' then for some Q' Q-2,-Q' and P'YQ' 
if Q-4Q' then for some P' P-P' and Q'YP' 
If we can find a strong .1, we write P-SQ. This is a congruence, and we call it 
strong equivalence. P'-Q ==> PQ. 
1.3 Proof Techniques 
As envisaged in [Milner 80], CCS can be used both for specification and 
implementation, and we can reason about them using the calculus. Proofs are 
not conducted in a separate formal language, but instead resemble ordinary 
proofs in mathematics. This is potentially a great advantage, because of the 
large amount of mathematical experience available to us. However, while CCS 
has been used as a vehicle for theoretical research, and a lot of work has been 
done on its mathematical foundations, there has been comparatively little work 
done on applying CCS, or on developing techniques for proof. 
[Backhouse 83] is the only work we know that gives a large proof of 
equivalence in a structured way, with meaningful individual steps. The primary 
tool used here is the Expansion Theorem, and there is also some bisimulation. 
A few other large proofs --of —equivalenceare also available, [Sanderson 82], 
[Mitchell 83]. While these are important in that they establish that proofs are 
possible, they do not go very far towards developing a useable technique or 
methodology. This is because they consist of large quantities of extremely 
detailed but opaque symbolic manipulation. As we shall discover in the course of 
this paper, it is very hard to do much better with programs even a few lines 
long, but we do make some progress. 
The obvious response to such proofs is to try to build proof checkers. 
[Sanderson 82] describes a simple algorithm to generate bisimulation relations 
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(between agents that satisfy certain conditions). Applied blindly, this yields a 
mass of symbols and no insight, except possibly in the case where the two 
agents we are looking at are already simple enough, and we have good reason to 
believe that they are indeed equivalent. 
In the sequel, we shall refer occasionally to our own attempts to build a 
proof checker to handle more structured proofs, using Sanderson's algorithm as 
one of the basic tools. However, the main thrust of this paper is to gain an 
understanding of the problem, and to develop techniques. Thus our view is that 
we are still formulating what we want of a proof checker. 
We defer more comments about proof techniques to the Conclusions section. 
1.4 Notation 
We use subscripts a on r as comments. T means exactly the same as T, but 
the subscript tells us that the silent action was the result of a communication 
between two agents, one using a and the other a. 
L(P) represents the sort of P. 
We use PQ for (PIQ)\ci 1\ ... \a where ja 1 . ... . a=names(L(P)rt)). 
Bisimulations occur throughout this paper, and we found that developing a 
notation to display them was a useful achievement. Some explanation of our 
notation: A bisimulation proof posits a relation Y which consists of one or more 
pairs, each pair consisting of one state from each of the two agents that we 
want to prove observation equivalent to each other. The first pair consists of the 
initial states, i.e., the agents themselves. The pairs in our proofs are labelled, 
and each heads a different paragraph in the proof. 
For each pair in .', we have to show that every atomic action of the left hand 
member, L, can be matched by a- sequence of actions (with the same observable 
content) by the right hand member, R. Lines starting with -3 deal with this. For 
each action of L we use a single line. We also have to show that the resulting 
states, L' and R', say, are in Y. The label at the end of the line gives the index of 
<L', H'> in ,f. If the resulting L' and R' are identical, we don't bother to mention 
the identity relation at the end of the line. 
The lines corresponding to actions of R start with 4-. If a line of the proof 
belongs to both 4- and -*, we mark it with 4-+. 
We have 	also 	introduced a 	notational short 	cut. 	If a pair 	<L,R> leads 	to 
<a. 	L', a. R'>, we have simply claimed that the result of the action was the pair 
<L',R'> (or sometimes, to be a little more explicit, 	"a. <L', 	R'>"). 	This saves us 
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the clutter of introducing another pair <a. L', a. R'> into the bisimulation 
relation, where each member has only one action, leading to the pair <L',R'>. 
Lastly, we use algebraic simplification on R' where necessary. 	This 
simplification, indicated by = in the proofs, is actually zc . 	Thus we write 
R—>R'=R" leading to the pair <L', R">. That is, we are using the concept of 
"bisimulation upto bisimulation". 
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2. A first version of a simple fault tolerant system 
2.1 CCS formulation 
We present a formal version of the scheme described in the introduction. 
We will model one example of a perfect process, a fallible version of it, and a 
perfect backup system, and try to prove that the last two are together 
equivalent to the first. The perfect process we have chosen for our first 
attempt, PER, is fairly typical of a process in a distributed system in that it 
waits for an input, computes a response consisting possibly of several messages, 
and then goes back to wait for the next input. We have already incorporated a 
simplification, however. PER has no internal 'state' between inputs. 
PER  4= in v. PER2(v) 
PER 2(v) = if B(v) then out f(v). PER 2(g(v)) else PER 
Suppose k is the lowest integer such that B(gk(v))  is true. Then PER outputs k 
values, exactly, and we can write more conveniently 
PER 	= in v. PER 
2.0 
PER 2,i  4= out u i 	2.i. PER . + 1 for i = O.k-I 
PER 2.k4=  PER  
Thus PER 2J  corresponds to PER 2(g t(v)) in our first description, and u to f(g'(v)). 
Note that k, ul ... uk. and PER 2 1...PER2k  are all functions of v, but we will usually 
drop the "(v)" in these expressions and in others, in order to reduce the clutter. 
Now for the fallible version P of PER. As long as it doesn't fail, P does the 
same thing as PER. Failure is modelled by incorporating a malevolent 'failer' F, 
which causes failures by communicating with P. p is always ready to fail, by 
receiving an f, and then going into a state from which it can only be restarted. 
P 1 4= pin.. P20 + f. P 
P 2 . : pout u P2 . 1 + f. P 3 	for i=O..k-1 
P2k 4= pfinish. P1 + f. P3 
P3 4= restart. P 1 
We shall see shortly why we use private versions pin and pout rather than the in 
and out of PER, and also why we need the pfinish to signal the end of output 
corresponding to an input value. 
If P fails while computing a response, it must be restarted and fed back the 
current input. If it fails between inputs, the response to the previous input has 
already been delivered, so we just have to restart it. The restarting is done by S 
(for "spy"), so called because it eavesdrops on all inputs to P. That is, S picks 
up input values on in from the outside world and relays them, via pin, to P. 
S 1 z in v. S 2 (v) 
S 2(v) 	pin V. S 3 (v) + pinf. S 4 
S 3(v) 	pfinish. S 1 + pinf. S 4 
S 4(v) <= restart. S 2 (v) 
Rather than model detection of failure by time-outs, we have chosen to have F 
inform S, via pinf, of the fact. 
F1 = f. F2 
F2 . 	pinf. F 1 
We see that pfinish is needed to tell S when it may go on to accept the next 
input. Until then, it must hold on to v in case it needs it to feed back to P. Note 
that S is willing to accept a pinf only at points where it is trying to talk to 
P. Note also how we use the fact that P has no state between inputs. 	Without 
this simplification, S would need to store a queue of input messages for P which 
would have to be fed back to it after a restart. (This queue would be zeroed 
whenever 	P 	checkpoints 	itself. 	An 	interesting special 	case would 	have 	no 
checkpoints, and a permanent store of all inputs to P. This is the case we deal 
with in Section 3.) 
But all is not yet well—Whenever P is restarted, it will generate again all the 
output corresponding to the input value. But some of this output might already 
have been relayed to the outside world before failure. We therefore introduce 
another agent DS (for "duplication suppressor"), which picks up the values on 
pout and counts the messages generated during the rerun, using a 'local counter' 
1. DS starts relaying them to the outside world, via out, only after P has caught 
up with history. This happens when the local counter equals the 'external 
counter' e, which counts the number of messages relayed to the outside. 
DS also needs to be informed of when a rerun has begun. We do this by 
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modifying S to relay pl.nf to DS as inf. Though not necessary, we also inform DS 
of a successful termination, via finish, so that it can initialise its counters. 
The whole system is summarised in Fig. 2-1. 
A very important feature of the system is the division of the backup system 
into S and DS. The consequences of this pervade all of this section and the next 
one, where the more general version of the system has the same feature. Before 
we arrived at this system, we had tried to work with a version that combined S 
and DS into a single backup agent that looked after both input and output. This 
turned out to be very difficult. But with the separation of S and DS, we can 
partition the proof into smaller chunks. It turns out that this partition is a 
particularly good one, because, for example, FTS with DS removed has an easily 
described behaviour. 
2.1.1 Practical motivation 
Error recovery for databases by means of checkpoints and audit trails of 
transactions since the last checkpoint is an old technique. But it can also be 
applied individually to each process of a distributed system, and at a very low 
cost under certain conditions. Further, if we have fail stop processes, the 
recovered process not only has the correct internal state, its communicants do 
not even notice any change in its behaviour in terms of messages. (In fact, they 
cannot find out about its state except by implications from messages). What we 
have modelled in CCS is a simplified version of such an error recovery scheme 
proposed in [Prasad, Ramani and Abraham 82]as an enhancement to a message 
switching system. 
We describe the system briefly to set our CCS programs in a real context, 
and to indicate that there are practical situations where even such simple 
recovery schemes are applicable. The formulation in Section 3 uses a few more 
of the features described below, but not all. 
The system consisted of a large number of simple communicating processes, 
and it was found in practice that errant behaviour on the part of one process 
was detected fairly soon, either by other processes doing consistency checks or 
by an operator. The large number of processes meant that the fault was 
localised very quickly once it was detected, and since most of the processes 
performed just one simple task, the cause of failure was also easily detected. For 
example, it often happened during development that a known special case 
occurred that the process was not yet programmed to handle. 
The proposed error recovery scheme was merely an automated version of a 
manual scheme that was evolved to handle these failures: 	kill the errant 
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The perfect process is defined by 




. 4= out u I . PER 2.1+1  for i = 0. .k-1 
PER 
2A
4= PER  
The fallible version of the perfect process: 
P 1 4= pin V. P20 + f. P 3 
P 23  4= pout u. P211  + f. P3 for i = 0. .k-1 
2.k 
= pfinish. P 1 + f. P 3 
P 3 4= restart. P 1 
The demon agent that causes failure: 
F 1 4= f. F2 
F2 4= pinf. F 1 
The spy agent that eavesdrops on Inputs, receives and relays information of 
failure, and restarts P: 
S 1 4= in v. S 2(v) 
S 2(v) 4= pin V. S 3(v) + pinf. S 5(v) 
S 3(v) 4= pfinish. S 4 + pinf. S 5(v) 
S 4 4= finish. S 1 
S 5(v) 4= 	j'. S8 (v) 
S 6(v) 4= restart. S 2 (v) 
The duplication suppressor that filters output: 
DS(l,e) 4= finish. DS(0,0) + inf. DS(0,e) 
+ pout u 1 . if l>=e tbeü out u 1 . DS(1+1, e+1) else DS(1+1, e) 
The complete fault tolerant system: 
FTS 4= (P 1 IF 1 IS 1 IDS(0.0)fluin, out 
To prove: FTS PER 1 
Figure 2-1: SYSTEM I: PER has no state between inputs 
process, use manual overrrides to patch up damage to the data base, and 
restart the process. A restarted process was reset either to its initial state, or 
to its last checkpoint if it had one. Its communications with other processes 
were then simulated from a terminal until it was brought up to date, and it was 
then linked back normally to other processes. 
To translate this into our terms: Quick discovery and localisation of the 
-. ---. ----.- 	 ---- ---- 	 .--- -.-.--2'_"---C 	 rrr'Th'tr 
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fault, followed by killing the faulty process, made the latter look like a fail-stop 
process. The patching up was necessary because this imitation was not perfect. 
The interactive update took care of suppressing duplicated output. 
Another reason why the scheme worked so well in practice: Several of the 
processes behaved like PER, returning to an initial state after processing each 
message sent to them, and therefore needed no checkpointing. They also needed 
no log of input messages or updating! And even for processes with an internal 
state, it turned out that many of the messages sent to them were merely queries 
that did not alter their state. Such messages were not recorded in the log. 
The same recovery mechanism also permitted continued development even 
when the system was online. The older versions were merely aborted and newer 
ones restarted in their place. 
2.2 Outline of proof 
We shall use the fact that 
(AIB)\a = (A\a)I(B\a) if a, 	L(A) u 
This allows us to move restriction inwards, and get 
(P 1 IF 1 IS 1 IDS(o,O))rin, oufl 
= (P 1 IF 1 lS 1 IDS(O,O))\pin, pout, pfinish, finish, f, pinf, inf, restart 
= ((P 1 IF 1 IS 1 )\pin, pfinish, pinf, f. restarfl  I DS(O,O))\pout, finish, inf 
= (((P 1 IS 1)\pin. pfinish, restartflF 1)\f, pinfflDS(O,O))\pout, pfinish, inf 
= ((P 1 11S 1 )11F 1 )1115S(0,0) 
We want to prove that this is equivalent to PER 1,  We do this by guessing a 
specification PSF for (P 1 11S 1 )11F 1 and proving 
PSFIIDS(O,O) z.,PER 1 . 
Next we guess a specification PS for P 1 11S 1  and show 
PSIIF 1 	PSF. 
Finally, we show 
P i lls 1  z PS. 
Note that in these last two equivalences, we do not need to show z C  since in the 
context of "I", observational equivalence is substitutive. 
T. in y_f 	T. 
PSF)4T0 J,ut 
	
T \ 	IT 
1+11 \ k 
finish 
PSF4=inv.T0 +T.inv.)'.T 
4= pout u1 . T11 + r. TF 	for i = O. .k-1 
T  4= finish. PSF + T. TF 	- 
TF 4= inf. T0 
Figure 2-2: Specification of PSF 
The definitions of DS and PER are reproduced below for reference 
DS(l,e) 4= finish. DS(0,0) 
± inf. DS(0,e) 
+ pout u. if l>e then out u 1 . DS(1+1, e+1) 
else DS(l+i, e) 
PER 4= in v. PER20 
PER 2.1  4= out u 	2.1+1 •. PER 	for i = 0..k-1 
PER 2A 4= PER-- 
To prove: PER 	PSFIIDS(0.0) 
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1 <PER 1 , PSFIIDS(O,O)> 
4—* L 1n4 PER 2.0 R in--4 T0IIDS(O,O) 
4— 	R -'> (in v. 	f. T 0 )IIDS(O,O) 	L 4- PER 1 
2 <PER21 , T1IIDS(j,i)>  where O<i<k-1 
 
OILIUL 	 1 	.OU1U -3 	L 	-. PER 2.1+1 	 1+1 R 
L 
T IIDS(i+1,i+1) 
4- 	R -'> TFIIDS(j,i) L -4 PER21 
*-j<i R '-- T 11 IDS(j+ 1 ,i) 	 L -4 PER 2J
1 
pout, 4— 	R 	- T 1+1  flout u. DS(i+1,i+1) L 41- PER21 
2k <PER2k . T1 DS(j,k)> where O<J<k 	 k-j 
-3 	L --4 PER 2.0 R i,out finish 	> T0IIDS(O,O) 
4-J<k R 	°> T11 IlDS(j+1,k) 	 L .4. PERZk 
+-j=k R fini.h,-  PSFflDS(O,O) 	 L 41- P E R 
1 
4- 	R -'> TFIIDS(j,k) 	 L 4- PER 2.k 
3 <PER 1 , (in V. 	T0)IIDS(O,O)> 
4-  	L "n--- PER20 	 R --4 (f. T0 )IIDS(O,O) 
4 <PER20, (;;'. T0)flDS(0.0)> 
T 	.T 	 mV 
->k=OL-"-4 PER 20 	 R_ ITL%Sh 	> PSFIIDS(O,O) 
tu 	 - 
-3k0 L 	> PER 2.1 R 	 °> T1flDS(1,1) 
4— 	R -I ---t> T0 flDS(O,O) 	 L -4 PER 2.0 
5 <PER21 , T11 IIout u1. DS(i+1,i+1)> where O<i<k- 1 
4-3 L 	PER 2,i+1 	 R 	> T i-s-i IIDS(i+ 1, i+ 1 ) 
6 
1 	2.1 
<PER , TFDS(j,i)> where O<i<k-1 and O<j<i 
i+1 - 
U 	 VV 	. out U 
2.1-s- I 
-3 L 	> PER 	 R 	TI pout 	L  T i+i IIDS(i+1,i±1) 
4— 	R —4 T0IIDS(O,i) 	 L 	PER 2i 
6k <PER2k . TFflDS(j,k)> where O<j<k 	 11 
1 	.r 	-7- 	. mnv 
-3 	L m4PER20 	 R pout ftnsh 	> T 0 IIDS(O,O) 
4— 	R -' T 0IIDS(Ok) 	 L -4 PER2k 
Figure 2-3: Weak bisimulation proof that PSF meets its requirements 
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2.3 Proof that PSF meets its requirements 
We want to prove that PSFIIDS(O,O) 	PER 1 . 
2.3.1 Specification of PSF 
We know that PSF is like PER  except that it might 'stutter', and make 
repeated attempts at putting out the sequence u l ...uk  before finally succeeding in 
doing so without being interrupted by a failure and having to restart. It is this 
repetition that DS is designed to suppress. 
So we guess that PSF will accept an input value v, and output a sequence of 
sequences of output values. Each of these sequences, which are separated by inf 
's, is either empty or consists of values u 1 ... u where 1<j<k. The sequence of 
sequences is terminated by finish, and the last sequence will be Ul...Uk. PSF will 
then be ready to accept the next input value 
PSF 4= in v. T0 + T. in v. inf. T 0 
T. 1 4= 	1 pout u. 'T i+1 + T. TF . for I = O. .k-1 
T  4= finish. PSF ± T. TF 
TF 4= inf. T 0 
A state diagram showing its actions is given in Fig. 2-2. 
The last term in the first line represents the possibility that PSF can fail 
even before accepting an input. It is tempting to try to get rid of it, and have 
just 
PSF' 4= in v. T 0 
since T0 has a path T. inf leading back to itself. We cannot do this: PSF and PSF 
are not equivalent. PSF' can match the actions of PSF as far as T. in v, but 
/ then it gives us T0 whereas we get inf . T 0 from PSF. The former can do a pout 
immediately but the latter has to do an inf first. 
2.3.2 Proof by bisimulation 
We find that a direct proof by bisimulation (Fig. 2-3) is easy here, so we 
don't do any algebraic simplification of PSF 11 DS(0.0). 
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2.4 Proof that PS meets its requirements 
We want to specify PS and prove that PS II F 1 z PSF. 
2.4.1 Specification of PS 
Our guessed specification for PS follows that of PSF closely. 
In the absence of failures. PS does exactly what PSF does. It will accept an 
in v and produce k pout's and a finish, cycling through the normal states PS, 
PSN0.. .PSNk. 
Failures can occur at any stage from PSN 0 to PSNk,  taking the system back to 
P1. P1 is the retry state which will again attempt to put out the whole output 
sequence corresponding to the input. So far, the only difference between PS and 
PSF is that PS fails by doing an f. pinf. inf rather than a T. inf. 
However, we shall see later that we cannot imitate PSF and go directly from 
PS to PSN 0. Contrast the positions of T0 and PSN Q . We need to go through the 
intermediate state P1, to handle the situation where failure occurs before P 
starts output. 
Like PSF, PS can fail (i.e. it can do an f) between inputs, and must accept an 
in v before doing pinf. inf and getting to P1. 
But we cannot assume that the failer will start in state F 1 ; it might start in 
F2. Thus all states where S and P can communicate can fail by doing a pinf as 
well. The states PSD. handle the possibility that information about impending 
failure is sent to S before it actually happens. P is now doomed to fail, and 
though it might put out all k pout's before doing so, it cannot do the pfinish, 
because S will not be listening for it. Once we have entered one of these states, 
we have to do an f. inf ultimately and get back to P1. 
Finally, the states PSB 1 handle the case where S has even put out the 'inf to 
DS, but P has not failed as yet. 
2.4.2 Proof by algebraic simplification 
To prove: PS 11 F 1 	PSF 
This is summarised in Fig. 2-5. 
To do the last part, IN 0 , it turns out we can use algebra again: 
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PS 4= in v. P1 + f. in v. pinf. inf. P1 
P1 4= T. P S N 
0 + f. pinf. inf. P1 + pin)'. (f I 	f). P1 
PSN. 4= pout u. PSN11  + .f. pin)'. inf. P1 + pinf. PSD 1 	for i = O. .k-1 
PSNk 4= finish. PS + f. pin)'. in)'. P1 + pin)'. PSDk 
PSD 1 4= pout u1. PSD11 + f. in)'. P1 + in)'. PSB 1 	for i = 0..k-1 
PSDk 4=  f. 'in)'. P1 + inf. PSBk 
PSB 1 4= pout u i,PSB.1 + f. P1 	for i = O.k-i 
PSB k  ez= f. P1 
Figure 2-4: Definition of PS 
P S F 4= in v. T 0 + T. in v. in)'. T0 
T1 4= pout u 1 T11 + T. TF 	for i = 0. .k-i 
T  4= finish. PSF + T. TF 
TF 4= in)'. T0 
Figure 2-2 (reproduced for reference): Definition of PSF 
To prove: PS F 1 z PSF 
Let N. = PSN. II F 1 for i = 0..k and I = PIIIF 1 
Using the facts that 
(a. A) II (. B) = a. (A ((P. B)) + P. ((a. A) II B) if a, a 
and 
(a. B) 11 (a. C) = 'Ta (B II C), 
we have 
PS 11 F 1 = in v. I + T,. in V. T. in)'. I 
pinf 
= in v. I + T. in v. in)'. I 
1= 'r. N0 + r1. 'r. 1 inf.I 
= 'r. N + T. in)'. I 
N 1 = pout u N. 1 + i-, . r. in)'. I 
	
= pout u 1 . N11 + T. in)'. I for i 	O.k-i 
.N
I,  = finish. (PS II F 1 ) + r1. r. 	f. I 
= finish. (PS II F 1  ) + T. inf. I 
Since we can show that IN 0, we see that this is the same as PSF 
except for renaming of agents: 
<PSF, PS((F 1 > 
<T 1 , N 1 > for i = O..k 
Figure 2-5: Summary of algebraic proof that PS meets its specification 
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I = r. N + T. tnf. 1 
- 	 T. (pout u.N+T. inf. I)+7. inf. l 
But we know that 
g. (B + 'r. C) + g. C 	g (B + i- . C) 
So we can absorb the last T. inf. I -in the expansion, and get 
I = T. N0 
But we also have B Z T. B 
So I 	No  
Therefore PSF = PS 11 F 1 . 
24.3 Comments 
We haven't used the generality of PS, which has to allow F to start in state 
F2 . We shall consider PSF 2 in a later section; meanwhile, notice that our proof 
that PSIF 1 z, PSF works essentially because F 1 cuts out the PSD. and PS13. states 
of PS, leaving a diagram that looks very like that of PSF. 
We can also prove PSIF 1 	PSF by bisimulation. In addition to <PSF, PSIIF 1 > 
and <T, N.> we will also need <T0, I>. This, too, suggests N0 I as a simplifying 
step. 
We do have N0 I, but why can we not collapse P1 and PSN 0? We can see the 
reason why not by trying to prove PIPSN 0 by bisimulation. One of the lines will 
be 
4-> 	P1 -> (f I inf). P1 matched by PSN0-'>PSD 0 
which leads to trouble because PSD 0 can do a pout, but (f I 	f). P1 cannot. 
Notice that this is not the same problem we had in 2.3.1. Once again, the 
difference between P1 and PSN Ø is neutralised by composing with F 1 , so that 
neither can do a p'inf. 
2.5 Proof that P and S implement the specification of PS 
We present the proof by bisimulation in Fig. 2-6. 
With this, we have completed our proof that PER 	FTS. 
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All the definitions on this page are repetitions, for reference. 
P 1 • 	pin. P2,0 + 1. P 3 
P2 . 	pout u P21 + f. P 3 for i = O. .k-1 
2.k 	pfinish. P1 + f. P 3 
P3 4= restart. P 1 
S 1 4= in v. S 2 (v) 
S 2(v) 4= pin V. S 3(v) + pinf. S 5 
S, 3(v) 4= pfinish. S 4 + pinf. S 5 
S4 4= finish. S 1 
S 5(v) 4= 	. S 6 (v) 
S 6(v) = restart. S 2 (v) 
PS 4= in v. P1 + f. in v. pinf. 'inf. P1 
PT 4= T. P S N 
0 
+ f. pinf. inf. PT + pinf. (f I 7n-f). P1 
PSN. 4= pout u1 . PSN11 + f. pinf. inf. PT + pinf. PSD 1 	for i = O. .k-1 
PSNk 4= finish. PS + f. pinf. inf. P1 + pinf. PSDk 
PSD. 4= pout u PSD 1  + f. inf. PT + inf. PSB. 	for i = O.k-i 
PSDk 4=  f. inf. P1 ± inf. PSBk 
PSB. 4= pout u. PSB.1 + f. PT 	for i = O.k-i 
PSBk 4= f. P1 
K
inv f.mn v. pinf.f
Tinf 
0 out u0 
pinf. 
- PSN. 
pinf 	 in, 
SD 	 -;;;t 
1ftTI 
PSNut u1JPSN 	... (PSNk\fi.shto PS 
SD pout u PSD.1 	... 	PSD k f. inf to PT 
mnftoPl 	.inftoPl 	.inftoPl 
PPSBpoutu PSB 	 PSB 	t u PSBP1 	 to PT 	to PT 	 to PT 	to P1 
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1 <PS. P 1 1lS 1 > 
—* L 	P1 	 R--4P 1 IIS 2(v) 	 5 
—+ L -> in v. pinf. inf. P1 R > P 3 11S 1  = in v. pinf. inf. 'r 11 P 1 11S 2(v) 	5 
S <P1. P 	(v)> 1fiS
2 
L -'> P S N 0 R 	''> P 20 11S 3(v) X 0 
+—' 	L -t>pinf. 	. PJ R -'>P 11S 2 (v) = pinf. 	. T re8garg  P 1 11S 2(v) s 3 
L 	(fI:f). P1 R .anL>pIIS(v) = P11S(v) 1 	2 5 restart 
X1 <PSN 1 . P2111S 3(v)> 	for i = 0. .k-1 




B 	5 P 	us (v) Jv 1+1 2,1+1 	3 - 	I-s-i 
*— 	L -> pinf. 	P1 B -> P31lS3(v) = pinf. 	f. T . 	P 1 11S 2 (v) S restart 
—3 	L -4 PSD 1 R _ 1nL>PllS(v) 
Xk <PSNk. PZk IISS(v)> 
L -i>  pinf. inf. P1 	B -> P3l1S3(v) = pinf. inf. 'r restart.  P 1tS2 (v) 	5 
-' L 	L> PSD k 	 B 	4P2k (JS S (v) 	 JD k 
finish 
—* 	L '5 PS 	 B 	 > P1IS1 
- 	B 	finish. P 1  fi 1 
	
S 	L .-. finish. PS 
2) <PSD1, P 2.1 IS5  (v)> for i = 0. .k-1 
out 
L 	PSD 	 R 	P 21-s-iuIS5(v) i-s-i  
-E--' 	L -t>inf. P1 	 B !> P311S5(v) = restart-  P111S2(v) 




2)k <PSDk , P2kIISS(v)> 
E—* L -> PSBk 
*— 	L -1> inf. P1 
<PSB1 . P2111S5(v)> 
pout u • 
f—> L 	- PSB. 1+1 
L->PI 
B -> P2kIIS S(v) 
B -> P3tIS5(v) = 	)• Trestart• P 1 11S 2(v) 
B 	-P 2,1+1 IIS6(v)
pout U 




3 	 k k <PSI3 	2.k P IS6  (v)> 
L-4P1 R 	P31IS6(v) = restar( P111S2(v) S 
Figure 2-6: Weak bisimulation proof that P and S together implement PS 
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2.6 Variation: Failer informs S before failing P 
We noticed earlier that P, S, and PS all allow for the possibility that F starts 
in F2 . Now we want to see whether our whole system will work just as well with 
F2 , i.e. whether ((P 1 11S 1 )11F2)IIDS(0,0) 	PER. 
Since we want to 	leave P and S (and therefore 	PS) unchanged, 	the 	basic 
question 	is: 	what happens to 	PSflF2? 	Not only 	might 	it turn 	out 	to 	be 	not 
equivalent to PSF, meaning that we have to provide a new specification PSF', but 
we 	might 	not 	even 	have PSF'IIDS(O,O) PER 	This 
I' 
would 	of 	course 	be 
disappointing, since we tried to make P and S independent of the starting state 
of F. 
2.7 What PS and F2 implement 
Refer to Figs. 2-4 and 2-6 for a description of PS. To see what PSIIF 2 does, 
we begin with some algebraic simplification, summarised in Fig. 2-7. 
PSIIF 1 has one extra term in the first line, but PSIIF 2 has two new sets of 
states, D I  and B.. L 
Why is PSIIF 1 so much simpler? We can see from the diagram for PS in Fig. 
2-6. When a failure occurs in PSIIF 1 it has to be a 'ri,. We have not bothered to 
give the resulting state a name because it can only do a T 	 'in.f and go backPinf 
to PIDF 1 . 
PSIIF2 is also constrained to fail in only one way, 'r f . But the result is one 
of the states D 1. which can do further pout's before completing the failure 
sequence by doing (r1 j 	) and returning to P1 11 F2 . Even worse, if the inf 
comes first, we get into the state B 1 , which again has a similar flexibility: it can 
do further pout's before doing the T,. Thus we do have a richer system in PSIIF 2 
than we had in PSIIF1. 
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PS 4= in v. Fl + f. in V. pirif. inf. P1 
Fl 4= T. PSNQ + f. pinf. inf. P1 + pinf. (f I P1 
PSN1 4= pout u. PSN11 + f. pinf. inf. P1 + pinf. PSD 1 	for i = O.k-i 
PSNk 4= finish. PS + f. p'inf. inf. P1 + pinf. 
PSD 1 4= pout u1 PSD11 + f. 	P1 + f. PSB 1 	for i = 0. .k-1 
PSDk 4= f. inf. P1 + inf. P S B k 
	
PSB 1 4= pout u1 . PSB1 + f. P1 	for i = 0. .k-1 
PSBk 4=  f. P1 
Figure 2-4 (reproduced for reference): Definition of PS 
Again, we use the facts that 
(a. A) II (. B) = a. (All (fi. B)) + 	. ((a. A) II B) if a, 
and 
(a. B) II (. C) =i- . (B II C) 
Let 
I = P1 II F2 
Ni 	I PSN. 	2 II F 	for i=O..k 
D.1  = PSD. I 	I F 	for i=O..k 
B
i 	 I 
= PSB F 	for i=O..k 
I 
We then have 
PSIIF2 = in V. I 
I = i- . N0  + Tpinf• (I I 	i'). PIIIF 1 
= 7. N0 + pinf ' T. 'iif I + 7pfrf•  'inf. 
= T. N0 + T. inf. I 
N. = pout u.i. N 1+1 	ptnf ,  
+ T 	. D I 	for i=O..k-1 1  
Nk = finish. PSJIF2 + i. e . D 
D. 	pout u • . D. 1 + 	inf. I + inf. B 1 	for i=O..k-1 
D  = T. inf. I + inf. B  
B. = pout u 1 B11 + 'r. I 	for i=O..k-i 
B  = T. I 
Compare this with PSIIF 1 , reproduced below. 
PS II F1 = in v. 1+ T. in v. inf. I 
 T. N0 + T. inf. I 
N 1 = pout u • . N11 + T. inf. I for i = O..k-i 
N 	finish. (PS II F) + T. 	I 
Figure 2-7: Towards a specification for PSF' 
2.8 Specification and implementation of PSF' 
We are trying to reduce the behaviour of PSI1F 2 to a simple description, PSF'. 
Rather than proceed by mechanically applying algebra, we will follow the method 
of our first proof and, make a guess. We will then have to prove that PSF 
PS1IF2 and also, if PSF' is different from PSF, that PSF'IIDS(O,O) 	PER. 
2.8.1 Specification 
Despite all the additional richness, we still have no reason to believe there is 
any asymmetry in the way we defined P and S. so we will try to keep PSF' close 
to PSF. We use in fact the same PSF' we 	discussed in 2.3.1. We know that the 
additional term in the first line of PSIIF 1 cannot be got rid of, so this is the only 
difference we have between PSF and PSF': 
PSF' = in v. T 0 
T. - pout u1. T11 + r. inf. T 0 	for i=O..k-1 
T  Z finish. PSF + T. inf. T 0 
2.8.2 Attempt at proof of implementation 
We try to prove the equivalence by bisimulation, Fig. 2-8. Except for the line 
marked with '??', we have no reference to a pair not in the figure. 
An attempt to chase this pair, <T 0, B 1 >, any further will lead to trouble: 
Successively, we will get <T 1 , B1+1 >. <T2, B12> ... <T k . ,  Bk>. At this point, Tk4  can 
do a pout but B   can only do so by getting to N 0. Thus we have to pair Tk.l and 
N 1 . leading i-i pout's later to <T k-  N1 >. And now we are stuck, because T  can do 
a finish but N 1 can do so only after some more pout's. 
But all is not lost, as we shall see. 
2.8.3 Modification to S to make the proof go through 
If we didn't have the line marked '??', there would be no problem. That is, if 
did not have an inf move taking it to B 1 (for i=O. .k), we would have only the 
pairs in the figure, and the proof would be complete. Notice that this would 
remove the states B1 8k  from PSIIF2 . 
How do we make this come true? From the algebra for PSIIF 2, we see that 
what is required is that PS should not have the states PSB1.. .PSBk.  i.e. it should 
not have the inf moves in PSD 1 . ..PSDk.  And looking at the proof in Fig. 2-6, we 
see that we can change PS only by making the corresponding changes in PBS. 
We want to remove the pairs Bl...Bk  from the bisimulation. They are reached 
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PSF is defined in 2.8.1 
PS is reproduced above Fig. 2-7 
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Figure 2-8: 	Attempted proof that PS and F 2 implement PSF' 
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only via the inf moves of D1.. .Dk.  This suits our proposed changes to PS. To 
prevent PS from doing an in)' at these points, we have to interchange S 5 and S 6 . 
We still need to be able to do nf, of course, but we see that PSD1. ..PSD k  can 
in fact do this (only) after an f. The change we are making to S insists that S 
can do in)' only after a restart. The connection is that the restart can take place 
only after an f. 
2.9 Summary of changes 
We make the following changes to S: 
S 5(v) 	restart. S 5 (v) 
S 5(v) Z 	. S 2(v) 
The effect on PS, which can be followed with reference to Fig. 2-4, is that 
PSB1 ... PSB k  go away, and PSD 1 ... PSDk  lose their 'in)' moves and become simpler: 
PSD. : pout u. PSD11 + f. inf. P1 for i=O..k-i 
PSDk 4= f. in)'. P1 
We can see that the new P111S1  and PS are equivalent, by simplifying the proof 
in Fig. 2-6. 
Notice that PSF is unaffected by these changes and so does our proof with F 
starting in F 1 . 
Now for F starting in F 2 . PSflF2 (see 2.7) simplifies as follows: 
pout u. D 11 + 'r1. inf. I for i=O. .k-1 
4= 'r1 . Tnf. I 
We have already seen that this PSIIF 2 is equivalent to PSF' because the 
changes remove the troublespot from Fig. 2-8. 
So we have ((P 1 11S 1 )UF2) 	PSF'. 
All that remains to be done is to show that PSF'IIDS(O,O) 	PER 
I' 
2.10 Proof that PSF' meets its requirements 
We know that PSF' differs from PSF only in its first line (see Fig. 2-2). A 
simplified version of the bisimulation proof that PSFI(DS(O,O) PER will do to 
show that PSF'IIDS(O,O) z PER I'  We do not need the second line of pair 1. since 
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PSF' does not have the corresponding term, and we do not need pairs 3 or 4, 
because this line is the only reference to them. There is no effect on the 
remainder of the proof. 
2.11 Discussion 
We have gone through the changes in detail, and recorded how the proof 
method pointed out the error in the original attempt at generalisation. The end 
result not only gives us the symmetry we were looking for in the system, but 
even simplifies the first proof a little! The 'simplifications' we saw in the second 
proof are of course not really simplifications: it just happens that the error in 
our system produced an incorrect proof that was more complicated than the 
correct one. 
A final remark about the 'error'. If F only ever starts in F 1 , there is no error, 
as our first proof shows. It is only the generalisation that fails, because the 
system as originally written gives too much freedom to S. 
In 	intuitive terms, what was happening was that if S picked up the pinf 
before P failed, it was possible for it to inform DS of failure before the event. DS 
would then have set its local counter to 0 and started counting the remaining 
outputs of the doomed P as outputs belonging to a fresh attempt. Thus we 
could have had some duplication in the output from DS. 
It is interesting to note that while the proof system finds our bug accurately, 
and even suggests the necessary changes, it does not immediately suggest the 
effect that the bug has on the intended behaviour of the system. The effect 
becomes apparent only after some reflection. 
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3. A Generalisation, and a Different Proof 
3.1 Why another example? 
We will begin afresh with a description of a new fault-free system, the 
"perfect process", and try to build a fault tolerant system equivalent to it. We 
have two aims: to generalise the perfect process a little from our first example, 
and to improve our proof. We will take a few steps away from our first toy 
example, and though we will still have only a very simple system, it will actually 
be quite general, as we shall see. 
For the proof, we have several goals: to make it more readable and 
structured, and to make the intermediate steps more meaningful rather than 
have opaque symbolic manipulations that somehow suddenly produce the desired 
result. We try to encapsulate each (still rather large) stretch of such 
manipulations into a chunk that is simple, if tedious, and whose end results are 
more plausible. We are trying to create a proof with a larger ratio of interest to 
pure drudgery. 
When we tried to build a Prolog system to do our first proof, we found that 
the bisimulation could be done easily enough, and it was only the notational 
manipulation (indexing for example) that required a proof checker of general 
mathematical sophistication. This situation continues with the present proof: 
the symbolic manipulation within each stage (though not in the transition 
between stages) is mechanical enough but still requires a system of general 
mathematical sophistication (indexing, case analysis, applying constraints, 
transforming parameters etc.). The CCS specific requirements of the system are 
as before. 
3.2 Formulation 
We start by trying to write down the most general CCS agent we can have as 
our perfect process, P. Then we will try to produce a fault tolerant system FTS 
equivalent to it, using stable storage as the technique to recover from faults. As 
before, FTS mimics the actions of pt  until a fault occurs. At this point it backs 
up to the initial state, and recomputes until it reaches the state at which it 
failed. In order to write such an FTS, we need Pt  to be deterministic. If pt  were 
non-deterministic, we could not guarantee that FTS will produce the same 
behaviour each time we back up to an earlier point in the computation. 




 a I  X. Pt (f(s,i,x)) 
which at each stage offers a choice of actions, the set offered being a function 
of its state. It then evolves to the next state, which is a function of its current 
state and the action taken. 
We do not consider a 1 = 'r, because we are assuming that Pt  is deterministic. 
If 
pt(s)_pt(s) and  pt(s).2>pt(s) 
we can take pt  from s 1 to s in a single step by merely rewriting the function f. 
We can also impose another restriction. 	If there is a choice of output 
actions, the process communicating with Pt  has to choose, and we can regard 
this choice as input, because its decision constitutes information that flows in to 
Pt Thus we can work with 
P t (s) : if in(s) then 	a 1x. Pt(f(s,i,x))  else PJ()h(s). Pt (g(s)) 
As written, P t offers either a choice of input actions, or a single output at 
each stage. However, we can achieve the effect of an agent A that offers a 
mixture of inputs and outputs as follows. Each state s of A is represented by 
two states s 1 and s of pt,  s 1 being a preliminary input state, in which the 
outside world can tell P what action it wishes A to perform in s. This will then 
be performed by Pt  in s2. Since the output action can be influenced by previous 
input, we can offer a protocol. For example, if the communicant wants a 
particular output fli  there might be a corresponding request input a. Thus to 
get fi, an external agent will have to do a A rather than just P . So as long as 
pt guarantees that all possible output actions have a corresponding request in 
each input sort I(s), it can effectively offer a mixture of inputs and outputs. 
Why don't we have arbitrary numbers of agents like Pt  composed with I? We 
have not allowed P to be composed of other agents in the form QIR because in 
this case we expect to have to surround each of these agents with its own 
recovery mechanism, so that communication between Q and R can also be spied 
on. 
Now for our fallible version p of Pt. As long as it doesn't fail, it behaves like 
pt• 	Failure 	is 	modelled 	as 	before, as 	being 	caused 	by a demon 	F 	that 
communicates with P. and can occur at any point between a and 16 actions. Once 
P 	has 	failed, it has to go through a restart protocol, 	and will then 	relive 	its 
history starting from the initial state, s0. 
a 1 , i€I(s) 
nj(s) 
Figure 3-1: Pictures of the Perfect and the Fault Tolerant Systems 
P(s) : if in(s) then (t I(s). P1(s) + f. PF) 
else (it(j(s),h(s)). P0(g(s)) + f. PF) 
P1(s) 	voila.(i,x). P(f(s,i,x)) + f. PF 	where i€I(s) 
P0(s) 	ok. F(s) + f. FF 
PF c#= dead. restart. F(s 0 ) 
F 1 	f. F2 
F2 . 	F1 
As we see from the specification above, P does not itself do a's and 's 	but 
makes requests in the form of get's and put's to infallible backup agents S and 
DS, described below, a's are actually done by S in response to a get from F, and 
the resulting value x is relayed to P by a voila. Thus S spies on all input to P, 
and can keep a record of it by appending each input (port and value) to q. When 
P fails, S is informed by inf. It then restarts P. and feeds it back all its input, 
using the queue pointer d to count off the records. Recovery is complete, and 
get's once again produce actual a's, after d has counted up to Iqi. 
S(d,q) 4== get L. SI(d,q,L) + inf. SF(q) 
SI(d,q,L) : if d = q+l then 	a 1x. SG(d, q:<i,x>) 
else SG(d, q) 
SG(d,q) z 	ia(q.i. q.x). S(d+1,q) + inf. SF(q) 
SF(q) 	dead. relay. restart. S(1,q) 
In these equations, d is the Index of the next element to be sent to P. 
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S shields the outside world from the effects of P's failure as far as a's are 
concerned. To do the same for T's,  we need DS. Whenever P is restarted, it will 
generate again all the output corresponding to the input value. But some of this 
output might already have been relayed to the outsideworid before failure. This 
duplicated output is suppressed by DS. - 
Since output is deterministically computed or recomputed by P. DS does not 
need a queue, but only a pair of counters. The external counter e keeps track of 
put's that have actually been relayed on to the outside as P's (and acknowledged 
by k). S relays inf to DS as relay, informing it of failure. DS then suppresses 
the next e put requests from P because these have already been passed on once. 
The counter 1 keeps track of this, counting the messages generated during the 
rerun. DS starts relaying them to the outside world, via fi, only after P has 
caught up with history. This happens when the local counter equals the external 
counter e, which counts the number of messages relayed to the outside. 
Recovery is now complete. 
DS(l,e) Z put(j,x). if l>e then fix. DO(1+1. e+1) 
else DO(1+1, e) 
± relay. DS(O,e) 
DO(l,e) 4= ok. DS(l,e) + relay. DS(O,e) 
It is worth noticing the fairly complex restart protocol. The dead allows us to 
cater for the case where F does 	before doing an f. This would happen for 
example, if we were using inf to model a timeout. Timeouts are not infallible as 
a means of detecting failure, and P can cause S to time out by merely being 
slow. Thus an 'inf can occur before an f. We can program this by starting F off 
in the state F 2 rather than in F 1 . This symmetry is not just a luxury - we will 
need it in our proof. as we will see. 	 - 
Without the dead, S would go ahead and reset DS while P is perhaps still 
computing. This would mess up our counters 1 and e. In our first example, we 
solved this by doing the restart before we did the relay. That will no longer 
work with our more general P because now P might start recomputing and 
produce outputs right away before DS has reset itself. (This problem arises only 
if s0 is an output state - otherwise it has to wait for S to accept a get and that 
would provide the necessary synchronisation). 
The specifications are summarised in Fig. 3-2. 
The sorts of S and DS depend on those of Pt.  but their structure is otherwise 
independent of it. S maintains a queue of inputs which can be retransmitted to 
P 	if 	it 	fails. DS can get by with counters because P will recompute the outputs. 
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The perfect process is defined by 
P t (s) 4= if in(s) then 	a 1x. pt(f(six))  else Ph(s). P t(g(s)) 
The fallible version of the perfect process: 
F(s) 4= if in(s) then (t I(s). P1(s) + f. PF) 
else (t(j(s).h(s)). P0(g(s)) + f. PF) 
P1(s) 4= vovta.(i,x). P(f(s,i,x)) + f. PF 	where i€I(s) 
P0(s) 4= ok. P(s) + f. PF 
PF 4= dead. restart. P(s 0 ) 
The demon agent that causes failure: 
F 1 4= f. F2 
F 2 4= ;;;j. F 1 
The spy that eavesdrops on all inputs to P. and saves them for recovery: 
S(d.q) 4= get L. SI(d,q,L) + inf. SF(q) 
SI(d,q,L) 4= if d = Iqt+1 then Ka x SG(d, q:<i,x>) 
else SG(d, q) 
SG(d,q) 4= iThia(q.i. q.x). S(d+l.q) + inf. SF(q) 
SF(q) 4= dead. relay. restart. S(1,q) 
In S(d,q) and its derivatives, d points to the next element to be sent to P. 
The duplication suppressor ensures that only new output is transmitted on 
DS(l,e) 4= put(j,x). if l>e then 
jyj
x. D0(1+1, e+l) 
else D0(1+1, e) 
± relay. DS(0,e) 
D0(l,e) 4= ok. DS(1.e) + relay. DS(0,e) 
Therefore the fault tolerant system is defined by: 
FTS(s,d,q,l,e) 4= (P(s)IF 1 IS(d,q)IDS(l,e))a, 
where we have used a as a shorthand for uI(s) and fi for uj. 
Note that there are constraints on the parameters of FTS: 
If we start from FTS(s 1 ,0,c.0,0) we have 
1< e 
ldIq(+1 
and more complicated connections due to the history of the system. 
To prove: FTS(s1,1.c.0,0) 	pt(s1) 
Figure 3-2: SYSTEM II 
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Notice that the "get-voila" and "put-ok" pattern makes S and DS more symmetric 
than in our earlier example. The decision to have S discovering the failure via 
.imf is arbitrary. We could just as well have had DS detect the failure and relay 
the information on to S. 
3.3 Outline of the proof 
We want to prove that FTS is equivalent to P. In giving this informal outline 
of the proof, our intention is only to provide a rough idea of what is to come. 
Many of the remarks below might be difficult to fully appreciate until they 
appear later in formal garb, and the reader might find that this section makes 
more sense after seeing the whole proof. 
We have to prove that 
FTS(s 1 ,1.e,O,O) z pt(s) 
In fact, it turns out that we will be able to prove a more general result: 
FTS(s,d,q,l,e) 	pt(S) 
with some conditions on the parameters. These conditions are satisfied by 
FTS 1 1 1 C 1 0 1 0).     
As before, we move restriction inwards to get 
FTS(s.d.q,1,e) 
=(P(s)F 1 IS(d,q)IDS(l,e))t(a,) 
=(((P(s)IS(d,q))\get,voi1a,dea.d,restartflF1 )\f,infflDS(l,e))\put,ok,re1ay 
We clarify a bit of usage: we will sometimes mention agents without giving 
their parameters. Thus "F" will refer to the agent defined by the four lines 
starting with "F(s) 4=" in Fig. 3-2. We will then refer to P. Fl, P0 and PF as 
"states of P". 
To prove FTS(s,d,q,l,e) equivalent to Pt(s),  we would like to proceed by stages, 
decomposing each agent bit by bit. But we have to do some preparation for this, 
because P is a very concise specification, and the very form of the equivalence 
shows that the extra parameters d,q,l,e in FTS are redundant at this level of 
description. 
So we begin by expanding Pt(s),  putting more and more redundant 
information into it, ensuring that each successive stage is equivalent to the 
previous one. When we have as much information in the specification as in the 
implementation FTS, we can start splitting off first DS and then F from each of 
Summary of the proof 
Proposition 3.4.2: P t (s) 	G(s) 
Proposition 3.5.1: G(s) 	Y(p:s) 
Proposition 3.6.2: Y(p) 	Z(p) 
Proposition 3.9.2: Z(p) z J(q,c) where p=u(q,c) 
Proposition 3.10.1: J(q.c) z B(q,c) 
Proposition 3.11.2: B(q,c) 	C(q,c)IIDS(e,e) where e=o(q,c) 
Proposition 3.12.2: C(q,c) 	D(q,$) where s=r(q,c) 
Proposition 3.13.1: D(q,$) 	E(q.$)IF 1 
Proposition 3.13.2: E(q,$) 	P(s)S(Iq+1,q) 
which proves that pt(8) 	DS(e.e)F1fP(s)IIS(Iq+1,q) 
where the parameters are all functions of the underlying history (q,c). 
Figure 3-3: Summary of the proof 
them. After every such decomposition, we have to show that the remaining pieces 
are equivalent. 
A word of apology for the names of the many agents we will define. We have 
not attempted to give meaningful names to every one of them (and some of 
them have several states), as this would have given us a host of names, and 
these names would have to be quite long in order to capture the slight 
differences between the agents. Instead, we have just used letters from all parts 
of the alphabet. The part of the alphabet a name comes from has historical 
significance with respect to the many versions the proof has been through, but 
can be taken by the reader to be entirely arbitrary. 
In what follows, the reader might find it helpful to refer to the summary of 
the proof given in Fig. 3-3. 
We first guess a specification G(s) for FTS(s,d,q,l,e), and prove G( s )Pt( s ) 
(Proposition 3.4.2). G naturally has only a and as externally visible actions, 
but it records failure and recovery as silent actions. Thus G(s) and P t (s) are only 
observationally equivalent, not strongly equivalent. In particular, we use the fact 
that observational equivalence permits one of the agents (G) to have infinite 
chatter even if the other doesn't. The infinite chatter in G can come about if 
failures occur repeatedly, and don't let it get on with the computation. 
Our next step is to convert G(s) into a specification Y(p) where p is a 
sequence of states, the last of which is the current state s. Thus p stores the 
whole state sequence of FTS. We show that G(s)Y(p) (Proposition 3.5.1). This is 
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our first data transformation, and is a strong bisimulation. 
We then expand Y(p) into Z(p), which shows the recovery process in more 
detail. Instead of a single silent action, it consists of a series of them: upon 
failure, Z sets a pointer to the start of the stored state sequence, and counts off 
the states till it reaches the end - the current state, at which failure occurred. 
Failure can also occur during this process. From the outside, all recovery states 
look exactly the same - they are all equivalent to the state just before failure 
occurred. Proposition 3.6.1, which proves this, is a weak bisimulation. 
Proposition 3.6.2, which proves Y(p)Z(p), follows trivially by algebra. 
At this point, we have seen the essence of the recovery process (at this level 
of description anyway), and are now ready for another data transformation. We 
need the new form of data In order to link up with later stages in the proof. 
We go back to G(s) and convert it into another one, H, which maintains a 
queue q of inputs (like S) and a count c of outputs, and uses these to calculate 
its current state. We start with G rather than Z because this transformation is 
a little complicated. H is for explanatory purposes only, and does not occur in 
the string of equivalences that constitute the whole proof. The relation between 
(q,c) and s is captured by a function r(q,c), defined inductively. H(q,c) does not 
describe recovery in any more detail than G(s), and the equivalence of the two is 
proved by strong bisimulation as Proposition 3.8.1. The bisimulation essentially 
shows that the relation r between the parameters of G and H is preserved as the 
two agents evolve. There are also some consistency constraints on the 
parameters of H, and we show that these are preserved if we start from a 
consistent state, H(e,O). 
We then expand H(q,c) into a specification J(q,c) which corresponds to Z(p). 
The equivalence between  and Z is proved in Proposition 3.9.2. in a similar way 
to Proposition 3.8.1: a function u relates (q,c) to p, and a 'strong bisimulation 
shows that the relation is preserved as J and Z evolve. 
We should mention here that an alternative chain of equivalences to do the 
whole proof would go from P to C to H to J. This would have the advantage that 
we would not need Y and Z at all. However going from H to .1 turns out to be 
slightly messy technically, and we prefer the longer but somewhat cleaner route. 
Our final specification for the whole FTS, B. shows in more detail all the 
points at which failure can occur. The equivalence of B(q,c) and J(q,c) is trivial, 
and is shown in Proposition 3.10.1. 
At this point, we have put in as much detail as we want to in our description 
of the whole FTS. We now separate it out into DS and C: we guess a specification 
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C(q,c) for FTS with DS removed, and prove that C(q,c)IjDS(e,e) 	B(q,c) 
(Proposition 3.11.2). This turns out to be just algebra, but made possible only 
because we have the correct level of detail in B, and because of some relations 
between the queue of inputs and the history of the system. These are the 
consistency constraints that tie up the behaviours of C and DS. It is clear from 
the form of the equivalence in Proposition 3.11.2 that we need a relation 
between (q.c) and e, the external counter of DS. We define, inductively, a 
function o(q,c) which gives the total number of outputs FTS generates in going 
from s 0 to r(q,c), and it will turn out that e=o(q,c). 
We are now through with the need for storing the counters, which relate to 
DS, and can simplify the data representation. We go back to storing the current 
state, rather than recalculating it every time from history. The new 
specification, D(q,$), still needs the queue of inputs for recovery. Proposition 
3.12.2 proves that C(q,c)D(q,$). This is essentially a proof of correctness of data 
transformation, and is a strong bisimulation. 
Before doing Proposition 3.12.2, we have to modify C a little, to take into 
account the fact that C and D have different ideas about when recovery is 
complete. For D, this is when all input has been fed back to P. If there is a 
string of output states after this, it cannot tell when it has passed the last 
recomputed output states and arrived at new states that have not occurred 
before. C can, because it marks this last state. Proposition 3.12.1 proves that 
the modification to C preserves its behaviour. 
We can now pull F out of D(q,$). giving us (we guess) E(q,$). Proposition 
3.13.1 proves that E(q,$)IF 1 z D(q,$). This is just algebra, made easy because F is 
so simple. - 
It only remains to show, as Proposition 3.13.2. that E(q,$) 	P(s)S(qj+1,q). 
This is a strong bisimulation, rather long but very straightforward. The reason 
why we don't try to do it by algebra is that E retains the recursive structure we 
have had for our specifications right through, whereas this is not apparent in 
PflS. The jump is easiest to show by bisimulation. Als9, E has recovery states and 
ordinary states, like all the other specifications, but on the other side, only S 
makes the distinction. P does not know whether it is reliving history or seeing it 
for the first time. 
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3.4 A specification (G) for the whole FTS 
G(s) Z if in(s) then (r,,1 . 	 1(,)a 1X. G(f(s,i,x)) + 'r1,. G(s)) 
else 	 h(s). G(g(s))+ r1 . G(s)) 
Figure 3: The definition of G 
As we see from Fig. 3-4. our first specification merely allows the possibility of 
failure. Failures at this level of abstraction cause no more than a 'hesitation'. 
G(s) is observationally equivalent to Pt(s),  as we see from Proposition 3.4.2 
below, but can have infinite chatter, whereas Pt has none. This is the first major 
characteristic of recovery from faults by stable storage. 
A brief point about notation: we will consistently write 
if b then (P+R) else (Q+R) 
rather than 
R + if b then P else Q 
The two forms are equivalent, but the one we choose has a slight advantage in 
clarity for some of our later expressions. 
To avoid having too many simple steps one after the other, we have included 
another feature in G. The i- 
get put 
and the T admit that even without failure, G 
does not do exactly what pt does, but goes through some silent moves. Later we 
shall see that these are G's representation of the mechanisms which record 
history and provide the redundancy required for fault recovery. 
Lemma 3.4.1: Hesitation causes infinite chatter but preserves equivalence 
If A <t= T. B + T. A then A B 
Proof: By a trivial (weak) bisimulation 
I 
We have stated Lemma 3.4.1 in a general form because it is a simple but 
important fact. We apply it to our special case: 
Proposition 3.4.2: Pt(s) 	G(s) 
Proof: We put pt(5)  for B, and G(s) for A in Lemma 3.4.1 
0 
The 	proposition 	says that G 	may 	have 	infinite chatter 	and still 	be 
observationally equivalent to 	pt It 	is 	this 	feature 	of our FTS that makes it 
impossible for us to make use of the testing equivalences proposed by [de Nicola 
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and Hennessy 83], since they will not accept G and Pt as equivalent. We point 
out in passing the connection to problems of fairness. 
To go to the next stage, we change the data representation to sequences of 
states. We call our new specification Y. 
3.5 A specification (Y) using sequences of states 




a I  X. Y(p:s:f(s,i,x)) + 'r, ,. Y(p:s)) 
else (-r 	. h(s). Y(p:s:g(s))+ r 1 . Y(p:s)) 
	
put 	(.) 
p is a sequence of states, and p:s means "s appended to p" 
Figure 3-5: The definition of Y 
G(s) 4= if in(s) then (T . 	a x. G(f(s,i,x)) + 1- . G(s)) get .1(s) I 
else 
(Tput . fi j(s) h(s). G(g(s))+ 'r/ . G(s)) 
Figure 3-4 (reproduced for reference): Definition of G 
K(s) (G(s). Y(P:s)) 
L-4L 
in(s) 	L_T>)a1x.  G(f(s,i,x)) 
*—> -'in(s) L-'>fi ()h(s). G(g(s)) 
1 
R-4R 
A-(3) a I x. Y(p:s:f(s,i,x)) 




Y uses the state sequence exactly as G uses the state 
Figure 3-6: Proof of Proposition 3.5.1 by strong bisimulation 
As we can see from the definition in Fig. 3-5, Y records its history as it 
unfolds, as the sequence of states p. It is clear that Y is identical to G except 
for the different data representation, and this is proved by strong bisirnulation 
in the following proposition. The form of the equivalence Y(p:s)G(s) tells us that 
the previous history of Y is irrelevant at this level of description. 
Proposition 3.5.1: State sequence and state representations are equivalent 
Y(p:s) = G(s) 
Proof: See Fig. 3-6 
Eli 
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3.6 A first description of recovery - reliving state 
sequences secretly 




ax. Z(p:s:f(s,i,x)) + 'r1 . ZR(1.p:s)) 
else (7
pitt 	1(i)
h(s). Z(p:s:g(s))+ T. ZR(l,p:s)) 
ZR(n,p) = if n=jpj then Z(p) 
else ('r. ZR(n+1,p) + 'r,. ZR(l,p)) 
Figure 3-7: The definition of Z 
(n,p:s) (Z(p:s). ZR(n.p:s) ) where 1nIp:s+1 
n=Ip:sI = L=R 
n<Ip:sI: 
L—AZR(1,p:s) 	 R-4ZR(1,p:s) 
-3 
 
in (s) 	L_ 2!4>a1x. Z(p:s:f(s,i,x)) 	R_. )ax. Z(p:s:f(s,i,x))  Ari 
- -sin(s) 	 Z(p:s:g(s)) 	R_Mh(s). Z(p:s:g(s)) 
R-'>ZR(n+l,p:s) 	 (n+1,p:s) 
Figure 3-8: Weak Bisimulation: all recovery states are equivalent 
We modify Y to show a little more detail - upon failure, the new specification 
Z (see Fig. 3-7) shows us that when a failure occurs, a fault tolerant system 
actually relives its computation from the starting state (or from the last 
checkpoint, more generally, but we aren't dealing with checkpoints in this 
system). Of course, all Z actually does is to count off the elements in the 
stored state sequence from the beginning to the current state. This is its 
superficial way of reliving its past. Note that failure can occur during this 
process. 
Later specifications will tell us more about recovery, but from the outside it 
will always appear to be a sequence of silent moves, as it is here. We now have 
to prove (Proposition 3.6.2) 
Y(p) 	Z(p) 
Note that this is for arbitrary p, though neither Y nor Z is capable of generating 
arbitrary state sequences. However, they can both accept an arbitrary initial 
sequence, and we are not imposing any restrictions on that at this stage. When 
we link up Z with J in a later section, we shall use the fact the starting state is 
so. 
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We begin by doing Proposition 3.6.1, which is a part of the proof. 
Proposition 3.6.1: Recovery states are equivalent to the failed state 
ZR(n.p:s) 	Z(p:s) 	Vn 1nIp:s 
Proof: By weak bisimulation (Fig. 3-8) 
This is the essence of the recovery - if a failure occurs in a state s, all 
recovery actions result in states that are equivalent to the fault free system in 
state s. When the FTS (completes its recovery and) makes externally visible 
actions they are exactly those it would have made had it not failed. 
Proposition 3.6.2: Recovery looks like hesitation 
Y(p) Z(p) 
Proof: We use the fact that 
if Q z R then  + T. Q 	A + 1. R 
We can simplify Z into a form that is identical to Y, because of Proposition 
3.6.1 and the fact that in the first equation in the definition of Z, the agent 
ZR is always guarded. Note that 
G(s) 	Z(p:s) 
follows as a corollary. 
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3.7 Representing history by an input sequence and an 
output counter 
In order to be able to separate DS out, our first decomposition of the 
system, we will need to produce a version of Z that uses a different data 
representation. We begin by motivating the new representation and explaining its 
relation to the state sequence representation. 
In Fig. 3-9, we see that all possible histories of P can be represented 
together as a tree, with each node labelled by a state. The root is s, the start 
state. An output state s has- only one son, labelled g(s). An input state has 
several (possibly an unbounded number) - one for each valid input port and 
value combination <ix>. The pair <ix> is valid if i€I(s). The corresponding son 
is labelled f(s,i.x). The intuition behind this is that since pt  is deterministic. FTS 
can always recompute the sequence of states it went through starting from s0, 
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s 1 =g(s 0) s 2 =g(s 1 ) 
.- 	 >... 
s=g(s 	
all possible inputs for sk 
each input leads to 
a similar subtree 
t(sk.i.x) 	g(f(s.ix)) 
• and so on 
(<i,x>,O) 	('Zi,x>,l) 
Figure 3-9: All possible histories of P 
provided it remembers the sequence of inputs. In fact, FTS can then retrace the 
path along the tree that Pt followed, starting from the root. We will see that 
there is more information in the path than just the state sequence, which is 
only the sequence of labels along the path. 
We can now think of an alternative labelling of the nodes. Because the graph 
is a tree, every node has a unique path to it from the root. To specify the path, 
starting from the root, we need only two pieces of information - which branch to 
take every time we come to an input node (output nodes have unique Sons and 
so we know where to go next), and after we have passed the last input node 
along the path, where to stop along the final straight. 
The two pieces of information described can be provided by pairs (q,c) where 
q is a sequence of input pairs <ix>, and c is an integer, c>O.  To trace the path 
specified by (q,c), we start at the root, and every time we come to an input 
node, use the next pair <ix> from q. When we have exhausted q, we take c more 
steps along a straight line. Obviously, not every pair (q,c) will be valid, but each 
valid (q,c) specifies a unique path from the root of the tree, and therefore leads 
to a unique node. 
We shall define "valid" in a moment, but first notice that we can define a 
function r(q,c) that gives for each valid pair (q,c) the state label of the node it 
leads to. (If (q,c) could specify more than one path, we would not have been able 
to guarantee that r is a h.inction). r is only a partial function, of course, defined 
only if (q,c) is valid. 
A pair (q,c) is valid only if it is consistent with the behaviour of P(s 0). E.g., if 
r(q,O) does 4 outputs before requesting a new input, r(q,5) is undefined. Also, 
r(q:<i,x>,O) will be defined, but only if icI(r(q,4)). Finally, if r(q,c) does an 
infinite sequence of outputs, r(q:<i,x>,c') is undefined. 
Now for the formal definitions. We will see that r can be defined 
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independently of the notion of validity, so we shall in fact define validity in 
terms of r. 
Definition 3.7.1: 
r(.0) = s 0 
if in(s) then r(q:<i.x>,0) = f(s,i,x) 
else r(q,c+1) = g(s) 
where s=r(q,c) and ieI(s) 
r(q.c) is defined iff it can be found by a finite number of applications of the 
above two rules. 
Definition 3.7.2: A history (q,c) is valid only if r(q.c) is defined 
We define r formally in Defn. 3.7.1. Note that this is an inductive definition. 
To repeat our earlier worry about r In a formal guise, how do we know r is a 
function? I.e., how do we know that the definition cannot produce two values for 
a given pair (q.c.)? Because given any such pair, we have to start with r(c,0). and 
.from there on we can only apply the second rule. At each successive stage, there 
is only one pair (q',c') that we generate on our way to (q,c). In terms of our 
tree, any pair (q,c) takes us down a unique path until it produces a result, or an 
inconsistency is detected. 
We point out that the domain of r is not recursive, but only recursively 
enumerable. The definition can detect inconsistencies of the form that q includes 
an invalid input pair, or of the form that c is too large for the final straight 
line segment of the path, but it will loop if an initial segment of q leads to an 
infinite sequence of output states. 
Since the set of valid histories is In fact the domain of r, it follows that this 
set is recursively enumerable but not recursive. 
We can of course write down a recursive definition of r (with all the same 
properties naturally), but not only is it less efficient to compute, it also does 
not tie in as well with what we intend to do with r in the following sections. 
Finally, notice that (q.c) carries more information than r(q,c), because while 
(q,c) specifies a unique node, we might have several nodes labelled by r(q.c). A 
consequence is that we cannot define an inverse function of r. 
From this point on, "history" will refer to a (q,c) representation rather than 
a state sequence representation. 
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3.7.1 A little more on validity 
When we come to agents that recompute histories, we shall need to ensure 
that they follow the same path as they did the first time around; indeed we shall 
need proof that they remain well defined. To this end, the obvious general lemma 
to prove is that if (q.c) is valid, then all points on the path from (e,O) to (q,c) 
represent valid histories. However, It turns out that all we need are the following 
lemmas. 
Lemma 3.7.3: If (q,c) is valid so is (q/d.0) Yd 1dq+1 where we use the 
notation q/d to mean q truncated after the first d-1 elements. 
Proof: Note that q/d is defined only for 1dq+1, and that q/l = c and 
q/lqI+1 = q. 
We shall first prove the following: If (q.c) is invalid, all histories of the form 
(q:q',c') are invalid where q' is a sequence of inputs. This follows from the 
definition of r. The only way we can find r(q:q',c') is to invoke rule (ii) with 
r(q,c) at some point. But we cannot do this if (q,c) is invalid. 
Now the lemma follows by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose (q,c) is validbut 
(q/d.0) is invalid for some d 1djq+1. But if (q/d,O) is invalid, so is (q,c), 
by the above statement. We have a contradiction, and (q/d,O) has to be 
valid. 
Lemma 3.7.4: If (q.c) is valid then Ym O<m<c.  -in(r(q.m)). 
Proof: By reductio ad absurdum. Suppose there is an m. O<m<c such that 
in(r(q.m)). Then we can see from the definition of r that we cannot have 
(q,c) valid for c>m. 
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3.8 A specification (H) using history to calculate the 
current state 
We now backtrack briefly. In the next section, we will produce a specification 
J that is a version of Z that uses our new data representation, but first we want 
to illustrate the latter in a simpler setting. So we define H(q,c) which behaves 
like G(s). The proof that the two are equivalent, using r to link the parameters, 
will also ease our proof that J(q,c)Z(p) where p=u(q,c) in terms of a new 
function u to be defined. 
First we have to ensure that our definition of H (Fig. 3-10) is proper. As we 
pointed out earlier, r is a well defined partial function. H is defined in terms of 
r, and in terms of other values of H. We do not have a circular definition. The 
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H(q,c) 	if in(s) then (T 
g e t * 
	
(i) I 	 / 
a x. H(q:<i,x>,O) + 1 . H(q,c)) 
else (T . 
put 	
j(.) h(s). H(q,c+1)+ r1 . H(q,c)) 
where s = r(q,c) 
Figure 3-10: The definition of H 
G(s) 	if in(s) then (T . 	a x. G(f(s,ix)) 
EL() 	 + r1 . G(s)) 
else (T
pu j( 
) h(s). G(g(s))+ T G(s)) 
Figure 3-4 (reproduced for reference): Definition of G 
X(q,c) (G(s). H(q,c)) where s = r(q.c) 
L-4L 
'-3in(s) 	L -'>E )a.x. G(f(s,i,x)) 
E— -'in(s) L_1> J( h(s). G(g(s)) 
R-4R 
a x. H(q:<i,x>,O) 
IEL(8) I 




Figure 3-11: Strong Bisimulation: H uses history exactly as G uses the state 
point of concern is that r is a partial function, and we have to ensure that it is 
defined for all parameter values with which it is going to be invoked by H. In 
fact, we are really only interested in derivatives of H(i 3 O). 
As it turns out, the bisimulation between H and , G will also prove that all 
derivatives of H(e,O) are well defined. This works particularly well with the 
inductive definition of r, and would not have been so clear with a recursive one. 
Proposition 3.8.1: Recomputing the current state from history is equivalent to 
storing it 
G(s0) 	H(e.0) 
Proof: In fact, we prove in general that 
G(s) 	H(q.c) where (q.c) is valid, and s=r(q,c) 
but notice that H is not necessarily defined for all values of (q,c). Instead, 
we use that fact that the start state is fixed at s, and prove that 
H(e,O)G(s 0). We then also show that we never get into undefined states of 
H. 
This is formally proved by a simple strong bisimulation (Fig. 3-11). 
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Because r(c,O) = s 0 , G(s 0) and H(a.0) form the pair X(c,O). This forms the 
basis: the bisimulation shown is relevant to our proposition! 
Now consider any pair X(q,c) for which (q,c) is valid. r(q,c) is defined, and 
is equal to s. If in(s), r(q:czi,x>,O) is defined for iEI(s) and is equal to 
f(si,x). This shows that the second line of our bisimulation Is correct, and 
also shows that the H(q:<i,x>.0) we reach in this case is well defined. 
A similar argument takes care of the third line, and our proof is complete. 
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A last comment about H before we leave this section. We know that (q,c) 
contains more information than r(q,c). But looking at H, we see that it carries q 
and c around as parameters, and updates them as necessary, but uses them 
solely to calculate r(q,c), the current state. 
3.9 J: an agent that relives history rather than state 
sequences 
We now define J(q,c) which behaves like Z(p). 
J is a version of Z that uses the new (q,c) representation. Note that where ZR 
needed only one pointer n, JR needs a pair (d,m). The nth. element of the state 
sequence p represented the state ZR had got to in its recomputation. Here we 
can recalculate this state from (q/d,m) where q/d represents the initial segment 
of q that JR has so far consumed.  
Note that we could state restrictions on the parameters d and m for JR. As 
we have written it, JR could be called with values of d and m that will cause it 
to loop. But continuing in the spirit of H and r, we will see that in fact ,J never 
calls JR with such values, so we don't have to worry! 
Like H, J uses history solely to calculate the states s=r(q,c) and t=r(q/d,rn). 
Later subsystems will use q more explicitly in the recovery. 
The reader might find it helpful to trace the behaviour of J on the history 
tree 	(Fig. 	3-9). It 	is very tightly linked 	to this tree - after practically every 
move, the next state is represented by a different (q,c) node on the tree. The 
only exceptions are that J(q,c) does both a Tgei and an a before moving to 
(q<i,x>,O), and similarly two moves, T and a fi before moving to (qc+l). Weput 
can think of the first (silent) action of -each of these pairs as leaving J on the 
same node, while the second action moves it to the new node 
During recovery, J has two "program counters" on the tree - a recovery 
counter, and a target counter that remembers the state at which failure 
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J(q,c) 	if in(s) then (T
grt A.( 8 )a  I x. J(q:<i,x>,O) + T. JR(1,0,q,c)) 
else (r
put 	
. j(.) h(s). J(q,c+1) + 'r1,. JR(1,0q,c)) 
where s=r(q,c) 
JR(d,m.q.c) : if d=jq+1 and m=c then J(q,c) 
else if in(t) then (r 1 JR(d+l.O,q,c) +r1 . JR(l.O,q,c)) 
else (r 1 . JR(d,m+1q,c) + r1 . JR(1,0,q.c)) 
where t = r(q/dm) 
Figure 3-12: The definition of J 
Z(p:s) <#= if in(s) then 	 a 1x. Z(p:s:f(s,i,x)) + T ZR(l,p:s)) 
else 	flh(S). Z(p:s:g(s))+ T1 . ZR(1,p:s)) 
ZR(n,p) r if n=jpj then Z(p) 
else (r. ZR(n+l,p) + i. ZR(1p)) 
Figure 3-7 (reproduced for reference): Definition of Z 
u(c,O) = 
if in(s) then u(q:<ix>,O) = u(qc):f(s,i,x) else u(q,c+l) = u(qc):g(s) 
where s=r(q.c) and i€I(s) 
u(q,c) is defined iff it can be found by a finite number of applications of 
the above two rules. 
Definition 3.9.1 (reproduced for reference): u 
X(q.c) (Z(p:s). J(q.c)) where s=r(qc) and p:s=u(q,c) 
4—) 	L_4>ZR(1 ,p:s) 	 R—tJR(1 ,O,q,c) 	 .*(1 .O.q.c) 
4—) in(s) L-.-2)a1X.  Z(p:s:f(s,i,x)) 	R-4. 	ax. J(q:<i.x>,O) 	X(q:<i,x>,O) 
tEl ici(s) t 
4—) -tin(s) L—h(s). Z(p:s:g(s)) 	R__5JMh(s). J(q,c+1) 	X(q.c+1) 
(d.m.q,c) (ZR(n,p). JR(d.m,q,c)) where p=u(qc) and n=u(q/d.m)j 
d=jq+ 1 and m=c ==> n=Iu(q/d.m)j=Iu(qc)I=IpI 
- L=J(qc) and R=Z(p) 	 (q, c) 
d<Iqj or (d=Iq+1 and l<c): 
4—) 	L-T>ZR(1 ,p) 	 R-'>JR(l ,O,q.c) 	 (1 .O,q.c) 
4—) in(t) L_X>ZR( n +1,p) R—JR(d+1,0,q.c) 	 (d+1,Q.q.c) 
4—) -.in(s) L-'>ZR(n+ 1,p) 	 R—>JR(d,m+ 1 .q.c) 	(d.m+1 ,q.c) 
Figure 3-13: Strong Bisimulation proof of proposition 3.9.2 
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occurred, and which J is trying to get back to. 
3.9.1 Calculating state sequences from history 
In order to prove that J and Z are observationally equivalent, we need a 
function that relates history (q,c) to a state sequence p. This is done by u(q,c) 
which yields for each valid (q,c) the whole path in the history tree from s 0 to 
r(q,c). 
Definition 3.9.1: 
u(t,O) = t:s 0 
where we write the right hand side as we do in order to emphasise that it is a 
sequence of states of length 1 rather than the state s 0 . 
if in(s) then u(q:<i,x>,O) = u(q,c):f(s,i,x) 
else u(q,c+1) = u(q,c):g(s) 
where s=r(q,c) and iEI(s) 
u(q,c) is defined iff it can be found by a finite number of applications of the 
above two rules. 
Formally, u is defined inductively in terms of r in Defn. 3.9.1. We can show that 
u is a function by arguments similar to the ones we used for r. We also need to 
show that u never invokes r except when it is defined. We can do this by 
induction along the path from s 0 to r(q,c). 
We can also show by induction that u is defined whenever r is, 	but our 
experience with Proposition 3.8.1 shows that we need not worry too much about 
the domain of u. so long as it is defined whenever it is invoked by J. 
Proposition 3.9.2: .1 relives history exactly as Z relives state sequences 
Z(c:s0) = J(c,O) 
Proof: Again, we prove in general that 
Z(p) 	J(q,c) where (qc) is valid, and p=u(q,c) 
Thus we do not need a restriction that J(q,c) should be reachable from 
J(c,O) in order to avoid talking about invalid histories for which J is 
undefined. 
The proof of the proposition is by strong bisimulation (Fig. 3-13). 
We begin by verifying that J(e,O) and Z(t:s 0) form the pair X(e,O). This is so 
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because r(e,O) = s 0 , and u(e,O) = c:s 0 . 
Similarly, both invocations of 	(1,0.q,c) are correct because the relation 
between (q,c) and p is unchanged, and u(q/l,O)I = Iu(c,O)I = Ie:s 0 1 = 1. 
The second line of the first pair: Since J(q,c) and r(q,c) are defined, in(s) 
implies that r(q:<i,x>.0) and therefore J(q:<i,x>,O) are defined. Further, 
r(q:'czi,x>.0) = f(s,i,x) and u(q:<i,x>,O) = u(q,c):f(s,i,x) = p:s:f(s,i,x) so that 
the next pair is indeed .K(q:<i,x>,O). 
A similar argument accounts for the third line of the first pair. 
For the second pair, the escape back to normalcy takes place at the same 
time for both JR and ZR, as explained in the figure, and failures within 
recovery merely go back to (l,O,q,c). 
The third line: p,q,c remain unchanged. For the rest, we know that u(q/d,m) 
is defined and that in(r(q/d,m)). Therefore, from the definitions of r and u, 
we know that r(q/d:<i,x>,O) is defined. But does this prove that J(q/d+l,O) 
is defined? Do we have to prove that in fact the d+l th element of q is 
<ix> where iEI(t)? No, because all we need is proof that (q/d+1,0) is valid, 
and we know that from Lemma 3.7.3. And we ensure that the parameters 
match up for the next pair, because 
u(q/d+l,O) = u(q/d,m):f(t,l,x) = u(q/d,rn)I+l = n+l, where i€I(t). 
The last line: p.q,c remain unchanged. For the rest, we know that u(q/d,m) 
is defined and that -in(r(q/d,m)). Therefore, r(q/d,m+l) is defined, and so 
is J(q/d,m+1). The parameters match because 
u(q/d,m+1)I = u(q/d,rn):g(t) = u(q/d,m)+1 = n+1. 
3.9.2 Why don't we prove directly that J and H are equivalent? 
If we took the step suggested, we would be able to avoid introducing Y and Z. 
Let us consider how we would do it. If we could prove (by bisirnulation) that 
all the recovery states of J are equivalent, exactly as we now do for Z, we can 
simplify J by algebra to a form identical to H. The bisimulation will consist of 
one pair 
(d,m,q,c) (J(q,c), JR(d,m,q,c)) 
It is easy enough to prove that J can match the moves of JR (it does nothing), 
4? 
but the other way around entails proving that JR can evolve to J. To do this, we 
need a slightly more general result than lemma 3.7.3 to show that JR will not get 
stuck with m increasing indefinitely. We will also need to state restrictions on 
the values of rn at each q/d, and this gets rather messy. 
We can perhaps get around this by using r and u to prove more theorems 
about initial segments of q, but we find that the attractions of being able to 
show recovery as simply as we can with Z outweigh those of going directly from 
H to J. 
3.10 The last representation of the whole FTS: B 
B (Fig. 3-14) is an expanded version of J, which shows in more detail the 
various silent actions of FTS, and the fact that failures can occur at many more 
points than indicated by J. J is already using the data representation we need to 
separate DS out. But when we do so, we will find that C (the remainder of FTS) 
has to do relay, ok and put actions, and that the product CflDS will show all 
these links. B will be in a form that anticipates all the silent actions in this 
product resulting from communication between C and DS. 
Proposition 3.10.1: B is equivalent to .1 
J(e,O) 	B(e,0) 
Note that this proves, as usual, that B is properly defined for all derivatives of 
B(c,O). 
Proof: If we had a direct proof that all the recovery states BR are 
equivalent to B, we can simplify B by algebra to a form identical to J. As it 
stands, this is true, but the simplest way of proving it is by bisimulation 
between B and Z! So we take the easier way out, and show an easy but 
boring weak bisimulation between B and J. The pairs are listed in Fig. 3-15. 
The steps are so easy that we don't list them out. 
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The behaviour of B is 	not as tightly linked to the history tree as that of 
J. There are now several silent moves which leave the "program counter" at the 
same node on the tree. This is why the two are related by a weak bisimulation 
rather than a strong one. 
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We use the abbreviations s = r(q,c) and t = r(q/d,m) throughout. 
r(c,O) = s 0 
if in(s) then r(q:<i,x>,O) = f(s,i.x) else r(q,c+1) = g(s) 
where iEI(s) 
r(q,c) is defined iff it can be found by a finite number of applications of the 
above two rules. 
Definition 3.7.1 (reproduced for reference): r 
J(q,c) 	if in(s) then 
(T get' 	 MaIX. 
J(q:<ix>O) + T1 JR(1,0q,c)) 
else (T 1 	()h(s). J(q,c+1) + r1 . JR(1,0,q,c)) 
JR(d,m.q,c) = if d=qI+1 and rn=c then J(q,c) 
else if in(t) then (T i . JR(d+1,O.q.c) +i. JR(l,O,q,c)) 
else (r. JR(d.rn+1,q,c) + T1 JR(1,0,qc)) 
Figure 3-12 (reproduced for reference): Definition of J 
B(q,c) Z if in(s) then I T 
get
. BG(q,c) + T1 BR(l,O,q,c)j 
else I T 
put
. BP(q.c+1) + rj.. BR(1,0,q,c) 
BG(q,c) I  ax. BC(q:<i,x>,O) + r/ 	
a ix. BR(1,0,q:<i,x>,O) ICI(q) i 	 lEr(s) 
BP( q c)
i(s) 	 / 
h(s). BC(qc) + T . 1(') h(s). BR(1,0.q,c) 
BC(qc) . 
voita,ok 
B(q,c) + r,. BR(10,q,c) 
BR(dmq,c) <= if d=q+1 and m=c then B(q.c) 
	
else if in(t) then I T 
get
. BRC'(d+1,0q.c) + 	BR(1,0.qc) 
else I T 
put
. BRC(dm+lq.c) + r1 BR(1,0,q,c) 
BRC(d,m.q,c) z 	
voita,ok
. BR(d,m,q,c) + T,. BR(1,0,q,c) 
Figure 3-14: The definition of B 
X(q,c) (J(qc), B(q,c)) 
(q, c) (I)aX. J(qc), BG(q,c)) where in(s) 
(q. c) ( ()h(s). J(q.c). BP(q.c)) where -tin(s) 
16 (q, c) (J(q,c), BC(q,c)) 
(d,mq,c) (JR(d,m,q,c), BR(d,m,q,c)) 
(q, c) (JR(d.m.q.c). BRC(d,m,q,c)) 
Weak bisiruulation between J(q.c) and B(q.c) 
Figure 3-15: Summary of proof of Proposition 3.10.1 
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3.11 The behaviour (C) of FTS with DS removed 
We have guessed a specification B(q,c) for the perfect system Pt(s), where 
s = r(q,c), and shown that the two are equivalent. We now have to prove that 
B(q,c) 	FTS(s,Iq,q,e.e) 
and explain the relation between e and (q,c). 
3.11.1 Maintaining a cumulative count of outputs for a history 
The c in the (q,c) pairs we have been using is different from the external 
counter e maintained by DS, but the relation between the two is simple: c 
counts the number of outputs since the last input, and e is a cumulative count 
since s. Formally, e = o(q,c) where o is defined below. 
Definition 3.11.1: 
o(e,O) = 0 
if in(r(q,c)) then o(q:<i,x>,O)=o(q,c) else o(q,c+1)=o(q,c) + 1 
The value of o(q,c) is that found by a finite number of applications of the above 
two rules. 
We can show that o is a function by arguments similar to those we used for 
r. We must remember, as for r and u, that o is a partial function, and we must 
ensure that it is only invoked with parameter values for which it is defined. 
We begin by guessing a specification (see Fig. 3-16) 
C(q,c) for 
and first proving, as Proposition 3.11.2, that 
C(q,c)IDS(e,e) 	B(q,c) where e = o(q,c). 
We then have to prove (in later sections) that our guess for C is right. 
Proposition 3.11.2: Adding DS to C gives us back FTS 
C(q,c)IDS(e,e) 	B(q.c) where e=o(q.c) 
Proof: We do this by expanding the lhs into an agent A, and then comparing 
A and B. It is convenient to proceed bottom up. 
In this proof, which needs to relate the behaviour of the counters used by 
DS and the states of C, we shall be using various facts about r and o that 
C(q,c) 	if in(s) then (i- 
get* 
 CG(q,c) + i. relay. CR(l,Oq,c)) 
else (t(j(s).h(s)). CO(q.c+1)+ r,. relay. CR(1,0q,c)) 
CG(qc) 	)ax. CI(q:<i,x>) 
+ r. 	1()a1x. relay. CR(1,0,q:<i,x>,O) 
CI(q) lct= C(q,O) ± T relay. CR(1.0,q,O) 
CO(q,c) 	ok. C(q,c) + r1 . relay. CR(l,O.q,c) 
CR(dmq,c) z if d=jq+1 and m=c then C(q,c) 
else if in(r(q/d,m)) then (r 1 . CRI(d+1,O,qc) 
+f relay. CR(1,0,q,c)) 
else (t(j(t).h(t)). CRO(d,m+ 1,q,c) 
+ 	relay. CR(1,0q,c)) 
where t = r(q/d.m) 
CRI(dmq,c) 	 CR(d,m,q,c) + r1. relay. CR(l,O,q,c) 
voila
CRO(d,rn,q,c) 4= ok. CR(d,rn.q,c) + r. relay. CR(l,O,q.c) 
Figure 3-16: The definition of C 
DS(1,e) <= put(jx). if 1>e then 
iii
x. DO(1+1, e+1) 
else DO(1+1, e) 
+ relay. DS(O,e) 
DO(l.e) 4= -o-k. DS(l.e) + relay. DS(O,e) 
The resulting equations for .A(q.c) = C(q,c)IDS(e,e) 
A(q,c) = if in(s) then (T 1 . AG(q,c) + i. AR(1.0,q,c)) 
else 	AP(q.c+1) + r1 . AR(1,0.q,c))puf 
AG(q,c) =a i x. AO(q:<ix>O) 
+ r
/ . 
	a I  X. r r.Zay . AR(l,O,q:<i,x>.0) 1€ (s)  
AP(q,c) = 	h(s). AO(q.c)+ r. 	h(s). AR(1,0,qc) 
AO(q,c) = T. A(q,c) + T. AR(1,0,q,c) 
AR(d,mq,c) = if d=q+1 and mc then A(q,c) 






else (-r put'  ARC(d,rn+1.q.c)+ -rf • r 1 . AR(l,O,q,c)) 
where t=r(q/dm) 
ARC(d,m.q,c) 	 AR(d,rn,q,c) + r. AR(l,O.q.c) 
Figure 3-17: Algebraic proof of Proposition 3.11.2 summarised 
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have already been stated and proved in earlier sections. 
Again, the reader might find it helpful to relate the various expressions in 
the algebra that follows to the history tree (Fig. 3-9). The behaviours of B 
and C are related to this tree in a very similar way- ---The--main--4ifierence--is----- 
that 	while 	it 	is 	only 	silent 	actions that 	leave B's position 	on 	the 	tree 
unchanged. C's position is also left unchanged by ok. Corresponding to this 
communication between C and DS, B does a T that leaves it in the same 
place. In contrast, when C and DS communicate by relay, both go back to 
(e,O). B does the same with a i- . 
DS does not really have a position on the tree because we cannot deduce 
(q,c) from (l,e). But if we think of it as occupying the same node as C 
(indeed the whole system, B, occupies this same node), we see that 
l=o(q/d,m) and e=o(q,c) where (q.c) is the state at which failure occurred, 
to which the system is trying to get back, and (q/d,m) is how far it has got 
in the recovery. DS sometimes moves along the tree even without any 
action on its part, if C is doing input, but the new node yields the same 
(l,e) as the old one. 
Let 
AR(d,m,q,c) = CR(d,rn,q,c)fDS(l,e) 
where e=o(q,c) and l=o(q/d,m) 
Notice that because o(q/1,0)=O we have CR(1,0,q,c)DS(0,e) = AR(1,0q,c) 
where e=o(q,c) as usual. Let 
ARO(d,m,q,c) = CRO(d,m,q,c)jIDO(l, e) where e=o(q,c) and l=o(q/d,m) 
= Tok, CR(d,m,q.c)lDS(l, e) 
+ T1. Treiay  CR(1 ,O,q,c)IDS(O,e) 
= 	AR(d,m,q,c) + r1 . AR(1,0,q,c) 
Note that dIqI in both CR0 and CR1 because of the first if clause in CR. Lt. 
ARI(d,q,c) = CRI(d,m,q,c)IDS(l, e) where e=o(q,c) and l=o(q/d,m) 








. AR(d,m,q,c) ± T1 . AR(1,0,q,c) 
Since ARO(d,m,q,c) = ARI(d,m,q,c), we use ARC for both: 
ARC(d,m,q,c) 	= 7
voi1a.ok 
. AR(d,m,q,c) + 'r1. AR(1,0,q,c) 
Now, 
AR(d,rn,q,c) = CR(d,m,q,c)IIDS(l,e) where e=o(q,c) and l=o(q/d,m) 
= if d=qJ+1 and m=c then C(q,c)IIDS(l,e) 






 . ?9LQ. 
AR(1,0,q,c)) 
else ('r 1 . CRO(d,m-i-1,q,c)IIDO(1+1, e) 
+ r
/ 
 . T 
relay . 
AR(1,0,q,c)) 
where t = r(q/d,m) as usual. 
We can simplify AR considerably at this point: First, let 
A(q,c) = C(q,c)IDS(e,e) where e=o(q.c). 
Next, notice that 
if d=Iq+1 and m=c then 1 = o(q/dm) = o(q/q+1,c) = o(q,c) = e. 
We also know that 
if in(t) then o(q/d±1,O) = o(q/d,m) 
- 	 else o(q/d,rn-i-l) = o(q/dm) + 1 
Making all the necessary substitutions in the above equation for AR, we get 
AR(d,na,q,c) = if d=IqI+1 and m=c then A(q,c) 
else if in(t) then (T 
get * 




else (1-put'  A'RC(d,m+l,q,c)+ r1 . i- i . AR(1,0,q,c)) 
Now let 
AI(q) = CI(q)IDS(e,e) where e=o(q,O) 
= T. C(q,O)DS(e,e) + -r. AR(1,0,q,c) 
= T. A(q,O) + T. AR(10,q,c) 
and let 
AO(q,c) = CO(q,c)DO(e,e) where e=o(q,c) as usual 
= T. C(q,c)IIDS(e,e) + T. AR(1,0,q,c) 
= T. A(q,c) + r. AR(1,0,q,c) 
We notice that AI(q) is just AO(q,O). 
Next, let 
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AG(q,c) = CG(q,c)DS(e.e) where e=o(q,c) as usual 
= 	CI(q:<i.x>)jDS(e.e) 
+ T,. 	)1X. relay. CR(1 ,O,q:<i,x>,O)lDS(O.e) 
AI(q:<i,x>) 
+ r.a i  X. T•  AR(1,0,q:<i,x>,O) 
where we have used the following fact in the last step: 
o(q:<i,x>,O) = o(q,c) where in(r(q,c)) 
We can replace the call to AI(q:<l,x>) by a call to AO(q:<i,x>,O). 
Finally, we can tackle 
A(q,c) = C(q,c)DS(e,e) where e=o(qc) and we put s=r(q,c) 
= if in(s) then (rget' CG(q,c)IDS(e,e) + 	
AR(1,0,q,c)) 
else (rput ' CO(q.c+1)Il )h(s). DO(e+l,e+1) + T,. AR(l,O,q,c)) 
= if in(s) then (i-ge t'  AG(q,c) + r. AR(l,O,q,c)) 
else (r
put ' 
AP(q,c+l) + ,. AR(1,0,q,c)) 
where we have written 
AP(qc+1) for 
CO(q.c+1)II )h(s). DO(e+l,e+1). 
We can expand this term: 
AP(q,c+ 1) 
= J()h(s). CO(q,c+1)IIDO(e+ l,e+1)+ T. 16 J()h(s). AR(1 ,O,q,c+l) 
= J()h(s). AO(q,c+1)+ T. Ph(s). AR(l,O,q,c) 
The equations for A are summarised in Fig. 3-17. Comparing the equations 
for A and B, we see that they are identical. (Except that the state 
corresponding to BC is called AO). 
Note that as usual, we have not stated any restrictions on the parameter 
values for CR, for example. The equivalence between B and CIIDS  proves that 
C does not invoke any of its states except with values for which they are 
well defined. Strictly, we have only shown that C has this nice property only 




3.12 Dropping the output counters, and saving the current 
state explicitly 
We now have a guessed specification (see Fig. 3-16) 
C(q.c) for (P(s)IS(Jqj,q)lF)rput,ok,reZay,awhere s=r(q,c) 
and we know that 
C(q,c)IDS(e,e) 	B(q,c), where e=o(q,c). 
We still have to prove that our guess for C is right. This will complete the proof 
that 
B(q.c) 	FTS(s,IqI,q,e,e) where e=o(q,c). 
We do this via D (Fig. 3-20), which is equivalent to C (Proposition 3.12.2, 
following) but uses states s=r(q,c) explicitly, and drops the counter c. 
D(q,$) = (P(s)IS(Iq,q)jF)rput,ok.reLay,a 
(to be proved in later sections) 
We want to drop the counter because we no longer have any need for it - it does 
not appear on the right hand side of the above equation. 	C, even though it 
represents the same agent as D, needed it in order to tie up with DS. 
3.12.1 A modified version of C equivalent to the original one 
Before we proceed with Proposition 3.12.2, let us consider whether we expect 
the data transformation in reverse to go smoothly. When we wrote the equations 
for H in terms of q and c instead of s, we used the function r(q,c). We noted 
that r is a partial function, so that not every pair (q,c) is a reasonable one to 
use - this is why we had to satisfy ourselves that H was well defined. But the 
other way around is no problem, for we are not trying to calculate the inverse 
of r: starting from (e,0) we know that C is well defined, and that for every pair 
(q,c) that occurs in its derivatives, s=r(q,c) is well defined. 
In fact, it turns out that we can even recover c from q and s=r(q,c). Briefly, 
if there are two different c's, c 1 and c2, such that s=r(q,c 1 )=r(q,c 2), it means 
that s is a state that will never lead to an input state. C(q.c 1 ) and C(q,c 2) are 
equivalent (from our notion of state), and we can just choose the smaller of our 
two C'S. 
But we need not concern ourselves at all with the question of recovering c 
from q and s, because an inspection of C (see Fig. 3-16) reveals that the various 
derivatives Cl. CO etc. either just pass the value of c on (perhaps modified), or 
-. --. 	.....-..- -.- ............... 
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use it to calculate s. In other words, there is no loss of information if we throw 
away c and just store s instead. Actually, this is not quite true just yet - the 
first line of CR uses the condition rn=c - but as we shall see shortly, this 
'condition can be dropped (Proposition 3.12.1). 
Lastly, we can also replace the counter in used during recovery by a state 
t=r.(q/d,m). 
Proposition 3.12.1: Recovery can stop when there are only output states left 
For valid (q,c) and Vm O<m<c CR(q+1,m,q,c) C(q,m) 
Proof: By strong bisirnulation (see Fig. 3-18) 
To 	clarify this 	informally: what 	happens 	at 	failure 	is 	that 	C 	forgets 	its 
current state, whether this is held explicitly as 	s or implicitly in the form 
(q,c), 	and goes back to s 0 or 	(c,O). 	Recovery consists 	of recomputing this 
current state, 	generating a sequence 	of states 	s 0 , 	s, s2 and so on where 
each state is a function of the last, and, possibly, 	of the next input from 
the input queue. 	During this process, C might do some output. 	All such 
output will be a 	duplication of previous outputs until C gets beyond past 
history to a new state, 	this duplication being filtered 	out by DS. 	C's only 
concern is to use the input queue to recompute its state sequence. 
Therefore, the proposition says, as far as C is concerned, recovery is 
complete when we have counted off the last of the input. At this stage, 
t=r(q/(ql+1,0)=r(q,0), the next state after, the last input state in the history 
of the system so far, and any more states left in the history (for C to relive 
before it catches up with current events) are all output states. But C is not 
concerned about duplicating output, and its behaviour will be the same 
whether or not it regards itself as still recovering. 
0 
The first consequence of this is that we can rewrite the first line of CR in the 
definition of C (see Fig. 3-16) as follows: 
CR(d,m,q,c) z if d=q+l then C(q,O) 
A further examination of CR, CR1 and CR0 now reveals that this removes the only 
place where c was used in these states of C, and so all calls to CR of the form 
CR(d,m,q,c) 	can 	be 	replaced 	by CR(d,m,q). 	(Or we 	can think 	of these calls 	as 
CR(d,m,qO)). 	What 	this 	means is 	that 	when 	failure 	occurs, the recovery 
mechanism (represented by S) does not have to keep track of the actual state C 
(or F) was in at the time, but need only use the input queue as a record 	of 
history. This is actually a natural consequence of the argument in the previous 
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C(q,c) Z if in(s) then (r 1 . CG(q.c) + r1 . relay. CR(1,0,q,c)) 
else (t(j(s),h(s)). CO(q,c+l)+ i-i,. relay. CR(1,0q,c)) 
CG(qc)z 	) a 1X. CI(q:<i,x>) 
+ T. 	(,)aX. relay. CR(l,O.q<i,x>O) 
CI(q) : T •1 . C(q,O) + r1 . relay. CR(LOq.0) 
CO(q,c) : ok. C(q,c) + r,. relay. CR(l.O,q,c) 
CR(dm,q,c) : if d=jql+i and m=c then C(q,c) 
else if in(r(q/d,m)) then (T 1 . CRI(d+1,Qq,c) 
+ v1 . relay. CR(1,0q,c)) 
else (f(j(t)h(t)). CRO(d,m+1,q,c) 
+ i-1 . relay. CR(1.0,q,c)) 
where t = r(q/d,m) 
CRI(d,m,q,c) - r. CR(d.m,q.c) + r1. relay. CR(1,0,q,c) 
CRO(d,rn.q,c) : ok. CR(d,mq,c) + T,. relay. CR(1,0.q,c) 
Figure 3-16 (reproduced for reference): Definition of C 
(m) (CR(IqI+1.m.q.c). C(q,m)) where (qc) is valid and O<m<c 
If c=O then m=O and L=R bydefinition. 
If m=c then L=R by definition. 
Valid (q,c), c>O and rn<c: 
By Lemma 3.7.4 we have -.in(r(q,m)). 
Let t = r(q/jq+1m) = r(q,m). 
E— 	L_V 	 t>CRo(q+ 1 .m,q,c) 	 R V1Lt(i(t.b(Lfl>Co(qm+ 1) 	 f(m+ 1) 
LZ>rel ay . CR(10.q,c) 	 R-'>relay. CR(1,O,q,c) 
V(m) 	(CRO(JqI+1.m.qc). CO(q.rn)) where (q,c) is valid and O<m<c 
4— 	L-CR(qI+1.m,q,c) 	 R-C(q.c) 	 A (m) 
—* L-T>relay. CR(1.0,q.c) 	 R-r>;:etay. CR(1,0,q,c) 
Figure 3-18: Strong Bisirnulation proof of proposition 3.12.1 
Because of the equivalence proved above between certain states of C, we can 
use a modified version of C (Fig. 3-19), equivalent to the original. 
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two paragraphs. 
The modified version of C is given in Fig. 3-19. 
3.12.2 D: an agent equivalent to C that uses no counters 
Proposition 3.12.2: We can retrieve the state from the queue and counters 
C(q,c) z D(q.$) for s=r(q,c) 
Proof: We begin by writing out the definition of D (Fig. 3-20), which is a 
version of C using (q,$) instead of (q,c), where s=r(q,c) as usual. From the 
arguments in the previous section, It should be clear that the proposition is 
true. If the reader would like a more formal proof, it is given by the strong 
bisimulation in Fig. 3-21. 
0 
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C(q.c) Z if in(s) then (T 1 . CG(q,c) + r. relay. CR(1,0,q)) 
else (t(j(s),h(s)). CO(q,c+1)+ Tf• relay. CR(l,O,q)) 
CG(q,c) 	CE x. CI(q:<i.x>) + .-r 	a 1x. relay. CR(1,0,q:<ix>) 
CI(q) <:= 	C(q,O) + r. relay. CR(1,0,q) 
CO(q,c) 	ok. C(q,c) + T,. relay. CR(1,0,q) 
CR(d,m.q) -::= if d=Iq+1 then C(q,O) 
else if in(r(q/d,m)) then (T 
get' 
 CRI(d+1,O,q) 
+ r. relay. CR(1,0,q)) 
else (t(j(t),h(t)). CRO(d,m+1,q) + T1. relay. CR(1,O,q)) 
where t = r(q/d.m) 
CRI(d,m,q) Z 	CR(d,rn,q) + r1. relay. CR(l,Oq) 
CRO(d,m,q) = ok. CR(d,m.q) + r1. relay. CR(1,0.q) 
Figure 3-19: The modified definition of C 
D(q,$) 	if in(s) then (T gref DG(q.$) + r1. relay. DR(1q,s 0)) 
else (t(j(s),h(s)). DO(q,g(s)) + T1. relay. DR(1q,s 0 )) 
DG(qs) 	= 	()a.X. DI(q:<i.x>, f(s,i,x)) + T. 	ax. relay. DR(1q:<ix>,s 0 ) 
DI(qs) 	 D(q,$) + r1. relay. DR(1,q,s 0 ) 
DO(q,$) 	= ok. D(q,$) + r1. relay. DR(1q,s 0 ) 
DR(d,q,t) 	if d=qI+1 then D(qt) 
else if in(t) then (r. DRI(d+1qf(t.q.i.q.x)) 
+ r. relay. DR(1,q,s 0)) 
else (put(J(t),h(t)). DRO(d,qg(t)) + r1. relay. DR(1,qs 0)) 
DRI(d,q.t) 	r.. DR(d.q.t) + T1 . relay. DR(1,q,s 0 ) 
DRO(d,q,t) : ok. DR(d,q,t) + r1 . relay. DR(1,q,s 0 ) 
Figure 3-20: The definition of D 
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X(qc) 	(C(q.c). D(q,$)) where s=r(q,c) 
L->relay. CR(1.0.q) 
	
R-'>relay. DR(1,qs0 ) 
	
(1,0.q) 
E-* in(s) 	L_X>CG(q,c) 
	
R-> D G ( q, s) 
	
(q. c) 





(q. c) 	(CG(q.c). DG(q.$)) where s=r(q,c) and in(s) 
ax 
ViEJ(s) L-1->CI(q:<i,x>,O) 	 R-->DI(q:<i,x>. f(s,i,x)) 
L_X> )a1x. relay. CR(1.0,q:<i.x>) 
R-1> )ax. relay. DR(1,q:<i,x>,s 0 ) 
J(q) 	(CI(q). DI(q.$)) where we choose some c such that (q,c) is valid, 
and in(r(q,c)), and s=f(r(q,c),q 11 .iq 1 .x) 
L-'>C(q,O) 	 R-'>D(q,$) 	 .h'(q,O) 
L-'>relay. CR(1,0,q) 	 R-'>relay. DR(1,q,s 0 ) 	 ( 1.O.q) 
V(q.c) 	(CO(q,c). DO(q.$)) 	where s=r(q,c) and -.in(s) 
L-C(q,c) 	 R-D(q,$) 	 X(q.c) 
L-T>relay. CR(1,0,q) 	 R-'>relay. DR(1,q,s0 ) 	 ( 1.O.q) 
(d.m.q) (CR(&m.q). DR(d.q.t) ) where t=r(q/d,m) and 1<d<Iq+1 
if d=q-F1 then L=C(qO) and R=D(qr(q,O)) 	 X(q.0) 
if 1dIqj: 
L-'>rela.y. CR(1.0.q) 	 R-'>relay. DR(1.q.s0 ) 	 ( 1.0.q) 
4—* in(t) 	L-'>CRI(d+ 1 .O.q) 	 R->DRI(d+ 1 .qf(tq.i.q.x)) 	£?(d+ 1,O.q) 
-* -.in(t) L_ t tIh(t)),CRO(drfl+  1 ,q) 	R tttDRo(d, q , g (t)) t'(d.m+ 1 .q) 
£(d,m.q) 	(CRI(d.m.q). DRI(d.q.t)) where tr(q/d,rn) and in(t) 
Lr>CR(d,m,q) 	 R->DR(dq.t) 	 (d.mq) 
L-'>re1ay. CR(1.0,q) 	 R-1>relay. DR(1.q.s 0 ) 	 ( 1,0,q) 
(d.m.q) 	(CRO(d.m.q). DRO(d.q.t)) 	where t=r(q/d,m) and -.in(t) 
L-CR(d.m,q) 	 R-#DR(d,q,t) 	 (d,m.q) 
L-7>relay. CR(l,Oq) 	 R-'>retay. DR(1,q,s 0 ) 	 ( 1,O.q) 




3.13 A specification (E) for the behaviour of P and S 
together 
P(s) 	if in(s) then.(t I(s). P1(s) + f. PF) 
else (t(j(s),h(s)). P0(g(s)) + f. PF) 
P1(s) Z voila(i,x). P(f(s,i,x)) + f. PF 	where i€I(s) 
P0(s) 4= ok. F(s) + f. PF 
PIP 4= dead. restart. P(s 0 ) 
S(d,q) 4= get L. SI(d,q,L) + mt. SF(q) 
SI(d,q,L) -t= if d = q+l then 	a1 x. SG(d, q:<i,x>) 
else SG(d, q) 
SG(d,q) <#= voila(q.i. q.x). S(d+l,q) + inf. SF(q) 
SF(q) 4= dead. relay. restart. S(l,q) 
In S(d,q) and its derivatives, d points to the next element to be sent to P. 
Figure 3-2 (reproduced for reference): Definitions of P and S 
E(q,$) 4= if in(s) then (T 1 . EG(q,$) + f. EF(q) + inf. EW(q,$)) 
else (it(j(s),h(s)). E0(q,g(s)) + f. EF(q) + inf. EW(qs)) 
EG(q,$) 4= 	(5)a X. EI(q:<i,x>, f(s,i,x)) + f. EGF(q,$) 
EI(q:<i,x>,$) 4= 	E(q:<i,x>,f(s,i,x)) + f. EF(q:<i,x> + inf. EW(q:<i,x>.$)) 
EGF(q,$) 4= a 1x. EF(q:<i,x>) 
E0(q,$) 4= ok. E(q,$) + f. EF(q) + inf. EWO(q,$) 
EW(qs) 4= if in(s) then f. ET(q) 
else (it(j(s),h(s)). EWO(q,g(s)) + f. ET(q)) 
EWO(q,$) 4= ok. EW(q,$) + f. ET(q) 
EF(q) 4= in)'. ET(q) 
ET(q) 4= -r dead  relay. restart  ER(l,q,s0) 
ER(dq,t) 4= if d=q+1 then E(q,t) 
else if in(t) then (T 
got* 
 ERI(d+l.qf(tq.i.q.x)) 
+ f. EF(q) + in)'. EW(q,t)) 
else (t(j(t),h(t)). ERO(d.q,g(t)) + f. EF(q) + inf. EW(q,t)) 
ERI(dq,t) 4= i- . 1 . ER(d,q.t) + f. EF(q) + in)'. EW(q,t) 
ERO(d,q,t) 4= ok. ER(d,q,t) + f. EF(q) + in)'. EWO(q.t) 
Figure 3-22: The definition of E 
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E(q,$)F 1 = if in(s) then ('r 1 . EG(q,$)F 1 + T,. EF(q)F 2 ) 
else (t(j(s).h(s)). EO(q,g(s))F 1 + Tf . EF(q)11F 2 ) 
EG(q,$)F 1 = 
;65) 	EI(q:<i,x>, f(s,l.x))11F 1 + 'r,. EGF(q,$)jF 2 
El(q:<i,x>,$)IF1 = •Tvr4Za E(q:czi,x>,f(s.l,x))F1 + 'r , ,• EF(q:'zi,x>)IF 2 
EGF(q,$)11F 2 = 	)a 1x. EF(q:<i,x>)IF 2 
EO(q.$)IF 1 = ok. E(q,$)(1F 1 + r. EF(q)F 2 
EF(q)F 2 = 1 (f  ET(q)jF 1 
ET(q)11F 1  = T 
dead 
 relay. Tresart• ER(1,q,s0)F1 
ER(d,q,t)flF 1 = if d=lql then E(q,t)F 1 
else if in(t) then (T i . ERI(d+1.q.f(tq.iq.x))IIF 1 + 'r1 . EF(q)F2 ) 
else (put(j(t),h(t)). ERO(d,q,g(t))IIF + r, ,. EF(q)F 2) 
ERI(d,q,t)F1 
= voiia ER(d,q,t)flF 1 + r,. EF(q)11F 2 
ERO(d,q,t)11F 1 = ok. ER(d,q,t)IIF + i- , ,. EF(q)IF2 
Figure 3-23: Proof of proposition 3.13.1 by algebra 
We have now finished the bulk of the proof, and have only a couple of routine 
steps left, to show that 
D(q,$) 
As usual, we will do this in' two steps, guessing a specification E(q,$) for 
P(s)IIS(qJ,q) and then showing (Proposition 3.13.1) that E(q,$)11F 1 D(q.$) and 
(Proposition 3.13.2) that our guess for E is correct. 
Proposition 3.13.1: Adding F to E gives us back D 
E(q,$)IF1 = D(q.$) 
Proof: As we can see from Fig. 3-22 and Fig. 3-20, E is very similar to D, 
and the proof goes through by simple if tedious algebra. We carry out the 
expansion of E(q,$)ljF 1 in Fig. 3-23, and we see by comparison with D that 
the two are the same. 
LU 
Proposition 3.13.2: E describes the behaviour of P and S together 
E(q,$) 	P(s)IIS(IqI+1.q) 
Proof: By strong bisimulation, Fig. 3-24. 
U] 
This brings us to the end of our proof that FTS is equivalent to P. 
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.N(q,$) (E(q.$). P(s)IIS(IqI+l.q)) 
—* in(s) L-'>EG(q,$) 
E—* -'in(s) L 	i(3I.h( > Eo( q , g ( s )) 
-(---3 	L>EF(q) 
L->EW(q,$) 
R-'>PI(s)IISI(IqI + 1 ,q,I(s)) 	 (q,$) 
R 	 + 1 ,q) 	V(q,g(s)) 
R1>PFIS(IqI+1,q) 	 5(q) 
R->P(s)SF(q) 	 W(q.$) 
1-1 (q. s) (EG(q.$). PI(s)IISI(IqI+1.qJ(s))) where in(s) 
(-3 Vi€1(s) L—'->EI(q:<i,x>,$) 	 R—PI(s)SG(Iq+ 1 ,q: <Lx>) 	J(q:<i,x>,$) 
L>EGF(q,$) 	 RJ>PFS1(q+ 1 ,q,I(s)) 	 5(q, s) 
.Y(q:<i.x>,$) (EI(q:<i.x>,$). PI(s)flSG(q+ 1 q:zi,x>)) where in(s) 
L-'>E(q:<i.x>,f(s,i,x)) 
R-'>P(f(s,i,x))IIS(q+ 1 .q:<i,x>) 	 X(q:<i.x>,f(s.i.x)) 
L-t>EF(q:<i,x>) 	 R-t>PFISG(qI+ 1 ,q:<ix>) 
L->EW(q:<i,x>,$) 	 R->P1(s)IISF(q: <ix>) 	W(q:<i,x>,$) 
C(q.$) (Eo(q.$). PO(s)IIS(Iq+ 1 , q)) 
L-E(q,$) 	 R-P(s)IS(qI+ 1,q) 	 X(q,$) 
L->EF(q) 	 R-t>PFflS(Iq+1,q) 	 5(q) 
L-4EWO(q,$) 	 R->PO(s)flSF(q) 	 W(q,$) 
5(q) (EF(q). PFIIS(d.q)) 	Vd 1dq+1 
L->ET(q) 	 R->PFSF(q) 	 5(q) 
Y!5 (q) (EF(q), PFIISG(d.q)) 	Vd 1<d<q+1 
L->ET(q) 	 R->PFIISF(q) 	 5(q) 
5(q.$) (EGF(q,$), PFIISI(IqI+1.q.I(s))) where in(s) 
4-3 ViEl(s) L-->EF(q:<ix>,$) 	 R—PFISG(q+ 1 .q:<i,x>) 	5(q:<i,x>) 
Figure 3-24: Proof of Proposition 3.13.2 by strong bisimulation 
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V(q,$) (Ew(q.$), P(s)DSF(q)) 
L>ET(q) 
—* -'in(s) L t ((Sl.h( I ) l>Ewo( qg ( s )) 
IVII(q.$) (EWO(q.$). PO(s)IISF(q)) 
L>ET(q) 
E—+-in(s) L-EW(q,$) 
RJ> PFSF( q ) 	 3(q) 
R 
	
WC (q.g (s)) 
R>PF 11SF ( q) 
	
ff(q) 
R- P ( s)  11SF ( q) 
	
W(q,$) 
5(q) (ET(q,$). PFIJSF(q)) 
L-1dec5 relay. 1 restart  ER(1,q,s0) 
R 	relay. T
restart P(s0)IS(l,q) 
.*(d.q,t) (ER(q,t), P(t)IIS(d.q)) 
	
d=q+1 	L=E(qt) and R = P(t)S(Iqj+1.q) 
else: 
in(t) 	L-'>ERI(d+ 1 .qf(t.q.i.q.x)) 
R_!>PI(t)jSI(d,q,I(t)) = PI(t)SG(d,q) 
'- -'in(t) L it(i(tl.h(t)l> ERo(d qg (t)) 
R 
- 	L-t>EF(q) 	 R_t>PFJS(d,q) 
L-'>EW(q,t) 	 R-'>P(t)SF(q) 
J(d,q,t) (ERI(d+1 .q.f(tqi.q.x)). PI(t)IISG(d.q)) where in(t) 
L-'>ER(d+1.q.f(t.q.1q.x)) 
R-I>P(f(tq.i.q.x))llS(d + 1, q)  
L->EF(q) 	 RJ>PFJSG(d,q) 
L->EW(q,t) 	 R->PI(t)jSF(q) 
(1.q,s 0) 
X(q,t) 




.(d+ 1 .q.f(t.q.i,q.x)) 
W(q.t) 
C(d,q.t) (ERO(d.q,t), PO(t)IIS(d.q)) 
L-ER(d,q,t) 	 R-P(t)IIS(d,q) 
	
(d.q.t) 
L-t>EF(q) 	 RJ>PFS(d,q) 
	
(q) 
L-'>EWO(q,t) 	 R->PO(t)ISF(q) 
	
1Vt(q,t) 
Figure 3-24 (contd.): Proof of Proposition 3.13.2 by strong bisirnulation 
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3.14 Notes 
Let us compare our second example and proof with our first example. We 
discuss first all the steps upto Pt CIIDS ,  to use our present notation, and then 
the rest of each proof. 
In the first proof, all the steps upto P 	CIIDS were combined into one much 
larger bisimulation. The intent of that bisimulation could be seen clearly enough 
from the accompanying state diagram, but it was otherwise much more 
complicated. 
In the new proof, we have broken this bisimulation down into several steps. 
In particular, we separated out the parts that had to be done by weak 
bisirnulation, the infinite chatter captured in Proposition 3.4.2, the equivalence 
of all recovery states (Proposition 3.6.1), and filling in temporal detail 
(Proposition 3.10.1). 
There is a fair amount of data transformation, all proved by strong 
bisimulation, and facilitated by inductive definitions of auxiliary functions r and 
- u. (Propositions 3.5.1, 3.8.1 and 3.9.2). 
The remainder of this first stage is algebra (Propositions 3.6.2 and 3.11.2). 
This algebra is facilitated by the definition of o, which ties up the behaviour of 
the counters used by DS with the history of C. These links are essentially 
consistency constraints on the parameters, and they allow us to have a simple 
structure for our agents. This consistency is what allows us to separate DS out 
by just simple algebra. (One of our earlier proofs encapsulated these various 
consistency constraints into one large data structure, a "fat" history queue that 
held not only the contents of q, but also states, output values, etc. and we had 
just one constraint: that the queues had to be "nice"). 
It is worth noting both the symmetries and the asymmetries of B, as well as 
the places where B and C differ in form. Basically, C has to distinguish between 
input and output instead of representing both by 's as B does. But C does not 
have a state CP corresponding to BP. This distinction, as to whether the occurs 
before or after the failure, is hidden in DS, and is not visible to C. 
The rest of the proof consists of showing that our guessed specification C for 
PISIF is correct. In both proofs, we make a guessed specification (called E here) 
for PIS, and separate F out by simple algebra. The correctness of E is also 
proved similarly in the two examples, by a long but straightforward bisirnulation. 
So the remaining new features are Proposition 3.12.1, which proves that recovery 
can stop when there are only output states left, and Proposition 3.12.2, which 
does a last data transformation from the history representation (q,c) to the (q,$) 
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representation used by PS. The first of these does not appear in our earlier 
example, because there recovery never went beyond the last input state, and 




We have found one simple way to model failure in CCS. and discovered some 
important aspects of fault recovery by stable storage, including the fact that the 
intuitively clear "equivalence" between FTS and P t is in fact observational 
equivalence, rather a surprising result at first sight, because this is a very 
strong equivalence. 
In fact, we have found that observational equivalence is particularly suited to 
describing the relation between the two. Foe example, the two systems are not 
equivalent under a testing equivalence because of the infinite chatter possible 
for the FTS. Testing equivalences are capable of distinguishing infinite chatter. 
Except for this one situation, observational equivalence is generally stronger 
than testing equivalences. Thus our example allows us to use a strong relation 
(it would be unsatisfactory to describe' it in terms of generally weaker relations), 
which happens to be lax in just the one case that we need. 
The proof is very long, and we have discovered that we can apply some 
standard mathematical techniques to help. We have not learnt anything new 
about CCS, but we have developed some new notation which, together with the 
structured decomposition used, makes it possible to do a proof that was 
previously quite unmanageable. 
We have applied some of these techniques to a few other (much simpler) 
proofs. Perhaps the most important is the simplest, indexing (or 
parametrisation). Together with our layout and notation for bisirnulation, this 
turns out to be quite powerful. We have aplied it to a simple system (the 
"man-hammer" example from [Milner 83b]) for which {Sanderson 82] gave the 
first proof. The bisimulation, generated by his algorithm, consists of some 40 
pairs. We now have a bisirnulation of 9 pairs, using indexing. Not only is the new 
proof shorter, the individual pairs are also more readable, and the indexing 
captures much of the symmetry in the example. 
Our technique of guessing refinements of specifications step by step applies 
stepwise refinement to the proof rather than to the program. It is not obvious 
for example, how we can derive P and S from E, or how to derive DS from B, 
even if we regarded the rest of the proof as putting more and more detail into a 
program. In any case, this is a most useful technique. In particular, it shows 
that we can often isolate strong bisimulations out of a larger weak bisirnulation. 
We notice that correctness of data transformation (often appearing in the 
guise of the standard mathematical technique of changing parameters) can be 
proved by strong bisirnulation. This is a modern version of ideas that were 
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discussed long ago. [Milner 72]. 
It has been remarked [Milner 63b] that bisimulation is the counterpart of the 
invariant for a loop. We have several examples of relations being preserved 
between the two agents in a bisimulation. Two other interesting features we have 
noticed are that we can combine proof of equivalence with proof of well 
definedness of one of the agents, and that an inductive definition of the relation 
between the agents goes well with bisimulation. 
We have already mentioned our conclusion about proof checkers: it appears 
that a useful proof checker for CCS proofs is likely to be a general 
mathematician's assistant, with only a little CCS specific knowledge built into it. 
An insufficiently sophisticated tool can actually be a hindrance. If we had 
succeeded in building a proof checker that confirmed all of our first proof, we 
might not have gone on to discover the rather more elegant techniques we use 
in the second. This is not a philosophy of salvation through unnecessary 
hardship. We are pointing out that we might have abandoned our proof to the 
realm of large mechanical manipulation, not realising that we could convert it to 
more understandable mathematics. 
However, we should mention that a major problem with such large proofs is 
that of maintaining any degree of confidence in their correctness. What we 
present here in section 3 is in fact the fifth or sixth version of the proof of the 
second system, and the difference between one version and a later one is best 
described as "greater believability". We leave it to the reader to imagine what 
the earlier proofs looked like. 
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5. Future work 
We would like to see the proof simplified further: we have surely not yet put 
it as simply as possible; it might even be that with a different framework we can 
get an elegant proof of only a few pages. 
We would like to extend the proof to handle checkpoints. There are also 
variations that might be of interest: can we separate out the components in a 
different order, for example, and would that yield a simpler proof? 
It would be nice to have a few more such examples, both in order to develop 
the proof techniques further, perhaps even to discover a few general facts, and 
in order to have a broader base of examples to study fault tolerance. But the 
effort required to develop the proofs, and the comparatively meager returns, 
make it unlikely that we will have a sizeable collection in the near future. It is 
likely to be more immediately profitable to study other formulations of failure 
and fault tolerance applied to the same problem in the hope of exploiting our 
understanding of it and possibly even similarities in the proof. 
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